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Adviser: Professor Andrew Polsky 
This study examines how Political Entrepreneurs in the United States Congress responded to 
human rights abuses in six countries during the 1970s and 1980s: Cambodia, El Salvador, South 
Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and Uganda. It presents a four-point model for approaching 
the study of United States human rights policy. The key element in all the cases is bonding social 
capital, also called affective politics. American policy towards the Soviet Union and Uganda 
both demonstrate the integration of international, transnational, and domestic politics. Taiwan 
receives special attention because U.S. Taiwan policy continues to exemplify the integration of 
international relations, transnational relations, and domestic politics.  
 
The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) represents Taiwanese-Americans who care 
about promoting democracy on Taiwan and, ultimately, Taiwan’s legal status as an independent 
country. FAPA cultivates and sustains relationships with members of Congress and their staff to 
create the Taiwan Caucus in the House and Senate, second in influence only to the Israel Caucus, 
which is cultivated by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). This study 
investigates how the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) learned, in part from AIPAC, to 
become politically viable as an ethnic lobby in the 1980s after limited success in the 1960s and 
1970s, despite lacking the voting power and financial resources of Jewish-Americans.  
 
 v 
This study examines how bonding social capital (affective politics) is used to compensate for 
deficiencies in financial capital and voting power (rational politics), thus creating the political 
capital that political entrepreneurs use to shape U.S. foreign policy. Political entrepreneurs 
include citizens, congressional staff, and members of Congress, who have an impact on U.S. 
foreign policy that is greater than we would expect if we studied their resources by using only a 
rational choice framework. This study demonstrates that scholars of international relations, 
transnational politics and American politics can analyze the biographies of political 


















For this section I am going to tell the story of the past 35 years. If I don’t tell it, no one will. 
 
This dissertation started, in a sense, the day I was born: January 2, 1976. I was the love child of 
two Hippie parents: my father Clay Adams (“Black Man Clay”) and my mother Vivian 
Swearingen (“Vivian the White Woman”). He was a black retired United States Air Force 
Officer who had spent 20 years as a technical sergeant. He left the Air Force after returning from 
Vietnam. She was a white college graduate, 15 years his junior, who had recently moved out to 
the west coast of the United States from Indiana and Ohio. As a liberated woman, my mother 
chose not to marry my father. They also gave me a name that was unconventional: “Marriah”, 
meaning “the wind”, and “Star”, because they wanted me to be a Star in everything I do. This is 
normal for Hippie culture: my sister is named Crystal Sunshine Star. This unique name helped 
me identify as a “flower child.” I was normal in the Hippie community of the American West, 
but different in other environments. This feeling of being different has stayed with me over 27 
years of living in other environments, and has influenced my approach to research and thinking 
about the world. It has convinced me that, solely because of my name, I must make a unique 
contribution to society, a contribution that builds on the Hippie critiques of Western society 
while accepting the benefits of Western society. This dissertation is one element of that 
contribution.  
 
My father left behind his first family to go on his Hippie journey. His first wife, Veda Adams, 
had four children: Albert, Sandra, Anthony, and Alton. My father’s exodus started a chain 
reaction of events that has culminated, 35 years later, in me, his middle son out of nine children 
completing a Ph.D. Veda succumbed to paranoid schizophrenia and her three male children 
eventually followed. As I moved around the country with my parents, living occasionally in a 
car, a teepee, a friend’s house, and other places in the Rocky Mountains and the Mohave Desert, 
my older brothers turned to drugs, gangs, and crime as coping mechanisms. I knew at the age of 
8 that my life had to go in the opposite direction. I entered public school at that age and vowed 
that I would create a new pattern for my family. It is because of this long-term effort that I 
identify with the political entrepreneurs examined in this dissertation. It takes one to know one! 
 
27 years later, on the exact day I called my stepmother to tell her I finished writing my 
dissertation, my older brother Albert went to my father asking for money and help because he 
had stopped taking his medications. My father had no choice but to call the police to put Albert 
in prison. As I completed editing my dissertation, my father and stepmother searched for ways to 
put Albert into a hospital so that he would not endanger himself or other people. My father told 
me that mental illness has plagued his first family since he was in Vietnam, and likely affects his 
extended family as well.  
 
Nothing has changed. I was in junior high in 1989 when Albert first became a menace to my 
family. I remember when the police came to Albert when he was intruding in my father’s house, 
where I lived with Alton, Sandra and Anthony. Albert could not remember his name and he did 
not know what time of the year it was. He was placed in a hospital. Five years later I celebrated 
getting accepted to Harvard in June 1994. I sat around a camp fire one night with my brother 
Alton as we talked about how bright my future surely was. I told him that, since I had 
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accomplished this great thing, I wanted him to succeed as well. He told me that he knew within 
five years, by the time he was 40, he would have $10,000. He did not know how he would do 
this, but he was sure he would be rich. That was the last night I saw him. He is currently living 
homeless on the streets. Alton had a run-in with the police, which triggered his paranoia, 
followed by time in a group home. My sister Amber last saw him homeless as she walked to her 
college graduation in 2009.  
 
My siblings have shaped, for better and worse, my entire academic career. It breaks my heart 
every time I think about them. It was because of them that I refused to give up when my studies 
seemed too difficult. I knew I had to be the example for my younger brothers and sisters to 
follow if they also wished to avoid a life of homelessness, drugs, gangs and prison. The Hippie 
drug culture I grew up in, and the shadow of mental illness in my family, motivated me to 
constantly verify and measure reality. I had to convince myself that I was neither stoned nor 
mentally ill if I accepted an argument within academia. This has helped me be comprehensive 
and thorough as a researcher, always challenging my own assumptions.  
 
In the past 20 years, thanks both to my example and the positive values instilled by my parents, I 
have seen my sister Crystal complete her college education, followed by Amber. Ava is currently 
embarking on the school of life, developing a range of practical skills that will always help her 
and other people. My youngest sibling, Austin, is embarking on the same promising academic 
path that I started at the same high school I attended. He is the same distance from me (4 
siblings) that I am from my brother Albert. However, instead of trying to avoid mental illness 
and drug abuse, Austin can be a healthy, normal teenager -- the kind I never had the freedom to 
be. My academic efforts for the past 25 years have been my gift to them. 
 
This dissertation is, in a very real sense, my love letter to them. I dedicate this dissertation to 
them because they taught me that, no matter how educated I get, I must be a voice and an 
advocate for the sick, the abused, the weak, the drug-addicted, and all other people who have 
been cast aside by a supposedly affluent society. I owe a debt of gratitude to Stephen J. Dubner 
for writing about the life of Harvard Professor Roland G. Fryer Jr. in “Toward a Unified Theory 
of Black America” (New York Times Magazine, March 20, 2005). Fryer proved that other at-risk 
black males can turn their lives around, just like he and I did.  
 
It has taken me 20 years to place my life on the proper academic foundations. In 1992, after my 
sophomore year of high school, I realized that I had become lazy and undisciplined. I thought I 
had built the necessary academic foundations for my life in junior high and my first two years of 
high school. However, in August 1992 I discovered that these foundations were crumbling 
beneath me. For four years I had seen my friends get involved with street gangs and drugs, saw 
gang signs spring up around my neighborhood, and gang activity in both my junior high school 
(Miles Exploratory Learning Center) and my high school (Amphitheater). I was a staff writer on 
my high school newspaper as it did one story after another on gang members, gang violence, 
drug sales, and the ongoing battle between the Crips and the Bloods. Every night I watched a 
news report about drive-by shootings between rival gangs, with young black and Hispanic kids 
being killed by stray bullets. I saw stories about drug overdoses, teenagers dying before they 
made it to college. In my home town gang activity was nearly everywhere. My high school had 
to close its campus in 1992 because the gang violence was getting so severe that it was claiming 
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the lives of students. I spent half of my time in "regular" classes, overhearing black and Hispanic 
students talking about their gang activities while they earned Bs and Cs on homework, and the 
other half of my time in "advanced" classes surrounded by white and Asian students talking 
about their perfect grade point averages while discussing class work. I knew where I wanted to 
be.  
 
The year from September 1991 to September 1992 was critical for me. It divides my life into 
“before” and “after.” It was during this year that I became very aware of my prospects for a 
happy and successful life. I realized that, even though I was racially mixed, I was considered 
African-American under the one-drop-of-blood theory. I watched Boyz n the Hood and realized 
that most young African-American males ended up dead or in prison. I listened to Body Count, 
with its song “Cop Killer”, and realized just how dangerous the world was for people of my 
ethnicity and gender. I listened to Ice T talking about the fact that more black males were in 
prison than in college. I listened to Easy-E and learned about the life of a gangster through 
Gangsta Rap. I watched the television as Rodney King was beat by white police officers and Los 
Angeles burst into flames during race riots after the officers were acquitted. The riots 
overwhelmed me emotionally. I watched Grand Canyon and realized that the biggest problems 
American society faced involved race and poverty.  
 
Between September 1991 and May 1992 my high school grades fell from A’s to B’s and C’s. I 
feared the worst: That I would end up dead or in prison, mentally ill, a drug addict, and 
homeless. I had changed my self-perception from being the smartest person in the room to being 
the most stupid. The bad grades had that effect on my psyche and self-esteem. I felt ridiculed by 
everyone around me for the first time in my life and I thought my life would be over if I did 
nothing to save myself. Yet, my daily habits were not intelligent. My life revolved around video 
games, watching television sitcoms almost all the time, watching horror movies and reading 
comic books. I knew I had to transform myself completely if I hoped to escape my environment.  
 
I made a choice. I gave up the friends and lifestyle that I associated with the ridicule, the 
mockery, and the bad grades. I vowed to get only A’s after that year. I killed the person I had 
been and gave birth to a new, very serious, very intellectual personality. I entered survival mode. 
I stopped listening to “Gangsta rap.” I stopped “hanging out” with my friends in high school and 
in the Boy Scouts. I stopped spending time with my family. I stopped playing video games, 
reading comic books, watching television, and watching horror movies. I went cold turkey. I 
stopped living during the day. I started studying non-stop, mostly at night. My life became the 
“life of the mind,” between 10 pm and 6 am, and my friends became books. I read politics, 
history, psychology, economics, philosophy, English literature, science, mathematics, and 
anything else I found interesting as the best way to train my brain and myself. I forced myself to 
think in completely different ways, to replace all of my mundane thoughts with intelligent 
analysis. I dissected fictional books, TV shows, movies, and songs (mostly from the 1960’s) for 
philosophical themes. I owe a huge debt to my therapist at that time, Jean Ware, who helped me 
remember during my junior year of high school that there is more to life than reading books. 
There is also spontaneity and fellowship in a loving community.  
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In September 1992 I was starting from nothing. The person I had been no longer existed. The 
person I am today did not yet exist. I had only emptiness, fear for my future and dread for the 
present inside me. I looked for signs of hope anywhere I could find it.  
 
I shifted my circadian rhythms. I stopped waking up at 6 am and going to bed at 10 pm or 
midnight. Instead, I pushed myself to be awake for 48 straight hours until I physically collapsed. 
By December of 1992 I measured myself getting a total of 8 hours of sleep between Monday and 
Friday. I learned I could function very well on 3 to 4 hours of sleep per night. That has been my 
pattern for 20 straight years. At the time I knew this was abnormal and unhealthy. My 
stepmother reminded my constantly to get more sleep. However, as I looked ahead to the next 20 
years – essentially to this year, 2011 – I realized that I could not get through the years of 
studying if I went back to my former personality. I had to sacrifice my body and my comfort to 
develop my mind.  
 
By November 1992, I started calling 1992 the “year of change” to correspond with Bill Clinton’s 
campaign theme and I increasingly turned my attention to politics. This was my first true 
political awakening. I turned for inspiration to such stories as Flowers for Algernon. I knew my 
only chance for success was for me to develop my mind, and that could happen only if I 
crammed as many books into my brain as I could read and remember. Wendelyn “Wende” Julien 
and other top students who were a year ahead of me (class of 1993) became my inspiration after I 
changed, and I owe them my gratitude. Greg Arnold helped me get excited about Algebra and 
Trigonometry, and wrote letters of recommendation. Karen Jocame helped me get into the 
REACH program. Teresa McCrory instilled in me a passion for art and culture. My classmates 
Matthew Scrivner and Sarah Taylor inspired me to keep writing.  
 
Thanks to Sam Caruso who sparked my passion for American History. His class gave me the 
foundation for reconstructing my mind by helping me to develop my memory. I was in his class 
in January 1993 as we were discussing the Progressive Era in the United States, in particular 
muckraking journalism. After we talked about Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel “The Jungle”, Mr. 
Caruso referred to this book as the Bible of the Progressive Movement because its important role 
in American History. He then asked the class, “What is the Bible of the Native American Rights 
Movement?” In that class, whoever spoke first became an intellectual hero. I rarely spoke first, if 
at all. We had covered Native American rights in November 1992. Immediately after he asked 
this question I formed a clear mental picture of the book he was talking about: “A Century of 
Dishonor” written by Helen Hunt Jackson in 1881. I was the first to speak and Mr. Caruso 
nodded his approval. I realized from that point on that I have a photographic memory. All the 
reading I had done since September 1992 gave me instant recall of the exact paragraph on any 
page. In order to remember something, I simply recall the page as an image in my mind and read 
the paragraph or sentence that I want to remember. I have since developed the ability to read 
what I remember and to compose paragraphs mentally. When I sit down to type what I have 
written in my mind, the only remaining challenge is mechanically transforming the mental image 
into a digital image on a screen.  
 
That was one day of lucidity and perfect clarity. I would have two or three lucid days every 
week. The rest would often be cloudy as I swam in a pool of despair and anxiety. Another day of 
crystal clarity came in April 1993. It started again with AP American History. We had taken a 
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Mock AP American History test. I received the score back – 88 points out of 100. I was 
disappointed that I had not achieved 90 points, but Mr. Caruso had written on the bottom, “You 
are a strong writer. I encourage you to take the AP American History exam.” Based on this note I 
registered for the test. On the morning of the test, in the middle of May, I completed reading 
every page of the American History book and immediately walked to the designated classroom 
to take the test. With everything fresh in my mind I finished the test early with a strong sense of 
energy. It is because of Mr. Caruso’s class that I was able to achieve the top score, a 5, on the AP 
American History test. When I saw Mr. Caruso in the library in September 1993 he told me 
“You are the elite of the elite.” I was shocked. I assumed most students had earned a 5. He said 
“You are one of only two students in the entire school to earn a 5 on the test.” It is my 
knowledge of American History, and my passion for analyzing it, that gives me the ability to 
remember the past 35 years of my life.  
 
Thanks to Bill Bendt who sparked my passion for political theory. Thanks to Cheryl Lockhart 
who sparked my passion for literature and helped me respect all things from William 
Shakespeare. Thanks to Rick Shorrock for giving me a passion for photography. Thanks to Jim 
Vinal for leading me through a great experience at Amphi Town. Thanks to Kelly DeForge, 
Brandon Gallego and Kim Lomanaco for helping to make Amphi Town so memorable.  
 
Special thanks to Patricia Childers, who helped me discover that I had academic talent when I 
was in 7th grade. I met with her and Omar Moreno at their flower shop in Summer 2002, before I 
started graduate school. They both told me about the sad fates of most of my classmates in junior 
high. Most of my friends were, by that time, dead, killed by the Mexican drug gangs, or in jail. It 
was Mrs. Childers who not only helped me survive a similar fate, but helped me realize that I am 
a survivor, and that I must never forget the people I left behind.  
 
Thanks to Claire Torre who helped restore my academic confidence when I became editor-in-
chief of the Desert Gazette Alternative in high school. Thanks to Aminifu and Bah Kaburou, 
Patrick Hruby, Daniel Telles, Rose and Tim Do, Pablo Pinheiro, Angelo Lopes, John Steen, 
Mike Brunson, Stephanie Brunson, Christopher Brooks, Muriel Brooks, Mark Braun, Mike 
Preble, Cara Hughes, Jason Bushmire, Steven Nagel, Jessica Biagi, Kendra Kaye, Chris Kreulen, 
Kyle Herman, Peter Lee, Alexandra Fisher, Julia Hunt, Amanda Kelley, Richard McKay, Sky 
Watson, Marta DeLeon, Lea McLaughlin, Cynthia Floyd, Julie Moen, Audrey Saxton, Mark 
Templin, Kirpal Johnson, Dan Myrmo, Nhan Nguyen, Oscar Ho, Jason Stasiak, Emerson 
Whitley, Joe Legros, Lena Amanti, Adam Hall, Jacob Hall, Adam Taylor, Saundra Taylor, Mike 
Oranski, Randy Karger, Phillip Kim, Jennie Lascelle, Kat James, Jason Misner, Brad Sokal, 
Tony Gomez, Taren Hines, Shiho Yoshinara, Jennifer Barbuscia, and Danielle Rhodes for giving 
me the motivation to continue my education over the past 20 years.  
 
Thanks to God, who helped me be at the very bottom of the list of the top 10% of high school 
students in September 1992. That list generated a letter to me from my counselor, Beverly Dutz, 
who told me that she could get me into Cornell Summer School, with the help of Cornell 
graduate Sally Shumaker. Over the next nine months I earned A’s in all my classes, top scores on 
AP tests, and a full scholarship to Cornell for the summer. Thanks to Nancy Evans, who replaced 
Mrs. Dutz in September 1993 and helped me get into Harvard. Over the past 20 years I have 
realized how much God, The Universe, Spirit, or some kind of intelligent force helped me at 
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critical times in my life. It was God who, in October 1997, placed me next to Maria Mitreva, a 
Bulgarian student at the Intercollegiate Model United Nations conference at Yale, who led me to 
my wife. It was God who gave me enough time to avoid being under the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001. It was God who kept Rep. Stephen Solarz alive long enough for me to 
contact him and read his memoirs.  
 
Thanks to Professor Marc Busch who taught “International Conflict and Cooperation” during my 
senior year at Harvard. It was this class that gave me a passion for game theory, rational choice 
analysis, and international relations theory. It was because of this class that my first two years at 
CUNY Graduate Center were so easy. Thanks to Lawrence Hamlet for serving as my thesis 
adviser at Harvard as I researched Social Capital on the Internet. Thanks to Robert Putnam for 
writing “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, Making 
Democracy Work and Bowling Alone. His ideas on game theory and social capital are the 
foundation for this study.  
 
I decided to enter graduate school on September 11, 2001. I was in Washington Square Park that 
day and saw both of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center fall. Apart from the 
psychological scars that experience gave me (it took me ten years to talk about it without crying) 
I also realized that the world had changed. That event gave me a deep yearning to investigate 
how international relations in the 21st century worked. Thus, I started graduate school with a 
single question in mind: How does the world actually work? I had taken three years after my 
college graduation to explore this question in New York City. I had written hundreds of personal 
essays in those three years as I tackled this question daily. I approached this question from a 
variety of perspectives: my life experience, philosophy, psychology, politics, economics, 
spirituality, anthropology, historical examination, and literary analysis. I tried to include micro 
perspectives and macro perspectives.  
 
By the time I started attending classes at CUNY, I knew I needed theoretical grounding for 
answering the question, “How does the world actually work?” I started with a focus on 
international relations and foreign policy because I had already studied American politics 
extensively. I had no interest in studying Congress. Moreover, I assumed most decisions at the 
international level involved rational analysis of structural constraints. When my colleagues 
talked about human rights I ignored it because I assumed human rights concerns were 
unenforceable at the international level. I started my research on this question -- “How does the 
world actually work?” -- with the aim to update Kenneth Waltz’s Structural Realism with a more 
comprehensive view of the world. Specifically, I wanted to bridge the gap between domestic 
politics, foreign policy, and the international system. Over nine years of research and thinking, I 
discovered that Congress is where all the action occurs, and most of the international action 
during the 1970s and 1980s was driven by human rights concerns. Contrary to my assumption 
that human rights concerns were unenforceable, I learned that human rights can easily be 
enforced through congressional resolutions and legislation. This has been the shock of my 
graduate education. My assumptions about how the world works were contradicted by my 
research.   
 
Thanks to Nancy Lublin, CEO of Do Something, and Prof. John Davenport of Fordham 
University for writing the recommendation letters that secured my admission to CUNY in Spring 
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2002. Thanks to Michael Sharpe for his wonderful friendship since my very first day at CUNY 
Graduate Center. He helped guide my dissertation in the proposal phase because our research 
interests overlap so much. Thanks to Darren Jaime, Bharati Kemraj, David Lesch, and all the 
people at Bronxnet for giving me a taste for being on television. Thanks also to Jamie Aroosi, 
Douglas Medina, Miriam Jimenez, Antoinette Raquiza, Daniel Skinner, Arthur Beckman, 
Paulette Southall Weiss, Philip Lowry, Chris Poulios, Arto Artinian, Karen Young, Toni Pole, 
Kristin Prince, Jonathan Keller, Nirit Ben-Ari, Jason Schulman, Victoria Allen, Maggie Gray, 
Margaret Groarke, Bobbi Gentry, Aida Hassenpappa, Letizia Paolini, Jamie Chandler, Annelies 
Kamran, Kenn Vance, Patrizia Nobbe, Aleta Styer, Robert Biondi, Margaret Turner, Sally 
Bermanzohn, June Speakman, Jose Cruz, Judy Duncker, and Desi Duncker for their support and 
friendship during nine years of graduate work. Thanks to Clarence Davis for helping me to plan 
my post-Ph.D. life. Thanks to Thomas Weiss for being my adviser for Levels I and II. Thanks to 
Marshall Berman, Leonard Markovitz, Tom Hattori, Vince Boudreau, Howard Lentner, the late 
Asher Arian, and John Harbeson for teaching great classes and providing me with a wonderful 
graduate experience.  
 
I owe my adviser, Andrew Polsky, a huge debt and gratitude because he became my only link to 
my dissertation and CUNY for the majority of the writing. Without his guidance for the past 18 
months I would not be here today. I owe Yan Sun, my former adviser, and current reader, an 
even greater debt because she helped me to initially understand Taiwan’s position in 
international relations. She was very respectful and tolerant as I experimented with different 
theoretical approaches to Taiwan until I found the best one. Thanks to Robert Hathaway for 
telling me about the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in the early stages of my proposal, 
and then, four years later, connecting me with Rep. Solarz. Thanks to Professors Peter Liberman 
and Janice Bockmeyer for sitting on my original committee. Thanks to Professor Charles Tien 
for serving as the Congress expert on my final committee.  
 
Thanks to Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia University for sitting on my proposal 
committee and suggesting I interview Edward Friedman. Thanks to Harvard’s Institute of 
Politics for hiring Rep. Jim Leach as a temporary director just in time for me to interview him. 
Thanks to Fulton Armstrong for telling me about the “Beyond Formosa Betrayed” Symposium, 
where I collected so much research. Thanks to Professor Brian Conley of Suffolk University who 
told me about Rep. Moakley and El Salvador. Thanks for Robert Ross, Robert Sutter, Pei-ti Lien, 
Nancy Soderberg, Cindy Fogleman (nee Sprunger), Coen Blaauw, and Michael Fonte for 
agreeing to share their time with me. Thanks to Mrs. Claiborne Pell for helping me get in touch 
with Thomas Hughes. When this research began, Rep. Solarz, Sen. Pell, and Sen. Kennedy were 
all alive. They have all passed away. Thanks to Rep. Solarz for sharing his unpublished memoirs 
with me.  
 
My 20-year-old academic journey has been shaped by a series of many amazing women (and a 
few men) in my life. The most amazing woman I know is my wife, Kremena, who struggled as a 
first-generation Bulgarian immigrant against her own dysfunctional family drama to attend 
medical school in the United States. When she started, she had no friends or family, and she was 
sick. In 16 years she has gone from the very bottom of the higher education ladder, Butler 
Community College in Wichita, Kansas, to the very top as a Pathology Resident at Harvard 
University’s Brigham and Women’s Hospital. I owe my wife everything because her practical 
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sense and love saved me from going into financial ruin after college. Without her, I would likely 
be homeless today. Instead, because of her I live around beauty. My wife convinced me to pay 
off my college debts before going to graduate school. She convinced me to start teaching after 
only a year of graduate study. She taught me the wonders of traveling abroad when I knew only 
how to travel through books. She taught me what a healthy, functional, loving family is really 
like. She gave me the time I needed to finish this research.  
 
Thanks to my stepmother, Anne. I did not realize how valuable she was in my life until the past 
five years as I struggled, sometimes unsuccessfully, to balance parenting my two young children 
with teaching classes and completing my dissertation. I knew at age 8 that she was special 
because she alone offered me stability when my life had been otherwise chaotic. She created a 
secure home that helped me develop my academic skills. Thanks to Jasmine Sante for helping 
me rediscover my stepmother.  
 
Thanks to my mom, Vivian, who became the other half of my brain for 15 years (1992-2007). 
Once I decided to become serious about my education, my mother helped me become the scholar 
I am today. We have had countless conversations about politics and spirituality for the past 20 
years, and we will have countless more. It was Vivian who helped me restore my confidence in 
my academic abilities after I thought I lost them in high school. It was Vivian who let me live at 
her house in the desert, rent-free, for 1996 while I retreated from the blizzards of Boston and 
became a security guard in Tucson. During 1996 I had the freedom to explore and think. I could 
concentrate for days, weeks, and months on a topic. This ability to concentrate for very long 
periods of time -- years and decades -- on a single question has proved valuable for completing 
this research and confronting many other issues every day. My mom's constant stories about her 
years as a feminist and anti-war activist in the late 1960s and 70s gave me the energy to study 
American history. It is because of her that I appreciate the contributions of Baby Boomers to the 
United States. The Baby Boomers bequeathed us the raw numbers that made the Civil Rights, 
Women's Rights, and Anti-War movements successful.  
 
Thanks to my father, Clay, who introduced me to the joys of artistic fellowship and spiritual 
philosophy. He has been my role model for how to live with his playfulness, generosity, 
accessibility, and willingness to help anyone with any problem.  
 
Thanks to Heather Clayton Staker for her wonderful friendship over 17 years, from our first 
Spanish class together at Harvard to babysitting my daughter while my wife gave birth to my 
son. Heather has been a constant intellectual companion in my life, and a true friend, offering her 
fellowship and family to complement my own. Thanks to Mike and Jessica Mladineo for their 
friendship.  
 
Thanks to Colin Kegler and Khalid Brathwaite for being intellectual sparring partners at 
Harvard. Their knowledge and rigorous examinations of life helped prepare me for graduate 
study. Thanks to Miriam Burgos, Virginia Barnhill, Sarah Ellis, Christine Folch, Matthew Peed, 
Billy Moss, Dakota Pippins, Jennifer Diebel, Megan White Mukuria, Thomas Kim, Trajan 
McGill, and Sandrine Goffard, who gave me spiritual grounding in college. Thanks to Robert 
Hyde for 13 years of friendship and caring. Thanks to Aldo and Maylis Rodriguez, Elinor and 
Peter Fondell, Kristina and John Alessi, Vesela Veleva, and Gergana Nenkov for their 
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friendship. Thanks to Kirstin Dechantsreiter and all the members of the Jamaica Plain Baby-
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The United States of the World 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
A Decade of Change 
• The Democrats were not happy. It was 1969 and the party had just lost the presidency to 
Republican Richard M. Nixon in a close election after occupying the White House fr eight 
years. If that were not bad enough, the United States Congress, controlled by the Democratic 
Party, was not producing policies favored by most Democratic lawmakers. Long-serving 
conservative Southern Democrats controlled powerful committee chairs and refused to hold 
hearings on or mark up liberal legislation. Progressive Democrats knew they had to do 
something, so the Democratic Study Group (DSG), which had been instrumental in paving 
the way for the Great Society legislation in the 1960s, took the lead in reforming the Hous  
to make it possible to advance liberal Democratic proposals. In 1970 the DSG helped pass 
the Legislative Reorganization Act, which, among other things, liberated subcommittees 
from control by the committees. By 1975, powerful committee chairs who fell out of step 
with mainstream Democratic positions were losing their chair positions. 
• On Dec. 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced, without consulting Congress, that the 
United States would officially recognize the People’s Republic of China on January 1, 1979, 
and transfer its embassy from the Republic of China on Taiwan. This action shocked and 
angered Congress because President Carter had pledged to consult it on all major foreign 
policies before making a decision. Representatives in the House decided to take immediate 
steps to adjust America’s relationship with Taiwan. By April 1979 Congress passed nd 
Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).   
 2 
• Stephen Solarz was a liberal Democrat from a heavily Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn, 
New York. He was elected in 1974 in the so-called Watergate Class, which included 70 new 
Democrats in the House of Representatives. He joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
so that he could have a say in U.S. policy toward Israel and he rose up the ranks of various 
subcommittees. Within five years he became chair of the Africa Subcommittee and 
frequently visited African presidents and officials in the Middle East. In 1980 he switched to 
the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee because he anticipated interactions with China. 
In 1981 he became the subcommittee chair after the previous chair died in office. Slarz used 
his new position to advocate democracy for Taiwan and promote military and economic aid 
for rebel factions in Cambodia, among other policies. He became a shadow secretary of state 
(Winik 1993), using congressional junkets to perform shuttle diplomacy by visiting 
numerous heads of state to negotiate realistic and acceptable policies toward Cambodia.  
• Cindy Sprunger was a human rights activist in the 1970s. She went to work for 
Representative Jim Leach (R-IA), who was the ranking minority member on the Asian and 
Pacific Subcommittee. After President Carter announced recognition of China, the 
government of Taiwan began a crackdown, postponing indefinitely the scheduled elections 
and then, on Dec. 10, 1979, killing and arresting hundreds of protesters who were 
recognizing Human Rights Day in Kaoshiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city. Sprunger’s 
family had spent a great deal of time on Taiwan as ministers for the Presbyterian Church. She 
encouraged Rep. Leach to take a public stand and condemn Taiwan’s actions. Cindy’s 
colleague, Fulton Armstrong, had lived on Taiwan and he also urged Leach to enter a 
statement in the congressional record. Dr. Edward Friedman worked for Rep. Solarz He had 
completed his dissertation research on Taiwan in the 1960s and worked for Solarz 
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immediately after he became chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. Solarz started 
organizing hearings about Taiwan, including the murder of Taiwanese-Americans by the 
agents of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The Asian and Pacific Subcommittee 
produced legislation banning arms sales to any country that killed citizens who became 
Americans. 
• The Taiwan Relations Act had changed the immigration quota for the Taiwan, merging it 
with the immigration quota for all of China, which severely limited the immigration of 
Taiwanese citizens to the United States. Dr. Peng Ming-Min, Trong Chai, and Mark Chen 
were Taiwanese independence activists who started the Formosan Association for Public 
Affairs (FAPA) in 1981. The three men met with Edward Friedman to explain this problem, 
and Friedman wrote legislation that created two separate immigration quotas for T iwan and 
Mainland China. Mark Chen met with Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Edward Kennedy 
to get Senate support for Taiwan. Soon, Solarz, Leach, Pell and Kennedy began holding press 
conferences together, calling themselves the “Gang of Four” to encourage Taiwan to 
democratize. Rep. Leach made speeches on the House floor and Solarz traveled to Taiwan to 
bring the message to the government. Senator Kennedy gave the John F. Kennedy Prize to 
Taiwan democracy activists. Senator Pell helped pass Senate resolutions statng that he fate 
of Taiwan was to be determined by the people of Taiwan, not its government. Although the 
membership of FAPA has averaged a mere 5,000 since its inception, it has managed to 
organize the Taiwan Caucus in the House and the Senate. The Taiwan Caucus is the second-




Explaining Change at All Levels 
 What do these examples have in common? From members of Congress to congressional 
staff and organizers of interest groups, they all involve the exercise of political entrepreneurship. 
At first glance this may seem puzzling. After all, senators, representativ s, congressional staff, 
and political organizers have vastly different social and political resources. From the ordinary 
citizen who gets people to meet together to discuss a common problem to a member of Congress, 
every actor plays a different political role. Yet, what unites all of these actors is the ability to 
create long-lasting change beyond their limited official roles, whether change starts at the 
grassroots level or in the halls of Congress.  
A study of political entrepreneurship requires not just examining change of degree, but 
also change of kind. A change of degree occurs within the boundaries of a political actor’s 
responsibility. Changes of degree can be reversed easily and thus they seldom last. In order for 
change to become durable reform, change of degree must become change of kind, and only a 
political entrepreneur can create that kind of change. A political entrepreneur creates a change of 
kind by adjusting the boundaries of responsibility, the jurisdiction, and acquires more 
responsibilities. The examples above demonstrate this: members of Congress changed t e 
selection of committee chairs and the rights of subcommittees; members of Congress acted like 
cabinet secretaries; congressional staff acted like members of Congress; citizens acted like 
congressional staff. The political entrepreneur, regardless of the level of activity, changes the 
fundamental nature of the role in practice. This change may eventually be codified in law, but it 
starts with a political entrepreneur changing the boundaries of his/her formal jurisdiction to 
create lasting changes within institutions and within society (usually by stretching the boundaries 
to acquire more responsibilities). 
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 This study contends that understanding what political entrepreneurs do and why they do 
it is essential for understanding political changes at the domestic and the international levels. 
Most studies of political entrepreneurship approach entrepreneurship as a change in degr e 
instead of a change in kind, and thus the focus of the studies are confined to discrete political 
domains and fixed jurisdictions. These studies are effective within their specializ d fields but 
they fail to elucidate the phenomena described above. A main purpose of this project is t  x end 
the study of entrepreneurship to illustrate its radical or transformative possibilitie . 
Why would Rep. Solarz, a Jewish representative from a safe Jewish district, care so much 
about Taiwan? Taiwan was just one of many countries that Solarz became intensely focused on 
during his career. He became one of the most-traveled members of Congress, visiting countries 
in Africa, the Middle East, Central America, South America, and Asia, meeting with heads of 
state and dissident groups. He became such an expert in American foreign policy that he was 
rumored to be a prospective secretary of state in a future Democratic presidential administration. 
What explains his deep interest and involvement in so many different areas of American fo eign 
policy that were of little if any concern to his constituents? What allowed Rep. Solarz to be so 
effective on American foreign policy as a member of Congress with less than 10 years of 
experience in the House? 
 Why do congressional staff have so much influence on a member of Congress when the 
literature would lead us to predict that the member of Congress leads the way? What incentives 
did Cindy Sprunger have for making suggestions to Rep. Leach, and what incentives did Rep. 
Leach have for following her lead? 
 How did a small number of Taiwanese-American activists manage to have such great 
influence on members of Congress and congressional activities? How does a small, grassroots 
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organization manage to organize so many members of Congress to vote in favor of Taiwan, 
especially for an island that no longer has strategic significance for United States foreign policy? 
How did this small organization become influential despite the lack of resources that the 
literature would predict, including votes in congressional districts and financial contributions to 
campaigns?  
  By studying these entrepreneurs, this dissertation explains a set of policy outcomes that 
defy most expectations we have of how foreign policy works, and much of what we think we 
know about elected lawmakers, their staffs, and the interest groups and issue activists with whom 
they interact.  In addition, this dissertation focuses on what motivates political actors, especially 
elected officials.  Some of them do not choose issues on which to focus based on our 
conventional understanding of rational political action.  Instead, they are moved to act by their 
emotional attachment to an issue.  
More generally, this study focuses on the impact political entrepreneurs have on 
American foreign policy and international relations. When we look at the making of American 
foreign policy from the 1970s onward, specifically human rights policy, we see that many key 
players seem to lack the motives or means to exercise influence.  Most of the literature on 
international relations, foreign policy making, Congress, and interest groups focuses n elite 
actors who have significant institutional resources.  They are supposed to be motivated primarily 
by their immediate interests.  Yet in the area of human rights, policy reflected the influence of 
different actors, both lawmakers and organized interests, who often derived no direct pol tical 
benefit from their efforts.   
This study claims that much political entrepreneurship in foreign policy has an affective 
foundation.  Powerful emotional responses, both in the short-term and over long periods of time, 
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have led to significant foreign policy outcomes that we would not expect from limited traditional 
political resources.  In turn, affective entrepreneurship has changed the nature of international 
relations. 
 
Competing explanations for change 
Following America’s official recognition of China, the Taiwanese government postponed 
scheduled elections. Then, in December 1979, the Taiwanese government started arresting
human rights protesters, dissidents, and other activists after December 10, UN Human Rights 
day. This provoked many Taiwanese-Americans to pool their resources and contact Cgress 
about Taiwan’s human rights abuses.  The TRA had included a line saying that the United States 
thought human rights on Taiwan were important (an amendment submitted by Rep. Jim Leach), 
but nothing obligated members of Congress to actively push for human rights on Taiwan. Yet, 
that is exactly what Congress did during the 1980s. To explain congressional activity on behalf 
of Taiwan, in the TRA as well as through hearings, press conferences, binding and non-binding 
legislation, from the 1980s to the present, we turn to theories of domestic policy change.   
Scholars of American politics draw on two general approaches to explain policy shifts. 
The first approach is the rational actor model: individual actors, including elected officials and 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), make policy changes to win re-election (Mayhew 1974). 
Mayhew’s approach has been influential because it describes members of Congress as single-
minded seekers of reelection. This approach is useful, but limited, because members of Congress 
are emotional human beings in addition to rational actors. Elected officials change policies to 
respond to both electoral pressures in their districts and to their own emotional needs.  
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It is possible for affective politics and rational electoral politics to co-exist and reinforce 
each other. We see this in the example of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC). Passionate Jewish voters care deeply about Israel and evoke memories of the 
Holocaust, but they also have high net worth. Jewish donors give money to political candidates 
and have large voting blocks. If another ethnic group wants to accomplish the same political
influence in Congress, it can have money and voting power, and/or affective concerns about 
human rights abuses in their home countries. Rep. Solarz responded to human rights abuses in 
Asian countries, then found to his surprise that Asian-Americans are wealthy and active voters. 
He cultivated this donor base after realizing that it existed. Other politicians may go for the 
rational calculation first, collecting money from ethnic voters in their district, and then, second, 
discover that they really care about the human rights abuses that these voters bring to their 
attention. This research gives a fuller, more comprehensive picture of how members of Congress 
actually work.  
The second approach to explain policy shifts is analyzing collective action through social 
movements or organized interests. A policy window may occur in which a policy entrepreneur 
senses that an old policy no longer works and a new policy is needed, but no one except the 
entrepreneur is offering a new policy. Social movements convince many policy makers at 
different levels to change polices simultaneously as a response to various forms of collective 
action (Allen 2007; Bernstein 1997; Jenkins 1977, 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). Some 
scholars of American politics have tried to connect these approaches, explaining that dividual 
entrepreneurs lead policy coalitions, cohering social movements that are otherwise fragmented 
(McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).1  
                                                      
1 Some scholars of international relations apply this logic internationally by merging the lenses of collective action 
and states. They have coined the term “complex interdependence” to analyze transnational politics (Keck and 
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These theories of domestic change have their own limitations. They can explin short-
term changes in policy at a specific time by a specific group of actors. Yet, coll ctive action is 
difficult to sustain over very long periods of time, and thus the results of collective action tend to 
be limited. In the case of Taiwan, in contrast, the specific actors, including members of 
Congress, staff, and activists, remained the same from the 1980s until the present. The policy 
targets have changed over the decades, but the goal has remained the same: maintaining  
democratic and economically vibrant Taiwan even as the PRC grows in military power, 
economic power and international influence. This study aims to explain this continuity in both 
the actors and their goals despite three decades of changes in American politics and Sino-
American relations.  
 
Transnational Actors 
One of the ways this study tries to explain the continuity of specific political actors in a 
changing political environment is by highlighting the unique nature of transnational activists in 
the international community, and how democratic countries filled with immigrants behave as a 
result of their presence. The U.S. has been the destination of choice for many immigrants, 
refugees, and exiles from around the world. America’s global economic and military dominance 
has made American foreign policy a subject with global implications. Thus, it wasnatural for 
foreign governments, ethnic lobbies, and transnational groups to lobby Congress (Tierney 1994). 
America’s destination status has turned the United States into a foreign policy to  for immigrant 
groups who retain their ethnic or homeland identities.  “Diasporas are an inherent part of the 
imperfection of the nation-state. Almost no states match perfectly territory with populations, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Sikkink 1998; Adamson 2002; Risse-Kappen 1995; Huntington 1973; Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 
1972; Rosenau 1980). 
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whether they define themselves in civic-nationalist or ethno-nationalist terms. Diasporas are thus 
an endemic feature of the international system, and transnational ethnic ties are an inevitable part 
of international relations.” (Shain and Wittes 2002, 177-178) (See also Shain, Yossi, and Barth 
2003) 
Thus, the interaction between the transnational level and the domestic level can be 
analyzed in terms of diaspora politics. The issues that motivate diasporas includehuman rights 
abuses, foreign aid, and democratization. Diaspora politics are “homeland political pra tices 
confined to those groups that are barred from direct participation in the political system of their 
homeland - or who do not even have a homeland political regime of their own to 
support/oppose.” (Cohen 1997, cited in ∅stergaard-Nielsen 2003, 763) Diaspora politics are one 
source of inputs, among many, in shaping U.S. foreign policy because immigrant groups are one 
source of pressure on Congress if political entrepreneurs can mobilize them to havea st bl  
political identity. The Taiwanese-American community constituted a diaspor, with exiled 
academic, political, and business leaders searching for ways to make Taiwan democratic so they 
could return home. U.S. Taiwan policy became one of their targets. 
We need to use different theories to explain entrepreneurship over time on international 
human rights issues. Major international relations theories are of little value in explaining 
diaspora politics in the United States. Neither state-centric Realist theories, institutional Liberal 
theories, nor relationship-based Constructivist approaches can account for the specific actors, the 
Taiwanese-American exiles, involved in helping to shape U.S. Taiwan policy in the 1980s. 
Realism ignores them. These actors were not official representatives of Taiwan at international 
institutions because Taiwan was no longer represented in any institutions. The relationships that 
the China Lobby had developed over 30 years were with the KMT government, not with the 
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exiles who lived in the United States. In sum, theoretical approaches in international relations 
would lead scholars to ignore this small group of activists who affected U.S.-Taiwan relations 
over three decades. 
Many theories of domestic political change would also ignore these actors. Taiwanese-
American activists lacked resources to put sufficient political pressure on policy makers at any 
level of government. A theory of political entrepreneurship helps us explain the impact of these 
actors. The only way these activists could make any impact was by finding political 
entrepreneurs in Congress, including staff, representatives, and senators, who would act on their 
behalf.  
Finally, the only way to account for the durability of the entrepreneurship is to u e the 
concept of Bonding Social Capital (Auerbach 1995; Bourdieu 1986; Gittel and Vidal 1998; 
Loflin 2003; Putnam 2000).  When we shift from a state-centric explanation to an explanation 
that includes individuals and collectives we encounter problems: How do collectives form? Why 
do certain individuals act and others do not? Political scientists and social movement theorists 
have offered explanations for collective formation. These explanations include pressure on 
people in a stressful environment; possessing the financial and social resources t organize; 
encountering a favorable political opportunity structure; receiving psychologica , social and 
economic benefits by taking part in the social movement. Political scientists and psychologists 
offer explanations for why some individuals take action and others do not. These explanations 
include financial incentives and ambition (within a rational choice framework), and social 
relationships. This study combines these explanations to understand the motivations of the 
Taiwanese-American activists. The concept of bonding social capital emphasizes the importance 
of the affective, emotional relationships that members of a social group develop as they organize.  
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A stressful environment causes citizens with high socio-economic status to form a 
movement. Taiwanese-American activists had faced this stressful environment on Taiwan, then 
they faced it again as they received news about the government’s crackdown in December 1979. 
These activists confronted economic depression, oppression by the KMT, and military conflict. 
They were forced to confront these problems together, and they derived psychological benefit 
from being part of the collective. Individuals who also have financial resources will use their 
social capital and financial capital to start organizations that will distribute social and financial 
resources to less capable people within the movement and through to society they live in. 
Taiwanese-American activists started the Formosan Association for Public Affairs to do this for 
the Taiwanese-American community. The problem is that these individuals usually do not 
receive a direct economic benefit from starting such organizations, and members hav  no 
incentive for paying dues to these organizations when they get the social benefits for free, thus 
presenting a collective action problem (Olson 1965). This brings us to the central problem: Why 
do individuals start organizations that present little, if any, financial reward and may not provide 
the desired political outcomes for years or decades? The question leads to the study of political 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Defining Political Entrepreneurship 
 Scholars have approached political entrepreneurship from a variety of perspectives, most 
of them viewing entrepreneurship as a change of degree, within jurisdictional b undaries, rather 
than a change of kind, to expand jurisdictional boundaries. This study builds on entrepreneurship 
scholarship that focuses on changing boundaries to permit policy change in kind. Political 
entrepreneurs are people who expand the jurisdictions of authority by engaging in “speculative 
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acts of creative recombination in ways that challenge existing boundaries of authority” 
(Sheingate 2003, 18). Political entrepreneurs operate within complex institutions where the 
boundaries of authority are ambiguous. These boundaries are constantly shifting as different 
parts of an institution lose authority over specific policy areas and gain authority over other 
areas. Political entrepreneurs are likely to be more common when there is more money to 
allocate. “Entrepreneurs will … be attracted by the possibility of redeploying … budgets to 
achieve the policy goals they prefer.” (Schneider and Teske 1992, 743). Combining these 
approaches, we can predict that political entrepreneurs will be more numerous when there are 
ambiguous jurisdictions and bigger budgets to allocate to preferred policy goals.  
Congress is a likely place to find political entrepreneurs for three reasons. First, 
congressional committees and subcommittees have ambiguous jurisdictions. Second, legislation 
is often referred simultaneously to multiple committees because the subject matter often crosses 
committee boundaries. This leads to conflict between committees and subcommittees, also 
known as turf wars (King 1997), in which members of Congress and their staff are constantly 
trying to expand their jurisdictions and protect their jurisdictions from encroachment by rival 
committees. Third, members of Congress must serve on multiple committees, often m re 
committees than they have time to attend, and so they sometimes are forced to sit on relatively 
obscure committees that rarely see any relevant action related to their districts or their policy 
interests. Thus, members of Congress and their staff have incentives to expand their committee 
jurisdictions to enhance the visibility with their constituents and increase their s ature in 
Congress (Maltzman 1997). These factors provide incentives for members of Congress to 
become political entrepreneurs.  
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However, not all members do so, and few successfully expand or change the jurisdictions 
of their committees and subcommittees. This leads to the question: what factors allow a member 
of Congress to become a successful political entrepreneur? Like business entrpreneurs, political 
entrepreneurs usually succeed because they make savvy investments with their t me and energy 
on policy issues. Unlike business entrepreneurs, who do not have fixed jurisdictions, political 
entrepreneurs have been identified mainly because they propose new policies in fixd
jurisdictions (Polsby 1984; Weissert 1991; Ainsworth and Sened 1993; Mintrom 1996, 1997; 
Polsky 2000; Moukarim 2008). Scholars have argued that success depends on the role of the 
person proposing new policies and on the environment the political actor is in. The environment 
creates a “policy window” (Kingdon 1997) and political entrepreneurs use issue or policy 
networks (Heclo 1977) within that window to build coalitions and create new policies. 
Subsequent studies have advanced the study of issue entrepreneurs and policy entrepren urs in 
different policy areas and at different levels of political activity.  
Like many fashionable terms in scholarship, “political entrepreneurship” is applied to a 
wide range of activities, some with little in common with the others. The only way to void 
conceptual confusion is by using the word “entrepreneur” sparingly to prevent “conceptual 
stretching” (Sartori 1970, 1984; Collier and Mahon 1993). A concept is an information container 
or “data container” (Sartori 1970) that is meaningful only if a scholar is very selectiv  in 
choosing data for the concept. From this perspective, an “entrepreneur” is meaningful i  a 
business context because the entrepreneur must make an investment of financial resources. For 
the concept to apply to political science, there must be similar kinds of investment and risks. 
Most scholars focus on the payoffs – the profit – that an investment generates in politics, such as 
when a policy becomes law. If the word “entrepreneur” is going to mean anything in political 
 15 
science, it is more effective to focus on the investments that are required instea  of he payoffs. 
By focusing on the payoffs, it is impossible to distinguish between an entrepreneur, who works 
to make a profit, and a gambler who just gets lucky with a momentary windfall. In contrast, by 
focusing on the investment we can distinguish the likely successes from the failur s.  
I define “political entrepreneur” as someone who makes an investment in his or her social 
network and consistently advocates policy ideas through various media until the social network 
includes people working in government who decide to implement the favored policy. The 
entrepreneur absorbs the transaction costs of assembling the coalition needed to bring about the 
political outcome the entrepreneur seeks. Transaction costs derive from trade-offs in the use of 
scarce resources. These trade-offs become more obvious as resources becom more scarce. For 
members of Congress and their staff, the trade-off is time spent in the district versus time spent 
on Capitol Hill writing legislation, meeting with interest groups, and holding hearings. For 
interest groups, the trade-off is time spent assembling a coalition versus time spent maintaining 
the interest group. For citizens, the trade-off is time spent assembling a coalition versus time 
spent with friends, family, and business associates. The lower these transaction costs, the easier 
the trade-offs, and the more likely a person is to become a political entrepreneur.  
To identify a political entrepreneur according to this definition, we must examine the 
working alliances, friendships, and advocacy groups that the entrepreneur develops. Thus, it is 
useful to think of “issue networks” (Heclo 1978) as well as “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier 
1988). These networks take time and energy to develop, and they change as policies are 
implemented and generate feedback. 
We also need to understand what a political entrepreneur is not. “Organizer” and 
“advocate” already describe people who use the media as resources to start social movements. 
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The media cover such events as sit-ins, marches, protests, picket lines, civil disobedience and 
acts of terrorism. The people who innovate these tools help people identify a common problem 
and take action to solve that problem. However, these political acts are high-risk, possibly 
leading to arrest or death. Few people have the fortitude to take such risks. Therefore, a less risky 
way to promote a policy change is to become an advocate by writing letters to the editor, 
publishing newspaper articles, and speaking through television and radio. Whether a person 
chooses a high-risk or low-risk approach to policy change, these activities mer ly represent good 
citizenship. These actors are not political entrepreneurs if their social networks do not include 
people working in government who decide to implement the favored policy 
Since a political entrepreneur must build social networks that include elected and 
appointed officials who will implement the favored policy, once those social networks are built, 
the political entrepreneur must use them. Initially, politicians and policy makers will likely 
oppose the favored policy. Thus, the political entrepreneur must be able to convince them to 
change their minds or help elect people who approve of the policy. The political entrepreur 
must set the agenda for the policy makers (Cobb and Elder 1983).  
Once the entrepreneur sets the agenda, a political actor within the governing body must 
codify the issue in legislation. Lawmakers often use legislation to take a position on a policy 
issue in order to please constituents (Mayhew, 1974), knowing that there is almost no chance of 
the bill becoming law. “Bill sponsorship seems to be the irrational act of otherwise ational 
members of Congress. From 1947 to 1998 only 4.74% of the bills introduced in Congress 
became law.” (Platt 2008) A political entrepreneur can sponsor, cosponsor, or amend legislation 
at some point along the legislative process (in subcommittee or committee markup, on the House 
or Senate Floor, or during a conference session). At the local level there are more opportunities 
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for policy to become law, so there should be more political entrepreneurs in local government. 
At the state level, with 50 governments, there should be fewer political entrepreneurs. At the 
federal level there should be a very small number of political entrepreneurs (Schneider and Teske 
1992). 
 Given the difficulties and low probability of turning policy into law at the federal l vel, 
there are two conditions that allow a citizen or political actor to see policy throug  the legislative 
process to become law: a policy window opens independent of a political actor’s effort or a 
political actor helps to create a policy window. A policy window opens when the supporting 
coalition and the policy ideas coincide at the right moment. Usually, the “right” moment occurs 
after a “focusing event” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Birkland 1997; Sabatier 1988; Saikaly 
2009; Corbin 2010). A political entrepreneur sees the opening and rushes to get his or her policy 
voted into law, or the political entrepreneur may submit the policy for consideration by the
governing body over many sessions (Weissert 1991). Political entrepreneurs help to cr ate policy 
windows by their continuous advocacy of specific policies. 
The political entrepreneurs in this study fit under Riker’s (1980) label “heresthetics” 
because they structured the world so they could win. Taiwanese-American activists and members 
of Congress used rhetoric to build coalitions of policy advocates, and the people within tha  
coalition helped shape the environment so that the policy becomes acceptable. The composition 
of the coalition is critical for the political entrepreneur, and the ways the political entrepreneur 
composes the coalition are just as important (Mintrom and Norman 2009). The Taiwanese-
American activists used precise language to target members of Congress and congressional staff 
who were sympathetic to the cause of human rights on Taiwan. The activists also supported 
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sympathetic candidates for Congress who won their first elections, in part with funding from 
wealthy Taiwanese-Americans, and maintained the support over the decades.  
This long period of time was critical for Taiwanese-Americans to develop rationships 
with citizens, congressional staff, and politicians. The metaphor of a policy windo  is appealing 
precisely because it captures the short time period in which new policies are considered and 
implemented. Yet, in order to understand sustained entrepreneurship, we must know what 
motivates political actors over long periods of time. 
 
The Congressional Environment 
A narrow understanding of political entrepreneurship is a key tool for resolving the 
puzzles of change in U.S-Taiwan relations during the 1980s.  All the action took place in 
Congress. The congressional environment poses a critical test for political entrepreneurship on 
foreign policy for three reasons. First, as previously mentioned, passing laws at the federal level 
is incredibly difficult, discouraging political entrepreneurship. Second, because foreign policy is 
not traditionally considered to be the domain of individual members of Congress, it is 
counterintuitive when a member of Congress acts like a surrogate secretary of state or defense. 
Finally, a common expectation for members of Congress is that they are alwys trying to win re-
election, so it is also counterintuitive when members of Congress become political en repreneurs 
in foreign policy in ways that do not promote their own reelection.   
The congressional environment matters as we try to account for the motivations of 
members to become political entrepreneurs. Aspects of the congressional environment provide 
incentives for entrepreneurship, including electoral imperatives, an opportunity structure with 
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many openings for individual initiative, leadership positions that reward entrepreneurs, media 
organizations that show entrepreneurs to the public, and fundraisers who reward entrepreneu s. 
One influential scholarly view of Congress maintains that its members rationally focus on 
doing what they can to win re-election (Mayhew 1974). They serve on committees that serve 
their district’s interests. They do constituent case work and meet mainly with people from their 
districts. They may meet with interest groups, but only with those that affecttheir district’s 
interests. They get involved in foreign policy issues if it helps their district or enhances their 
standing among constituents. They meet mainly with people who will either give them vot s for 
re-election or money to campaign. They take positions that matter to the constituents even if the 
position does not lead to a legislative outcome or a position on a committee. In addition, 
ambition theory recognizes that members of Congress may take positions that will elp them 
advance to higher office. 
The scholarly literature on congressional staff leads us to predict that staffers have little 
influence over members of Congress. Staff members do not initiate legislation or new policies, 
instead working as agents who do the bidding of the member of Congress or the committee. 
Finally, the scholarly literature leads us to predict that interest groups get the attention of 
members of Congress only if they have the ability to sway a large number of votes or contribute 
money to a campaign (Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Weil 1974; Said 1981; Watanabe 1984: ch. 
3; Tierney 1994). Thus, we would expect that large and/or wealthy interest groups get more 
attention than small, poor interest groups. We would also expect interest groups to succeed only 




Broadening the Opportunities for Political Entrepreneurship within Congress 
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Congress is a complex institution characterized by 
multiple (and sometimes competing) committees and subcommittees in the House and th
Senate. Therefore, we can expect to find many political entrepreneurs within each chamber, and 
indeed we do. However, at the start of the time period that is the focus of this study, lawmakers 
who might pursue political entrepreneurship in the U.S. Congress faced several constrints  
Obstacles included the powers of the leadership to appoint committee and subcommittee chairs 
and direct legislation to relevant subcommittees, the powers of committee and subcommittee 
chairs to hold hearings, and the powers of members of Congress to submit legislation and 
amendments during markup sessions within committees and on the House floor. These powers 
presented significant obstacles to political entrepreneurs.  
A brief review of House reforms will help us understand why members did not become 
entrepreneurs until the 1970s. The first House reform was in 1910. Before 1910, Speaker Joe 
Cannon had appointed committee chairs in a very arbitrary manner, satisfying his personal 
political preferences and effectively curbing any initiative by individual lawmakers. The reforms 
centralized power in the House leadership, taking personal political preferences out of the 
selection of committee chairs. The new tool was seniority (Polsby et al 1969). This system still 
stifled entrepreneurship because members could accomplish nothing without the chairs’ 
cooperation.  
In 1975 Democratic House members rebelled against the powers conferred by seniority 
and created a more open political environment that was conducive to entrepreneurship.  This 
rebellion happened because conservative Southern Democratic committee chairs had views that 
matched the Republican White House more than the rank-and-file democrats who came from the 
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Northeast (Ornstein 1977). To counter an assertive Republican President and the monopoly 
power of conservative Southern democrats, liberal Northern Democrats stripped committee 
chairs of their power. This rebellion also happened in part because Congress began to lose trust 
in the executive branch, particularly in its monopoly over information on international issues that 
allowed executive officials to distort what they presented to Congress and the public (Bennet 
1978). Moreover, the partisan division of national institutions, with the Democrats controlling 
Congress and the Republicans dominating the presidency, led to increasing congressional 
assertiveness (Rohde 1994). 
Congressional assertiveness reflected other developments that involved foreign p licy in 
particular.  The postwar consensus, premised upon the need to resist Communist threats, ook  
particular institutional form in which the executive branch developed and managed a national 
security state and an intelligence community. Congress followed the president’  lead, permitting 
various parts of the executive branch latitude to deal with international Communism. As liberal 
Northern Democrats became more numerous in the late 1960s, they recoiled against executive 
dominance over foreign policy.  This spilled over into opposition to Southern Democrats becu e 
they controlled the committees that set foreign relations and defense policy, and they often sided 
with the executive branch. The Northern Democrats sought to change the institutional rules to 
take power away from the Southern Democrats and make foreign and defense policy reflect 
liberal ideas (Rohde 1994).  
Congress faced three pressures at the start of the 1970s that triggered changes that, in 
turn, improved the opportunity structure for entrepreneurship by lawmakers, their staffs, and 
others.  First, within the House the views of the committee chairs no longer reflected the views 
of the committee members, much less those of the whole chamber. Second, Congress had 
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inadequate resources for managing issues. Finally, Congress had to figure out how to effectively 
manage the new demands of interest groups and political entrepreneurs. 
For the first pressure, committee chairs whose views no longer reflected the views of the 
committee members, Democratic reformers made it easier to amend measures and insisted on 
recorded floor votes (Whalen 1982). Floor transparency thwarted the committee chair who might 
try a final vote on a bill he had drafted himself, sometimes with little committee say. Without 
transparency, rank-and-file representatives had no incentive to challenge legislation because no 
one in their district would know how they voted.  Once legislative action became public through 
recorded votes, members could put together majorities to amend bills. Transparency in the 
selection of committee chairs was intended to accomplish the same goal of giving power to the 
rank-and-file. Before the 1970s the House members voted on committee and subcommittee 
chairs as a block and were unable to challenge individual chairs. During the 1970s House 
reformers changed the voting procedures so that representatives could approve or reject
committee chairs individually by secret ballot. Lawmakers gained moreinflu nce over chairs, 
even if they exercised it infrequently.  Further, the approval of the so-called Subcommittee Bill 
of Rights transferred control over legislation to subcommittee chairs and gave them their own 
staff resources.  
These changes within the House lowered the obstacles for political entrepreneurs. During 
the 1970s, rank-and-file House members started to move more quickly into leadership positions 
on subcommittees and committees, and they started to expand the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior for representatives. For example, they started to challenge committee and subcommittee 
chairs who had greater seniority, replacing them with members who had barely arriv d in the 
House. In addition, representatives started to propose many more amendments on the House 
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floor. Republicans, accustomed to minority status in House, accepted transparency to force 
liberal Democrats to take a stand on controversial issues on the floor (Smith 1992). The 
Democrats followed the Republicans’ lead and submitted floor amendments if they could not get 
amendments approved in subcommittee or committee markup sessions. Subcommittee 
empowerment meant a large number of lawmakers in the majority party now had resources t  
influence the legislative agenda and the content of legislation. 
The second pressure, inadequate resources for managing issues, derived from revelations 
that the Nixon administration frequently lied to Congress about foreign policy activities, and 
from the increasing merger of international and domestic issues as “intermes ic” issues (Manning 
1977). The Nixon administration’s lies demonstrated to Congress that the House and Senate 
needed professional staff that equaled the staff in the executive branch. To fix this, Congress 
passed the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act that gave Congress more oversight
over executive branch activity (Fox and Hammond 1977). The merger of domestic and 
international issues forced members of Congress to spend more time on case work that merged 
foreign policy and their constituents’ interests, but members of Congress simply did not have this 
time, and committees did not have the staff. Thus, Congress gave itself more staff in the 1970s. 
With more staff, members of Congress suddenly found more issues to place on the agenda as 
entrepreneurs (Loomis 1988; Burgin 1991; Burgin 1993) and they delegated more authority to 
staff. Congressional staff began to accept more input from interest groups (Tierney 1993; 
Tierney 1994). 
The addition of more expert staff to Congress, especially to the House, reversed the 
historical dynamics in foreign policy. Before 1970, the foreign policy environment had been 
filled by the executive branch and the Senate according to their prescribed constitutional roles. 
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By 1980, in contrast, the House took the lead in the foreign policy arena for three reasons. Fir t, 
the executive branch became more deferential to Congress, especially to the House, and 
consulted members of Congress before making foreign policy decisions (with exceptions such as 
America’s China policy). Second, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went from being very 
active to largely inactive. Third, the House Foreign Affairs Committee moved in the reverse 
direction, from being inactive to being very active. The declining activity of the Senate 
committee and the increasing activity of the House committee were largely the result of changes 
in committee chairmen in the House and Senate during the 1970s (Johnson 1975; McCormick 
1985; Noble 1993). After 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lost influence as it 
became ideologically divided, filled with inexperienced senators and thus unable to pass 
legislation. Simultaneously, the powers of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were spread 
out to its subcommittee chairs and staff, and the chairs became very active. 
Members of Congress responded to the third pressure, managing the new demands of 
interest groups, by delegating tasks to staff and interest groups through a legislative enterprise 
system (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) in which congressional offices functioned like small 
businesses (Loomis 1979). House members created enterprises that helped them to coordinate 
domestic and international policies, from writing legislation to final signature by the president. 
House subcommittees became routine, focused and aggressive in monitoring policy behavior in 
the executive branch (McCormick 1993).  
In sum, the House increased transparency, increased staff resources, and increased 
organization at the level of the individual member and subcommittee. These changes shifted 
influence from the foreign policy elites in the executive branch and the Senate to House 
members who sat on committees overseeing defense policies and appropriations. As the e 
 25 
developments converged in the 1970s, political entrepreneurs took advantage of both the 
openness of Congress and the synthesis of international and domestic issues to become national 
political figures with high levels of ambition. This ambition compelled them to seek an impact 
on a range of international and domestic policy issues from the moment they enterd Congress, 
whether as a member, or as congressional staff, or as a lobbyist for an interest group.  
 
Opportunity Structure and Personal Motivation 
The developments within Congress during the 1970s transformed the political 
opportunity structure. A closed political structure will present no opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs. Conversely, an open one will provide opportunities, but no incentives:  political 
entrepreneurs will see no long-term benefits because their accomplishments can be easily 
undone. As Sheingate explains, “Consider for a moment the impact of very high or very low 
entry barriers on political entrepreneurship. Where entry barriers are too high, entrepr neurship 
will be discouraged as innovations that would challenge existing jurisdictions of auth rity fail to 
see the light of day.…Where entry barriers are too low, entrepreneurs find it comparatively easy 
to engage in speculative acts of creative recombination, but the consolidation of innovation – 
transforming institutional boundaries in a way that perpetuates new jurisdictions of authority – 
may be exceptionally difficult.” (Sheingate 2003, 200) 
Applying the idea of political opportunity structures to Congress, Sheingate articulates a 
“congressional opportunity structure” based on the jurisdictions of committees and 
subcommittees. The more ambiguous a committee’s or subcommittee’s jurisdiction, the more 
opportunities there will be for hearings on different issues.  
Central to the concept of a congressional opportunity structure is th  notion that 
committee jurisdictions are not uniform. Whereas some committees maintain 
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relatively homogeneous jurisdictions and a degree of redundancy in issue 
attention, others have more complex jurisdictions characterized by a diversity of 
issue attention. Because of these manifold qualities, issue attention will be 
contingent upon the characteristics of specific policy domains and the manner in 
which they engage particular committee jurisdictions. Whereas some issues will 
touch upon multiple jurisdictions, … others will not, instead falling within the 
purview of well-defined committee jurisdictions that offer few opportunities for 
issue entrepreneurship. (Sheingate 2006, 847) 
 
Political entrepreneurs will likely be members of Congress and congressional staff who serve on 
committees that have ambiguous, overlapping jurisdictions. The more ambiguous the 
jurisdictions of committees and subcommittees, the more hearings, indicating political 
entrepreneurship on the part of both members of Congress and their staff, Sheingate argues. In 
addition, committees that control appropriations should attract more political entrepr eurs 
(Schneider and Teske 1992). We can also see political entrepreneurs on committees tha  
authorize policies because, within these committees, it is still necessary to push an agenda item 
and forge coalitions. Setting the committee’s agenda and building coalitions on the committee 
are entrepreneurial activities because both entail transaction costs. Sometimes members of 
Congress become both authorizers and appropriators (Fisher 1980; Gist 1981; Champoux and 
Sullivan 2006; Ginieczki 2010), and fund policies without authorization. 
This logic leads us to expect that every member of Congress and every staff can become 
a political entrepreneur, but we know that few people choose this path. We are left with the 
original puzzle: Why do some members of Congress and congressional staff become political 
entrepreneurs? The only way to solve this puzzle is to examine motivations. Committee 
assignments, district representation, and number of years serving in Congress are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for entrepreneurship.  
 District representation and number of years serving in Congress are necessary conditions 
for entrepreneurship because a member of Congress is more likely to become an entrpreneu  if 
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his or her seat is safe, as indicated by the political composition of the district and the margins of 
victory in past elections. Starting in the 1970s, congressional seats became increasingly safe as 
landslide victories replaced marginal victories (Mayhew 1974). This happened for a couple 
reasons. First, party loyalty declined as voters defected from their register d political parties and 
voted for incumbents based on casework (Yiannakis 1981). Second, the advantages of 
incumbency increased as members of Congress used increased staff to devote more resources to 
casework (Epstein and Frankovic 1982). Paradoxically, as casework replaced political parties as 
voting cues for citizens, they became more important for political entrepreneurs as a way to 
reduce transaction costs (Aldrich 1995). This leads us to predict that a member of Congress is 
likely to be a political entrepreneur in foreign policy if he has won a series of landslide victories, 
has sufficient staff to devote to casework, and has a high enough political rank in Congress 
(subcommittee chair, committee chair, whip, minority leader, majority leader, speaker) to know 
that his or her party will support entrepreneurial activities. The entrepreneurs I st dy in chapters 
two and three have all of these characteristics.  
 However, even with a safe seat and the backing of the political party, the initial incentive 
for a member of Congress is to not get involved in foreign policy issues because the transaction 
costs are too high. The executive branch usually has more information about foreign policy 
issues. If the executive branch does not have a policy on a specific foreign policy prblem, there 
is likely at least one member of Congress, out of 535, who “owns” the issue. Thus, a member of 
Congress will likely learn who else is active on the specific foreign policy issue before becoming 
active. This is because, with scarce time and resources, no member of Congress wants to
duplicate efforts. If the effort to learn about a foreign policy issue is high, but the political reward 
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is low, then the member of Congress will likely delegate the foreign policy issue to the executive 
branch or another member of Congress (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).   
Once we know that a member of Congress has a secure enough position to take political 
risks as an entrepreneur, and learns that neither the executive branch or another memb r is acting 
on a foreign policy issue, we can use a microfoundational approach to extend the application of 
the concept of political opportunity structure beyond the committee level to include al of 
Congress. We can approach a more complete understanding of the rational and affective
motivations for political entrepreneurship. “Microfoundation refers to considering how decisions 
…aggregate into larger phenomena. Basically, it aims to trace a causal path through individual 
decisions. It is based on the understanding that the external incentives structure is only half of the 
story; the individual decision is the other, and both halves of the equation are equally important.” 
(Fan 2000, 9) A microfoundation approach requires examining the demographic profiles of th  
subjects of study. Fan argues that a subject’s demographic profile affects “a movement’s 
organizational and tactical repertoires as well as its interaction with political opportunity 
structure.” (Fan 2000, 12-13)  
As the House and Senate opened up their opportunity structures, members of Congress 
claimed ownership of specific foreign policies. Representative James Obertar (D-MN, 1975-
2011), held no seat on a committee related to foreign affairs but was “the universally r cognized 
congressional expert on Haiti (having lived there for several years in the early 1960s)” and 
“earned the privilege of being consulted whenever United States actions concerning Haiti were 
considered.” (Tierney 1994, 104) Representative Joe Moakley (D-MA, 1973-2001) chaired the 
Rules Committee and “had tremendous influence in cutting military aid to El Salvador because 
he got interested in human rights abuses there.” (Tierney 1994, 104) Moakley became an exp rt 
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on the issue and rewrote the 1990 immigration law to allow more Salvadorans to immigrate to 
the United States Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT, 1981-2011) became influential on Central 
America issues because of “his stint as a Peace Corps volunteer in the Dominican Republic, his 
fluency in Spanish, and his demonstrated expertise on the issues.” (Tierney 1994, 110) For these 
members of Congress, biography mattered more than the demographics or needs of the senator’s 
state or the representative’s districts.  
One obvious motivator for a politician is ambition. During the 1970s, members of 
Congress became more ambitious. Schlesinger identifies three types of ambition: discrete, for a 
specific political office for a specific time period and no other political office; static, for a long 
career in a specific political office; and progressive, for an office that is more important than the 
current one the politician seeks or holds (Schlesinger 1966). A political opportunity structure 
describes the situational responses of politicians as their ambition is facilitated by the political 
environment they occupy (Day, 1974). House members shifted from static ambition to 
progressive ambition. Members of Congress became more ambitious in the 1970s because th 
Watergate class that was elected in 1974, the “Watergate Babies”, was younger and less 
experienced in politics than the rest of the House of Representatives (Loomis 1988). Before 
1970, representatives aimed for higher leadership roles within the House over decades of service 
through seniority. By 1980, representatives sought more prominent leadership roles without 
relying on seniority, and they focused more quickly on being elected to the Senate or even 
running for president.  
The Watergate Class reformed Congress as an institution and the way members organized 
their offices because they knew of different organizational repertoires (Cl mens 1997). They 
formed personal offices that were open and non-hierarchical, and allowed staff members and 
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constituents to have frequent and direct access to them. In addition to the organization of their 
personal offices, these House freshmen brought a new emphasis on intra-party organization: they 
organized themselves rapidly into informal caucuses immediately following the November 
midterm elections and were thus able to quickly mobilize their numerical resourc to hange the 
institutional structures in the House. 
The House of Representatives consists of multiple layers of political opportunity 
structures. The top layer is the structure of leadership opportunities for representatives. The 
middle layer is the structure of opportunities for congressional staff. The opportunities include 
the ability to impact legislation, the ability to translate a congressional staff position into an 
elected political office, an appointed position on a government agency, a staff position in the 
senate or executive branch, and/or a paid position as a lobbyist for an interest group or a law
firm. The bottom layer is the structure of opportunities for concerned citizens, constitue t , and 
interest groups who want to set the agenda for legislation in the House of Representatives. We 
can also use this approach to look at the Senate with equivalent layers.  
Congressional staff became more numerous, more specialized, more professional, and 
more entrepreneurial as well. The staff became an autonomous force, writing legislation before it 
reached markup in subcommittees and committees (Jones and Woll 1979, Malbin 1977, 1980). 
Franck and Weisband (1979) illustrate the increased influence of congressional staff on members 
of Congress. Representative Vanik’s legislative aide helped secure passage of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment on Jewish emigration for the Soviet Union. He called every congressional office to 
secure co-sponsorship from members and he negotiated directly with Jewish lobbying groups. In 
a second example “Representative Tom Harkin has acknowledged that the human rights issue 
was of little interest to him until Rebecca Switzer of his staff handed him the fully drafted 
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amendment to that year’s foreign assistance authorization that became the first mandatory human 
rights legislation.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 236) Senator Hubert Humphrey and Henry 
Kissinger had to rely on Humphrey’s staff to interpret the language in a foreign aid bill to 
facilitate negotiations.  
Congressional staffs have generally two types of motivations: professional and 
entrepreneurial (Price 1971). Professional staffs know the policies of the members of Congress 
and the committee chairs so that they can reflect those policies in legislation. Entrepreneurial 
staffs actively initiate legislation and seek out members who will sponsor or co-sponsor the 
legislation, regardless of party, even when the policy views do not match the views of the 
members for whom the staff work (Romzek 2000). Congressional staffs tend to have short 
tenures in Congress if they are personal staff, but they have professional ambitions outside of 
Congress that relate to their work as staff. They may later work in the executive branch or for 
government agencies that implement the policies they wrote as staff, or they may become 
members of Congress (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981; Romzek and Utter 1996, 1997; Henschen 
and Sidlow 1986; Herrnson 1994). 
With more staff and greater expertise on a wider range of policy issues under their 
control, rank-and-file representatives were able to set the agenda of Congress at the individual 
level instead of relying solely on positions in subcommittees and committees. The congr ssional 
staff found allies among other lawmakers through networks of staffs. These became informal 
issue or policy networks (Heclo 1977) that enabled the staff to provide a great deal of support to 
their representatives. Thus, representatives developed multiple resources: intellectual expertise 
with more and better staff; financial capability with better fundraising from individuals and 
interest groups; access to decision-makers in both Congress and the executive branch through 
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their experienced staff; and access to expert policy through policy networks.  The issue networks 
that congressional staff cultivated connected with transnational advocacy networks (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998) to give members of Congress access to expert information around the world 
through subcommittee and committee hearings. 
 
Interest Groups and Opportunity Structures 
Congressional staff members are often the first points of contact for a lawmaker, 
suggesting the importance of the relationship between interest groups and legislativ  staff for 
understanding how groups influence Congress. For this study, the important literture is on 
interest groups that influence foreign policy through Congress (Ambrosio 2002; Al Qahtani 
2001; Almond 1950; Arnson and Brenner 1993; Brenner et al. 2002; Dent 1995; Dietrich 1997; 
Fischer 2004; Milbrath 1967; Skidmore 1993; Tierney 1993, 1994; Trice 1976), with a focus on 
ethnic interest groups that attempt to influence foreign policy toward their home c untries or 
home regions (Aziabu 1992; Cosgrove 1993; Davis and  Moore 1997; Fernandez 1987; Goldberg 
1990; Greve 1995; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Heindl 2004, 2007; Huseynov 2003; King and 
Melvin 2000; King and Pomper 2004; Lindsay 2002; McC Mathias 1981; Mearsheimer and Walt 
2006; Moore 2002; O’Gara 2000; O’Grady 1996; Paul and Paul 2009; Podbielski 1997; 
Rampersad 2007; Said 1981; Saideman 2002; Shain 1995; Silverman 1996; Smith 2000; 
Watanabe 1984; Woodruff 2005). 
Ethnic interest groups have had increasing influence on U.S. foreign policy since the 
early 20th century. There are three historical periods for interest group influence (Smith 2000). In 
the first period, the 1910s to the 1930s, the most active groups were German, Scandinavian, 
Irish, and Italian.   These groups helped maintain American international neutrality, and there 
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was often a tension between ethnic loyalties to the homeland and national loyalties. Dur ng the 
second period, the Cold War, ethnic and national identities coincided. AIPAC became the mos  
powerful lobby during this period because its devotion to Israel fit with America’s strategic 
interest in Israel as an ally against Soviet influence in the Middle East, and as an asset for 
projecting American influence into that region (Silverman 1996).  The end of the Cold War 
marked the transition into the third period.  The post-Cold War international environment 
provided a great opportunity for ethnic and other interest groups to dominate an otherwise 
aimless American foreign policy. Indeed, the threshold of entry for an ethnic interest group to 
influence American foreign policy is very low:  access is available to an ethnic lobby that can 
spend at least $1 million in campaign contributions and control about 250,000 votes in select 
congressional districts. “The influence of such a group might well be ‘considerable,’ providing 
that the group had no powerful enemies, a clear agenda, and the capacity to find at least some 
credible allies.” (Smith 2000, 88)  
Ethnic activism on foreign policy has interacted with the more open congressional 
opportunity structure and increased political entrepreneurship by lawmakers and congressional 
staff. Paul and Paul (2009) give examples of both representatives and senators who become 
active in U.S. foreign policy issues because of ethnic group influences.  Consider two examples 
of lawmakers who chose to speak for the Armenian cause. “Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)
championed Armenian issues because the doctor who nursed him back to health after World War 
II was Armenian” (Greve 1995, cited in Paul and Paul 2009, 66). In 1988 Rep. Frank Pallone (D-
NJ) succeeded the deceased James Howard and retained as his first staffer Armenian-American  
Rosalie Chorbajian. Pallone also lives across the street from an Armenian church and thus has 
close contact with the Armenian community. Chorbajian “told Pallone about her family's 
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experience, specifically that her father’s family was massacred during the Armenian genocide, 
and her father only escaped because he was not home at the time. She gave Pallone information 
on the issue, including that opponents of the genocide call the events a civil war. Pallone became 
a champion of recognizing the genocide, and Armenian Americans were very grateful for his 
support.” (Paul and Paul 2009, 207) Rep. Pallone co-founded the Armenian congressional caucus 
in 1995 (Auerbach 1995 cited in Paul and Paul 2009, 206).  
Closer examination of the details demonstrates causal mechanisms for representatives to 
become active in a foreign policy issue. The Pallone case suggests the likelihood of activism 
when (1) a new member of Congress hires staff from previous (retired or deceased) members, (2) 
develops a close relationship with his personal staff and is influenced by that relationship, (3) 
uses formal (e.g. subcommittees and committees) and informal (e.g. caucuses) institutional 
mechanisms in Congress to promote the issues he/she learns about through the staff, and (4) is
motivated by a personal connection with the community (living next to a community, having 
relatives from a community, visiting a specific country) to promote the issu . The Pallone 
example highlights a key motivational element in entrepreneurship.  As his experience shows, 
affective politics often drive a member of Congress to get involved with a foreign policy issue. 
Lawmakers who develop close relationships with people who are affected by a foreign policy 
issue, especially human rights abuses in a specific country, or who visit foreign countries with 
human rights abuses are more likely to become foreign policy entrepreneurs (Carter et al 2004).  
In sum, congressional entrepreneurship on foreign policy reflects the convergence of two 
developments, a new opportunity structure that facilitates individual lawmaker and staff 
entrepreneurship and increased ethnic diaspora activism. 
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To understand why lawmakers embrace causes with no obvious and immediate political 
payoff, we must broaden our understanding of congressional motivation. Members of Congress 
and their staff often become foreign policy entrepreneurs because of chance associations between 
a lawmaker and a particular group, especially one that has been exploited or victimized. In order 
for the chance association to turn into an affective relationship, two elements need to be present. 
First, the member of Congress makes a rational decision that there is a policy window: the 
member discovers a policy that no longer works, learns that no one else is trying to find a 
solution, and decides to fill the void. Second, the member of Congress forms long-term 
relationships with ethnic interest groups and staff, and these relationships become the motivation 
for foreign policy entrepreneurship over years or decades. The longevity of the relationship 
strengthens the affective connection between the lawmaker, staff, and interest groups. The longer 
the relationship, the more potent it becomes as a source of motivation. 
These changes within Congress, and the sources of motivation, emphasize the individual 
politician over the institution or the political party, so it is the individual politician who becomes 
identified with a specific foreign policy and a specific concern over human rights abuses in a 
given country. Thus it is no longer sufficient to understand foreign policy through Congress from 
a macro, institutional perspective. Instead we require a micro perspective, one that examines the 
biographies and lives of specific members of Congress and their staff, to fully explain the origins 
of foreign policy entrepreneurship.  By extension, the micro perspective accounts for the 
persistence of such legislative entrepreneurship. 
The legislative process is difficult and long, with many possible veto points along the 
path for any member of Congress who is opposed to the specific policy. It takes a long-term 
strategic view and a great deal of commitment to submit legislation over years and decades with 
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the hope that a “policy window” will open for the specific policy. If lawmakers were motivated 
only by short-term electoral calculations, they would have little incentive to push hard for 
legislation likely to require a long period of time and a measure of luck to be succesf l. It would 
be better for the rational politician to content him/herself with a few speeches to please the home 
audience.  Persistence demands a deeper commitment to a cause and affective ties are the most 
likely basis for such a commitment. 
Diaspora organizations also practice entrepreneurial politics.  They do so in various ways 
that include writing legislation for a member of Congress to submit in a committee or on the 
floor and working with other interest groups, members of Congress, and their staff to build an 
advocacy coalition that will pass the legislation. Paul and Paul (2009) describe the 
entrepreneurial model of organizing ethnic groups: “The organization is run by an individual or 
two, and these few people wear all of the hats, including fundraising, public relations, advocacy, 
and contacting members of Congress and their offices. Many of these organizations are run by 
the same individual(s) who founded the group, and some of these founders … established the 
organization because of the absence of ethnic entities that focused on foreign policy.”(Paul and 
Paul 2009, 56) The authors include in this category the Polish American Congress, the Iri h 
National Caucus, the American Kurdish Information Network and the Albanian American Civic 
League. “Despite their relatively small size, such organizations can have influence.” (Paul and 
Paul 2009, 56) 
For the ethnic lobby, the challenge is to sustain influence over time.  An acknowledged 
policy “crisis” increases the likelihood that the ethnic entrepreneur gets a hearing, but once the 
focusing event passes entrepreneurial activity usually stops. There is no contiuing relationship 
between the member of Congress and the entrepreneurial immigrant or interest group that 
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originally submitted the legislation. This is why building personal relationships can prove 
decisive.  Ethnic activists who forge affective ties to a member of Congress will have more 
opportunities over years or even decades to turn their ideas into successful legislation. They have 
a better chance of influencing American foreign policy, regardless of how big the ethnic lobby is 
in terms of membership or how financially wealthy it is. As I will show, Taiwanese-Americans 
have managed to accomplish this.  They continue to have a relationship with members of 
Congress and their staff, through the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). 
 
Rational Motivations for Entrepreneurship 
Since the president normally leads the way in a domestic or foreign policy crisis, 
members of Congress become foreign policy entrepreneurs when (1) the executiv  does not yet 
have a policy toward a specific country and (2) when the member of Congress wants to change 
policy toward a specific country (Carter and Scott 2010). Senators are more likely to b  
entrepreneurs. Members of the majority party in Congress are likely to be entrepr neurs. 
Members of the non-presidential party are likely to be entrepreneurs. Members serving on 
foreign policy committees are likely to be entrepreneurs (Carter and Scott 2010). This helps 
explain why Rep. Solarz became a foreign policy entrepreneur: he chaired a for ign policy 
subcommittee, he was a member of the majority party in the House, he was a member of the non-
presidential party from 1975 to 1977 and 1981 to 1991.  
Carter and Scott (2010) offer evidence on the targets of foreign policy entrepreneurs. 
They provide a fourfold typology: policy specialists, process specialists, policy strategists, and 
process strategists. Policy specialists care about what the United Stats does about specific 
problems in specific countries, or specific problems shared by many countries. Process 
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specialists care about how a specific issue should be handled. Policy strategists re concerned 
about the best approaches to long-term problems like economic development or dealing with 
rogue states. Finally, process strategists are concerned with such issues a  war powers and who 
makes the rules regarding foreign military sales procedures. 
From the literature on policy networks and advocacy coalitions, we can also predict that a 
member of Congress, or congressional staff, will become a political entrepreneur when (1) he or 
she thinks that a specific policy is not working and (2) he or she is persuaded by an interest
group that a specific policy should be changed. According to the policy literature, a sense of 
“crisis” builds in a policy coalition such that there is an incentive to change a policy. In this 
context, a “crisis” in a specific policy, warranting change, is different from a domestic or foreign 
crisis that the president must address. During a foreign or domestic crisis involving the United 
States the president leads and Congress follows. This leadership provides a “policy window” 
around a focusing event that gives policy experts the opportunity to change policies ac ording to 
their preferences (Corbin 2010). Academics and researchers in think tanks use various strategies 
to get Congress to pursue one policy instead of another. However, when there is not a focusing 
event, the president usually does not take the lead. This lack of leadership gives policy advocates 
and interest groups an opening to contact entrepreneurial staff and members of Congress.  
This dissertation examines three types of political entrepreneurship targeted at policy 
windows. The first is by a member of Congress; the second, by congressional staff; the third, by 
an ethnic interest group based on transnational activism.  In the last type, an ethnic interest group 
based on transnational activism: immigrants, exiles, or people with strong ethnic identities 
organize by pooling their resources to target congressional staff or a member of Congress. In the 
next chapter we will examine how policy windows affected the scope of foreign policy 
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entrepreneurship by members of Congress. Starting in 1970 there were numerous policy 
windows opening for American foreign policies toward various countries. These windo s 
included civil wars in Latin America and Africa; human rights abuses by governments in El 
Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Cambodia, China, South Africa, Sudan; humanitarian 
crises brought on by natural disasters. These crises drove citizens of the affect d countries to 
emigrate, many to the United States. In turn members of Congress and their staff started taking 
the initiative to produce legislation to affect the countries in the crisis. 
American policy toward China was settled until President Carter suddenly recognized the 
People’s Republic of China in 1979. This abrupt decision created a policy window for Congress 
to take the lead on U.S. China policy. The result, as previously mentioned, was the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA). The TRA unintentionally created a policy “crisis” among the Taiwanese-
American community because it changed the immigration quota for Taiwanese citizens, merging 
the quota for Taiwan with the quota for Mainland China and dramatically reducing the number 
of Taiwanese who could immigrate to the United States Finally, the recognition of China 
provoked a human rights crisis on Taiwan that became a catalyst for Taiwanese-Am ricans to 
organize themselves and contact Congress for help. There were many political entrepreneurs 
among Taiwanese-Americans, congressional staff, and members of Congress, all converging 
simultaneously to rapidly affect American policy toward Taiwan from the 1980s to the present. 
Taiwan stands out because it is the only example, next to Israel, that has sustained affective and 






Human Rights Abuse as Catalyst for Affective Political Entrepreneurship  
The changes within Congress during the late 1960s and early 1970s created an 
environment that encouraged the emergence of political entrepreneurs. However, these changes 
do not suffice to explain the emergence of political entrepreneurs who focused on huma  rights. 
To understand the rise of human rights, we must examine contemporary changes both within te 
United States and around the world.  
The changes within the United States and around the world changed the topics that 
members of Congress cared about. In the United States the Civil Rights movement brought home 
to many activists the importance of human rights. The Watergate scandal demonstrated the 
willingness of people in the executive branch to abuse power. The Vietnam War showed t at the 
U.S. was supporting an immoral regime and was becoming immoral in the process. The invasion 
of Cambodia and the killing of students at Kent State convinced many members of Congress that 
the Vietnam War had shifted from being a military problem to being a moral problem (Schneider 
1979, 5). Human rights abuses by a Greek military junta, the Brazilian government, the 
Indonesian military in East Timor, and the military junta in Chile convinced members of 
Congress that the American government had to stop sending financial and military support to 
such governments. This led Congress in 1973 to adopt the War Powers Resolution, which limited 
the President’s ability to deploy American troops, and to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to 
deny economic and military assistance to governments that committed human rights abuses 
(Schneider 1979, 6-7). Congress extended human rights amendments to trade agreements and 
bilateral economic assistance.   
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The emergence of human rights concerns in the Democratic-led Congress and among 
Democratic voters persuaded Jimmy Carter to use human rights as a campaign tool to win the 
Democratic nomination for president in 1976 and then make human rights a centerpiece of 
American foreign policy during his inaugural address (Schneider 1979, 9; Muravchik 1986). 
President Carter used human rights rhetoric for two reasons. The first was to provide the moral 
center to U.S. foreign policy that Democrats believed had been missing from the Nixon and Ford 
administrations. The second was to aggressively counter the Soviet Union’s actionsin places like 
Afghanistan and Angola. Carter viewed policies that emphasized human rights as replacing Cold 
War military activities in post-Vietnam America (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 1987; Cohen R 1982; 
Cohen S 1982; Cohen M 1983; Hartmann 2001).  
However, Carter was inconsistent in his human rights policies: his administraton, led by 
Patricia Derian, the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in theStat  
Department, seldom used human rights to formulate foreign policy. When it did use human 
rights to shape foreign policies, these still supported regimes that committed human rights abuses 
(Loescher 1979). In reaction, some members of Congress decided that President Carter was not 
serious about human rights, and that general human rights amendments and legislation were 
insufficient to deal with specific countries. Senators and representatives began to inves  a great 
deal of time and energy in rights violations in Angola, Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.   
Interestingly, the lawmakers received no rewards from their constituents for their efforts. 
Why would senators and representatives invest so much time and energy in specif c countries 
while knowing that their constituents did not care? To solve this puzzle, this chapter provides a 
model to explain the motivations of members of Congress and how a human rights abuse in a 
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specific country translated into American foreign policy toward the country committing the 
abuses.  
First there are the international provocations: A country decides to imprison, kill, and 
torture its citizens or to deprive its citizens of rights that are acknowledged by the United 
Nations.  
Second, information about these international provocations reaches people in the United 
States through an intermediary. Refugees from the country may travel to the United Stat s to 
testify before Congress, as may political exiles living in the United States. They also may 
communicate to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or citizens’ groups, which then 
communicate the information to Congress. Members of Congress and/or their staff may travel 
abroad to meet with NGOs and/or political prisoners. Members of Congress may emplostaff 
who have traveled to an afflicted country, have friends/relatives there, or may themselves have 
had formative experiences there. 
Third, regardless of how the member of Congress gets information about human rights 
abuses in a specific country, he or she is deeply personally affected by the information and 
decides to take action through a variety of mechanisms. This is where we see the concept of 
bonding social capital, but it is called affective politics. Once members of Congress are deeply 
personally affected by information about human rights abuses, they form close relationships with 
the sources of information and with the country suffering the abuse. The words are different, but 
they refer to the power of emotional attachments to connect people to each other and trust each 
other so that they can work as a collective.  
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Fourth, the member of Congress chooses the path of least resistance to advance his/her 
concerns. If the member of Congress is in the majority party and a member of the president’s 
party, the easiest path is to communicate privately with the president about the situation in order 
to spur immediate action through the executive branch.2 If a member of Congress is in the 
minority party and a member of the opposition party, direct communication with the president 
will likely be difficult. Moreover, communication with the congressional leadership will likely 
produce few results.  
Thus, the motivation to become a foreign policy entrepreneur will depend first on how 
deeply affected the member of Congress is by the specific human rights abuse, and cond on the 
member’s assessment of the probability of getting a result from communicatio  with 
Congressional leadership and the president. The more deeply affected the memberof Congress 
is, and the more difficult the institutional and political environment, the higher the probability 
that the member of Congress will exert extraordinary effort to become a foreign policy 
entrepreneur over years and decades.  
 
Amnesty International 
We can apply this model to the work of Amnesty International (AI). AI started in London 
in 1961. It enlisted many anti-war activists to go to college campuses to start groups that wrote 
letters to oppressive governments requesting freedom for political prisoners (Cmiel 1999). Most 
of the information that Congress received about human rights abuses came from AI, whose 
volunteers went on fact-finding missions around the world to gather information for published 
reports on human rights abuses in every country. Prisoners of conscience and priests wrot  letters 
                                                      
2 Ideology may also be a factor: if a member of Congress is ideologically opposed to the president, direct 
communication will likely not produce the desired results. However, ideology is difficult to measure. 
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to AI that described the horrible conditions in prisons and the various kinds of torture that states 
used against their populations. The information that AI published helped other human rights 
groups to start around the world, especially in the United States. “Between 1965 and 1980 the 
sheer quantity of information available on human rights abuses around the world rose 
dramatically. Fact-finding missions, academic studies, and congressional hearings all poured out. 
There were books on the subject, annual reports, and special reports.” (Cmiel, 1999, 1236) All of 
this took place mainly during the 1970s, which indicates that “the 1970s should be treated neither 
as a moment of flagging liberal energy nor as a simple adjunct to the sixtiesbut a  a moment of 
more basic political restructuring.” (Cmiel, 1999, 1234) AI led an information revolution on 
human rights with a global network of agile activists. This network provided informati n that 
had not been available 10 years earlier, and the global network sent this to politicians who could 
get media attention (Cmiel, 1999, 1238).  
An interaction between the executive branch and AI in 1976 reveals how Congress 
became dependent on AI for information. In 1976, Ronald Palmer, the deputy coordinator for 
human rights in the State Department visited Stephanie Grant in the London office. He told her 
that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was circumventing human rights leislation by ignoring 
the congressional mandate to report on human rights abuses. As a result, Palmer'soffice was 
receiving almost no information.  Palmer argued that AI should develop questions based on it 
research and give them to members of Congress so that the member could send an inquiry to the 
State Department that would have to be answered within two days. This way, AI would be able 
to get information to Palmer. The London office sent a memo of this discussion to the American 
office of AI and suggested that the American office follow Palmer’s suggestion (Cmiel, 1999, 
1238-1239)  
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The Increasing Human Rights Sensitivity of Congress 
Three factors contributed to the increasing sensitivity of members of Congress to human 
rights abuses around the world:  the pioneering investigations by Representative Donald Fraser 
(D-MN), starting in 1973 (Fraser 1977, 1979; Fraser and Salzberg 1979); the personal 
background of many new members of Congress who entered the House in 1975; and House 
members’ desire to focus on human rights to challenge Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
focus on détente with the Soviet Union during the Nixon and Ford administrations. 
Rep. Fraser had been an activist in the civil rights and anti-war movements before 
entering the House, and in 1973 he became the first House member to hold hearings on human 
rights abuses around the world. Fraser chaired the Subcommittee on International Organizations 
and Movements.  The hearings allowed human rights groups to testify and convinced many to 
seek congressional champions who could apply pressure to oppressive governments and change 
American foreign policy to embrace human rights. Rep. Fraser thus created the first policy 
window for paying attention to human rights in Congress.  
Human rights activism in the 1970s was an extension of the successful social and 
political movements of the 1960s. Three parallel movements -- civil rights, the anti-war, 
women’s rights -- had achieved their goals by 1975. The civil rights movement had achieved 
legal victories with the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, and political victories with the Voting Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1965. By 1968 the civil rights movement had produced congressional representatives in 
majority-minority Southern districts. Civil rights activists shifted their attention from the human 
rights issues posed by Jim Crow to the human rights abuses around the world.  
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The anti-war movement achieved a political victory in 1973 as President Richard Nixon 
withdrew all American troops from Vietnam. Many anti-war activists were elected to Congress 
in 1974. Other anti-war activists took positions in the federal government after Jimmy Carter was 
elected president in 1976. After the Vietnam War ended, many organizers of anti-war 
demonstrations shifted their focus to human rights abuses around the world.  
The women’s movement reached maturity in the 1970s as many women graduated from 
college and started professional careers. Many feminists shifted their focus fr m the plight of 
American women to the plight of oppressed women around the world. Civil rights, anti-war, and 
women’s activists shifted naturally from domestic political concerns to the growing international 
human rights campaign. 
Movement activists entered Congress, the executive branch and various human rights 
organizations. Representative (and later Senator) Tom Harkin (D-IA) traced his commitment to 
human rights to his time as a congressional staff member when he discovered South Vietnam’s 
“tiger cages” for prisoners. Representative Andrew Maguire (D-NJ), who entered Congress with 
the Watergate class of 1974, “began his political education by being punched in the mouth 
during a civil-rights march” (Vogelgesang, 1980, 122) Maguire also demonstrated against the 
Vietnam War and was part of the efforts to stop South African Apartheid. Rep. Fraser w s active 
in the civil rights and anti-war movements. Andrew Young was Martin Luther King’s 
collaborator during the civil rights movement, and then was elected to the House in 1972 from 
Georgia before becoming the highest black official as Ambassador to the UN during the Car er 
Administration (See also DeRoche, 2003; Haskins, 1979). Allard Lowenstein (D-NY, 1969-
1971) was an activist in the civil rights movement and anti-war movement before and after 
serving a single term in the House. Lowenstein became the U.S. representative to the UN Human 
 47 
Rights Commission in 1977 under the Carter Administration. (See also Chafe, 1993). Patricia
Derian was an activist in the civil rights movement before being appointed by President Carter as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. 
This spillover from social movements into Congress and the executive branch was based 
on an implicit recognition of the connections between the movements and international human 
rights. “By the 1970s, both blacks and whites saw promotion of international human rights as a 
logical extension of their own work within the United States during the 1960s. Patricia Derian, 
the highest-ranking political appointee in the Carter administration with the most explicit 
mandate on human rights, found remarkable overlap between what she experienced as a civil-
rights activist in Mississippi and what she found abroad in nations like Argentina, most notable 
for their violations of human rights. Concern with South African apartheid became a focal point 
for U.S. student activism in the 1970s because of the connection between concern about racial 
discrimination in both the United States and the Republic of South Africa.” (Vogelgesan , 1980, 
122-123)  
These social activists were inspired by the idealism of President John F. Kennedy. “A 
disproportionate number were veterans of the Peace Corps, the symbol of Kennedy-era idealism. 
Their approach to politics was not rooted in party loyalty or interest-group advocacy. They were 
Kennedy's children, and, like him, they were committed to a new kind of politics-a politics f 
ideas.” (Schneider, 1989) They grew up comfortable with television and focused on using 
government to achieve social justice. The social activists who entered Congress in 1975 had very 
little political experience in terms of holding previous elected offices. Instead, they had been 
community organizers and Peace Corps volunteers. “Many members… had grass-roots 
organizing experience as activists in various liberal movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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‘We were the sixties generation that did not drop out,’ [Representative] Bob Edgar [D-PA] said.” 
(Schneider, 1989)  
 By examining the biographies of House members who entered Congress in 1975, we find 
many links between grassroots activism and their congressional activities. Rep. Edgar started as 
a minister and street activist in Philadelphia and helped establish a shelterfor women and 
families. “I spent the late 1960s and early 1970s dealing with racial issues, gang-rel ted issues, 
and housing issues in the city.”  (Schneider, 1989) Representative Toby Moffett (D-CT) had 
entered the Peace Corps with his wife and then moved to Washington to start a family. Moffett 
had worked with street gangs to do storefront-school training projects. He worked in th  Office 
of Students and Youth at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, during the Nixon 
Administration. After Kent State and the invasion of Cambodia he quit and worked for Senator 
Walter Mondale (D-MN). As a staffer in Sen. Mondale’s office, Moffett organized hearings for 
the Select Committee on Children and Youth. After that he went to Connecticut and started the 
Connecticut Citizen Action Group for Ralph Nader. After running this group for three years he 
entered Congress. 
Once social activists entered Congress in 1975, they turned their attention toward human 
rights abuses in many countries, including El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, the SovietUnion, 
South Africa and Cambodia. Refugees and exiles from afflicted regions of the world either 
traveled to the United States or communicated with activists within the United States. They sent 
information about human rights abuses to both activists and members of Congress. Information 
about torture in Soviet prisons, death squads in Latin American countries, racial discrmination 
in South Africa, and killing fields in Cambodia spawned human rights groups around the world 
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and inspired members of Congress to hold hearings and write amendments to laws to deal with 
these abuses.  
The hearings held by the Fraser Subcommittee revealed many countries committing 
human rights abuses. After the Fraser Committee published its report in 1974, Congress pass d 
legislation that targeted three main areas: foreign aid, lethal aid, and voting power for 
developmental aid. With foreign aid, Congress cut off funds to any country found to be in 
systematic gross violations of human rights. With lethal aid, Congress cut off sales of police and 
military equipment to countries found to be arresting people without following due process and 
then torturing prisoners. With voting power for developmental aid, Congress instructed 
representatives to the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development 
Association, to vote to cut off development aid to any country that was found to be in gross 
violations of human rights (Loescher 1977; Salzberg 1986). 
In nearly every case of foreign policy entrepreneurship that followed the model described 
above, the international provocations (human rights abuses in a country) led to outputs (changes 
in American foreign policy toward the abusing country). To demonstrate the utility of the model, 
I apply it to the cases of the Soviet Union, Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa.  
The cases will be discussed in two categories. The first category includes countries that 
were the target of human rights legislation in a Cold War context, for which the Sovit Union 
serves as an example. The second category includes countries that were the targe s of 
amendments and stand-alone legislation in an exclusively human rights context, such as
Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, and Uganda. In each of these cases I will examine the 
specific human rights abuses in the country, the intermediaries who brought attention r garding 
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the abuses to members of Congress, and the congressional political entrepreneurs who both
invested time investigating the abuses and invested energy trying to pass legislation that would 
help end the abuses. I will also discuss the final legislative outcome and its impact. 
 
The Soviet Union 
The activists from the social movements of the 1950s and 60s entered Congress just as 
the Ford administration was pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, which meant a reduced 
American focus on human rights issues with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. 
This conflict of policy interest produced a growing tension between Congress and the executiv  
branch. Human rights legislation became an important tool for Congress to keep the reluctant 
Ford administration, and specifically Secretary of State Kissinger, focused on human rights. The 
Soviet government arrested and tortured political dissidents, producing political ac vists within 
the Soviet Union who self-published newsletters and books detailing the many ways that the
regime systematically tortured its citizens, both physically and psychologica ly. The Soviet 
government also prevented its Jewish citizens from emigrating to Western Europe and North 
America. These Jewish citizens became known as “refuseniks”. 
Members of Congress responded to Soviet human rights abuses by shepherding 
legislation that made American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union dependent on the Soviet 
government improving its record with both political dissidents and refuseniks.  Representative 
Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) was instrumental in creating the American delegation to the Helsinki 
Accords, an international alliance that monitored human rights abuses in the Soviet Union 
(Albright and Friendly 1986; Korey 1993). Representative Thomas Vanik (D-OH) and Senator 
Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) successfully promoted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which 
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made American-Soviet trade policy contingent on Jewish citizens being allowed t  leave the 
Soviet Union (Franck and Weisband 1979; Robson 1989).  
 After Israel was founded in 1948, the Soviet Union began a series of actions to suppress 
Jewish culture. “The period between Israel’s birth in May 1948 and Soviet Premier Joseph 
Stalin’s death in March 1953 witnessed the gradual elimination of Jewish religion and culture 
and their institutions in the Soviet Union. In addition, the open Soviet assault on assimilated 
Jewish ‘cosmopolitans’ during these years resulted in discrimination and the imprisonment of 
hundreds of Jews.” (Frey 2002; See also Ro’I 1991; Pinkus 1998, Pinkus and Frankel 1984) The 
Soviet crackdown on Jews was part of a larger crackdown on dissidents. In the mid-1960s a 
human-rights movement emerged in the Soviet Union. “It sprang up in 1965 because of the 
arrests of several established dissenters…. Underground writing known as samizdat also made an 
explicit connection between Soviet protest and internationally recognized human rights.” 
(Vogelgesang 1980)  
The plight of Soviet Jews became the focus of American Jews, the Soviet Jewry 
Movement (SJM), during the 1960s as a distant echo of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust. Memories of the Holocaust were being reintroduced to the American public.
American Jews felt guilty about ignoring the genocidal actions of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. 
As Soviet discrimination against and persecution of Jews in the 1950s and 1960s increased, the 
actions reminded American Jewry of the Nazi efforts preceding the Holocaust (Frey 2002). 
American Jews put pressure on members of Congress and the executive branch to condemn the 
actions of the Soviet Union and help facilitate emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.  
 These efforts reached legislative fruition when Senator Jackson introduced an amendment 
in 1972 tying U.S.-Soviet trade relations to the Soviet Union’s granting permission to Jews to 
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emigrate. Jackson introduced his amendment because he believed that “something should have 
been done about repression of Jews in the 1930s in the interest of world peace.” (Robson 1989, 
33) More than that, though, he and his allies, doubting that détente would yield benign Soviet 
behavior, sought to combat détente and used human rights as their weapon. “The Jacksonites 
were aiming more at derailing detente than at promoting human rights, but a precedent was 
nonetheless established.” (Feffer 2004) There was a massive effort by American Jewish 
organizations to pass the Jackson-Vanick Amendment. Jackson announced his amendment to the 
National Conference on Soviet Jewry, an umbrella organization comprising B’nai B’rith, the 
American Jewish Committee, 32 other national Jewish organizations and more than 200 local 
Jewish agencies (Franck and Weisband 1979, 189). This network of Jewish organizations 
produced 259 co-sponsors when Rep. Vanik introduced the amendment in the House in 1973. 
Rep. Vanik’s legislative aide, Mark Talisman, helped secure passage of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment. He called every congressional office to secure co-sponsorship from members and 
he negotiated directly with Jewish lobbying groups. Talisman “undertook a sixteen-hour-a-day 
campaign to contact every one of 435 Congressional offices, cajoling key staffers o secure co-
sponsorship of the amendment by their principals. He called some offices as many as fifteen 
times.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 236) The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was finally passed 
and became part of the 1974 Trade Act.  
 Another legislative product of the SJM was the U.S. Helsinki Commission to the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE had been conceived by 
the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s to legitimize the Soviet territorial gains from World 
War II. The CSCE was organized through a series of meetings culminating in Helsinki, Finland, 
with the Final Act. The Helsinki accords constituted  
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a far-ranging set of agreements among 35 countries in Europe, North America, 
and the Soviet bloc, represented the high-water mark of detente. Numerous 
bargaining positions had to be accommodated at the negotiating table. … 
[H]uman rights advocates wanted the Eastern bloc countries to adhere to a set of 
principles guaranteeing individual rights of expression, assembly, and so on. The 
final accords did include human rights provisions, though no one in the West 
expected the governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to pay 
anything but lip service to the human rights protocols. (Feffer 2004, 32) 
 
Following the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki, Congress sent a delegation of 18 
representatives, led by Speaker Carl Albert, to the Soviet Union in 1975 to discuss issue of 
compliance. A member of that delegation was freshman Rep. Fenwick. She met with r fuseniks, 
Soviet Jews who had been denied exit visas to join families in Israel. The meetings were 
arranged by an American Jewish organization, but the refuseniks took the initiative to v sit the 
congressional delegation (Korey 1993, 22). Fenwick was struck by the courage and the pathos of 
the Soviet Jews who were being denied freedom to emigrate to Israel.  
“We would meet them at night in hotels in Moscow and Leningrad,” she later
recalled, “and I would ask, ‘How do you dare to come see us here?’” in a setting 
where no visitor went unnoticed by the Soviet secret police. “’Don’t you 
understand?’” she recalls the universal reply. “’That’s our only hope. We’ve seen 
you. Now they [the KGB] know you’ve seen us.’” (Albright and Friendly 1986, 
291) 
 
One visitor deeply touched Rep. Fenwick. Lilia Tenenboim Roitburd was a 39-year-old mother
from Odessa. She and her husband, Lev, had been applying for exit visas for 3 years. “Lev was 
fired from his engineering job, denounced in the local newspaper as ‘an imperialist puppet,’ and 
later arrested for allegedly striking a police officer.” (Korey 1993, 23) Lilia was visiting Fenwick 
because Lev had disappeared a month earlier as he was traveling to Moscow to get help with the 
exit visa.  
 
“She was desperate,” Representative Fenwick remembered. “She brought out a 
photograph that showed three people: a solemn-eyed little boy, a solidly built 
man, and a good-looking woman. It had been taken four months earlier. It was her 
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family, but she was unrecognizable; the strain had aged her so much. That woman 
haunted me. I wanted to do something for Lilia, and the Commission bill was 
what I did. Like all my legislation, it comes from some human problem.” 
(Albright and Friendly 1986, 291-292) 
 
Korey notes that Fenwick  
was overwrought by the difference between Lilia’s image on a sapshot and the 
“ravaged face” of the woman pleading her family’s case. “I still have nightmares 
about it,” she would tell listeners upon returning to the United States. (Korey 
1993, 23) 
  
Fenwick told herself: “We’ve got to do something for Lilia. We’ve got to do something.” (Korey 
1993, 23) When she returned to Washington she read the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords and 
decided that the human rights provisions (Basket III) of the Final Act would help Soviet Jews get 
to Israel. On September 9, 1975, she introduced a bill to create a commission that would press 
countries to comply with the Helsinki Accords and monitor violations of the Final Act. On 
November 17, 1975, Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) introduced her bill before the Senate. The 
Commission was designed to include members from both houses of Congress and from the 
executive branch to demonstrate national unity in favor of compliance with human rights.
President Gerald Ford, who had gone to Helsinki to sign the Final Act, signed the Fenwick-Case 
Bill into law on June 3, 1976.  
 The SJM found its cohesion with the Helsinki Final Act. The humanitarian provisions of 
the Final Act mandated the reunification of families, increased contact among pe ple, and 
improved communication flows. After Helsinki the member nations met in Belgrade in 1978, in 
Madrid in 1983, and in Vienna in 1989. Yet, despite the Final Act, the Soviet Union increased its 
crackdown on Soviet Jews and other dissidents in the late 1970s. Vogelgesang notes that th  
Soviet leaders were likely surprised that the Final Act became a rallying point for internal 
dissension. There was also growing unrest across Eastern Europe as human rights activists used 
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the Final Act to protest their governments. The Soviet Union wanted to make sure that this unrest 
did not affect it as well. The Soviet economy was crumbling, leading to increasing di satisfaction 
with the Soviet government. Finally, aging Soviet leaders were very conservativ  and sensitive 
to criticism from dissidents and Jews. Thus, despite the creation of the U.S. Helsinki 
Commission, the condition of Soviet Jews got worse instead of better, and the U.S. Congress was 
forced to deal with refuseniks until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.  However, the Helsinki 
Commission helped institutionalize human rights in American foreign policy (Galey 1985), 
translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into American foreign policy (Galey 
1998). The Helsinki Accords also changed global norms on human rights and helped speed up 
the demise of Communism (Peterson 2009, Thomas 1997).  
 We can understand the efforts of Senator Jackson, Rep. Vanik, and Rep. Fenwick, by 
applying the four elements of the model. The input came from the Soviet crackdown on 
dissidents and refusal to grant exit visas to Soviet Jews to travel to Israel. The information came 
from both political dissidents, who self-published books and magazines documenting horrible 
prison conditions in the Soviet Union (Vogelgesang 1980), and the SJM, which passed 
information from the Soviet Union to American Jewish groups that responded because they felt 
guilty about America’s failure to respond adequately to the Jewish Holocaust in Nazi Germany 
(Frey 2002). The information reached members of Congress through the Soviet dissidents an  
the SJM, culminating in the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Senator Jackson had ties to American 
Jewish organizations, and Rep. Vanik employed staff who had connections to Jewish 
organizations. They were in the majority parties in Congress, facing a Republican administration 
that sought to decrease the focus on human rights. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment represented 
the path of least resistance for them, coupled with great assistance from American J wish 
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organizations. Rep. Fenwick received information directly from a refusenik during her visit in 
the Soviet Union and she was deeply personally affected by the information. Even though se 
was a freshman representative lacking institutional resources and a member of the minority 
party, her bill to create the commission resonated with her colleagues, who were also interested 
in human rights. Her colleague, Senator Case, gave her institutional weight by sponsoring her 
amendment in the Senate. This legislation constituted her path of least resistanc. The personal 
impact is more apparent for Rep. Fenwick than for Rep. Vanik or Senator Jackson, but the 
international provocations and information are obvious in both cases.  
 
Cambodia 
After the victorious Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, they marched 
Cambodians, including the sick and the elderly, out of the cities to create collective farms. The 
Khmer Rouge established concentration camps for the sole purpose of interrogating, torturing, 
and killing Cambodians who were suspected of disobedience. Hundreds of thousands of 
Cambodians died in the camps, and many more thousands died from untreated diseases while 
working the collective farms. Fortunately, in the midst of mass death and destruction, a few 
hundred Cambodians managed to escape. The Khmer Rouge had cut off all contact with the 
outside world as they conducted this experiment in pure Communism, so the first information 
about this genocide came from Cambodians who fled through refugee camps in Thailand. For 
example, there is the story of Ly Linn, one of many told to New York Times correspondent Henry 
Kamm and U.S. embassy officials at Cambodian refugee camps (Vogelgesang 1980). Linn was 
born into the upper middle class in Phnom Penh. On April 17, 1975 Communist Khmer Rouge 
soldiers broke into her home and forced her and her family to leave Phnom Penh with thousands 
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of other Cambodians. Most of her relatives died on the month-long march to the small rural 
villages in southeastern Cambodia near the Vietnamese border. Linn was made to work in 
existing fields and carve new fields out of the jungle. Her only food was banana tree roots and 
leaves. The Khmer Rouge soldiers learned her husband was a lieutenant in the army in General 
Lon Nol’s government and killed him. Once her husband disappeared, Ly Linn decided to make 
a run for freedom. She left with her two-year-old son and sister-in-law in the night a d traveled 
to Vietnam. They bribed village officials along the way with jewels hidden on their bodies and 
worked in the villages until they arrived by separate routes in Saigon. She hid in a sugar-cane 
field for three days and nights before leaving on a boat run by a Cambodian refugee who was 
helping many others to escape to Thailand. While in the Thai refugee camp she applied for 
emigration to the United States. 
 The events in Cambodia can be described as genocide (Hannum 1989). The Khmer 
Rouge forcibly moved half of the population to rural areas to provide compulsory agricultural 
production. They eliminated money, markets, wages, and salaries. They prohibited private 
property, including a family's cooking utensils, clothing, and personal effects. They separated 
children from parents and forced children to spy on parents. In addition, the Khmer Roug 
destroyed organized religion and prohibited religious practice. They stopped all education and 
eliminated all government institutions. “The radical transformation of Cambodia envisaged by 
the Khmer Rouge required the racial, social, ideological, and political purification of the 
Cambodian nation, through the sociological and physical liquidation of a variety of groups 
considered to be irremediably tainted by their association with the old social order or otherwise 
unsuited to the intended new order. To achieve this goal, the Khmer Rouge government 
instituted unremitting, absolute dictatorship over a populace ruled by terror.” (Hannum 1989, 85)  
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 With little information of the atrocities seeping out beyond Cambodia, the United States 
and the international community responded very slowly. The information that did emerge from 
refugees and American foreign service officers seemed unbelievable. Power (2002) writes about 
Charles Twining, a foreign service officer who interviewed refugees arriving at the Thai-
Cambodia border and initially  
did not even file a report because he found the refugees’ recollections literally 
“inconceivable” and felt he would be laughed at back in Washington. But every 
time he took the four-hour car journey to the border, he found it harder to deny 
the reality of the atrocities. The Cambodians had heard the howlsof their starving 
infants. They had watched KR [Khmer Rouge] cadres use plastic bags to 
suffocate Buddhist monks. They had seen their loved ones murdered by teenage 
warriors who mechanically delivered the blow of a hoe to the back of the neck. 
(Power 2002, 115)  
 
The Khmer Rouge was killing groups of people, anyone who was deemed suspicious for any 
reason.  
 One of the few American politicians who heard these stories was Representative S ephen 
Solarz (D-NY), who became very engaged. He traveled in 1976 to Bangkok with a congressional 
delegation and heard from Cambodian refugees about the conditions they had survived. “Solarz 
was seized by what he was told about the Khmer Rouge.” (Winik 1993) He returned to 
Washington and organized hearings on “Human Rights in Cambodia.” “For Solarz, the events in 
Cambodia had ominous echoes of the Holocaust. ‘We have a moral obligation to consider every 
conceivable possibility of doing something about the situation. I am not simply talking bout 
making statements so that we can wallow in our own sense of virtue. I am talking about doing 
something which can bring a criminal regime to its senses and prevent a continuation of what has 
happened.’” (Hearing on Human Rights in Cambodia, p. 39, cited in Winik 1993, 126) Solarz 
successfully worked with Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) to change the refugee laws so that 15,000 
Cambodians could enter the United States immediately as a group.  
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In January 1979, compelled by security concerns, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, driving 
the Khmer Rouge from power and installing the People’s Republic of Democratic Kampuchea 
(PRK). This invasion sparked retaliation by the Chinese government, which invaded Vietnam in 
February 1979. Thailand joined China to nurture a guerilla movement on Cambodia’s border 
with Vietnam that benefited the Khmer Rouge. By 1980 three guerilla groups vied with the PRK 
for supremacy in Cambodia.  
There was constant war among the various factions until Vietnam succeeded in driving 
out the guerilla groups in 1985 and setting up Cambodia as a satellite state for Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, the PRK government behaved in much the same way as the Khmer Rouge had 
between 1975 and 1979 (Winik 1993, 132). Because of the brutality exhibited by the PRK 
government, the Khmer Rouge regained enough popularity and military strength to defeat it, 
especially after the Khmer Rouge claimed to renounce Communism and Pol Pot announced his 
retirement.   
 By 1985 the Reagan Administration was planning to fund another insurgent group, the 
Non-Communist Resistance (NCR), as part of its effort to support anti-communist g erilla 
movements around the world. Simultaneously, Rep. Solarz helped authorize $5 million in 
economic aid to the NCR. This economic aid provided the spark that the NCR needed to counter 
the superior manpower of the Khmer Rouge. This produced a military stalemate by 1988, when 
the international and domestic political environment began to change. The Soviet Union 
normalized relations with China and pressured Vietnam to leave Cambodia. An internationally 
brokered peace agreement returned Prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state and led the 
Cambodian factions to initiate discussions about sharing power.  
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This changed international and political environment concerned Rep. Solarz. He feared 
that once the PRK government left the Khmer Rouge would return to power and resume the 
genocide. He decided that the United States had to get actively involved in brokering a peace 
between the factions, and that meant going beyond economic aid to the NCR. He wanted to giv  
the NCR military (or “lethal”) aid, so that it would have a better bargaining chip against the 
forces of the Khmer Rouge and the PRK. Solarz had backing for this effort from President 
Reagan in 1988, when Reagan met with Sihanouk and pledged more economic aid for the NCR. 
President George H.W. Bush met with Chinese leaders in February 1989 to discuss a peace 
settlement in Cambodia. But it was Solarz who formulated the policy for Cambodia.  
 Solarz used his chair position on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee to first establish 
during March 1989 hearings that the Bush Administration would support lethal aid to the NCR 
and then started engaging in shuttle diplomacy to see if lethal aid would actually work as a 
policy. “He met with virtually all the key actors relevant to the Cambodia settlement, testing his 
ideas against the realities of the region. In addition to solidifying his thinking, the trip also had 
the benefit of shoring up his credibility and authority at home on the issue.” (Winik 1993, 149) 
Overall, Solarz learned that lethal aid was the right policy at that time, and he returned to 
Washington to persuade the Bush Administration to adopt this policy.  
 Despite this intense diplomatic and political work, Solarz encountered resistance to lethal 
aid from Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(SFRC), because the SFRC staff specialists were against lethal aid to any n n-communist group 
around the world. Solarz overcame this resistance by forming a political all ance with freshman 
Senator Charles Robb (D-VA). Solarz convinced Robb to sponsor an amendment to the relevant 
State Department Authorization bill that regularly passed through the SFRC. He formed an 
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alliance with Robb by persuading Vice President Dan Quayle, a supporter of lethal aid to the 
NCR, to contact Robb. This was an essential act of coalition-building on Solarz’s part: enlisting 
the help of the Vice-President in the opposition party to call a freshman senator of you party. 
Robb faced resistance in the SFRC from Senator Pell and Senator Alan Cranston, the chair of the 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. During markup sessions on the Subcommittee, 
Sen. Cranston organized his fellow Democrats to criticize the lethal aid amendment and postpone 
a vote on it, essentially killing the amendment in the subcommittee. Sen. Robb was forced to go 
to the Senate Floor and offer his amendment during the final debate on the bill, which was 
scheduled for a vote by the full Senate five weeks later.  
This delay between the subcommittee defeat and the floor vote gave both Solarz and 
Robb the ability to line up a coalition of supporters that passed the amendment in the Senate. 
(Solarz had passed the lethal aid amendment in the House, so the Senate remained the final 
obstacle.) The Bush Administration had already come out in support of lethal aid to the NCR. 
Robb and Solarz set out to line up the votes of moderate Republicans and Democrats. Solarz 
took extraordinary steps in this effort. In addition to giving Robb the support of his staff, Sol rz 
“wrote a detailed, three-page, single-spaced letter urging senators to support a possible Robb 
amendment. The letter was marked ‘Urgent,’ and was co-signed by HFAC Chairman Dante 
Fascell, and Congressmen Bill Richardson, Robert Torricelli, and Charles Wilson. … Solarz 
hand-carried more than 50 copies of his letter and strode onto the Senate floor after a vote on 
another issue…One by one, Solarz stopped Senate Democrats, handed them his letter, and 
pleaded for them to support Robb.” (Winik 1993, 187-188) 
After Robb pressed his Senate colleagues heavily, the amendment passed 59-39. Robb 
had put together a coalition that crossed party and ideological lines (Winik 1993, 192). 
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Throughout this effort, Cambodian-Americans had been very active, attending the subcommittee 
and committee hearings, and sending letters to senators on the SFRC. However, this grassroots 
organizing effort had no impact on the SFRC. Instead it served to further motivate Robb by 
giving him the sense that he had the moral high ground (Winik 1993, 177).  
In addition to this emotional support, Robb forged a personal bond with Solarz and 
senators to help build the coalition. The connection to Solarz was solidified when he testified 
before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This relat onship with Solarz 
gave Robb intense motivation (Winik 1993, 167). Robb built his coalition with fellow senators 
who had grown close to him as a Vietnam War veteran, such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ). 
McCain had spent five and a half years in an American POW camp in Vietnam during the war. 
McCain helped Robb enlist the support of fellow moderate Republicans and Democrats during 
the final days before the vote (Winik 1993, 186).  
Despite the victory in the Senate that paved the way for lethal aid to the NCR, the 
international environment made lethal aid nearly a moot issue. Solarz realized that lethal aid was 
not enough to provide a final resolution for Cambodia once Vietnam removed the PRK 
government. He began to think of what the endgame for Cambodia might look like. He decided 
to get the United Nations involved to administer elections in Cambodia and ensure a peac ful 
transition to democracy that did not simultaneously raise the possibility of the Khmr Rouge 
coming back into power. He developed a UN Interim Trusteeship Perm Five Plan in which the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council would authorize the UN to take over the 
sovereignty of Cambodia to ensure the transition to a peaceful democratic government.  
Solarz had presented the idea of a UN Interim Trusteeship to both Sihanouk and the 
prime minister of Singapore, with positive reviews, and he decided to focus on making it a 
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reality. In the steps that he took to realize the UN plan, Solarz first enlisted the help of Australia, 
which presented the plan as its own plan for Cambodia. Next, Solarz contacted the State 
Department to see if the Bush Administration would back the plan, and received news that it 
would. Solarz’s political stature was rising. Solarz presented the UN plan to the State 
Department, which was reluctant to accept it, but, lacking an alternative policy, was forced to go 
along. Next, the NCR and the UN Security Council both endorsed the plan. 
The only obstacle for Solarz was the U.S. Senate. In both houses of Congress the critics 
of the UN plan either had misconceptions about what was happening in Cambodia or had the 
wrong information. They charged that aid to the NCR was also going to the Khmer Rouge and 
that the Khmer Rouge would be brought back into power with the help of Congress. They argued 
that the Chinese government was supporting the Khmer Rouge in its bid to take back power, and 
that any UN Plan that included the Khmer Rouge in a governing body was, ipso, facto, a plan to 
return the Khmer Rouge to power. No one in Congress wanted the Khmer Rouge to return to 
power and recommence the genocide of the late 1970s, but by 1989 and 1990 few members of 
Congress, except Rep. Solarz, Sen. Robb, Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), and Senator John Kery 
(D-MA) knew the facts on the ground.  
In the end, international events overtook the Cambodia debate in Congress. Once Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in August 1990, few, if any, members of Congress focused on Cambodia. 
Moreover, by that time the UN negotiations were finalized. On August 29, 1990, the Perm Fiv  
announced a plan that aligned perfectly with Solarz’s initial idea. This announcement re oved 
the issue from congressional debate when the four factions in Cambodia quickly agreed to the 
plan. The final disagreement was over the level of covert lethal and overt economic aid that 
Congress would authorize for the NCR and for humanitarian purposes, such as for the children of 
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Cambodia. The Bush Administration struck a deal with the Senate critics to maintain the overt 
aid, and eventually turn covert aid into overt aid, on a last-minute amendment to the State 
Department authorization bill. The bill was passed and President Bush signed it into law. 
Afterwards, Congress focused on the international crisis brewing in the Middle East. This 
effectively ended America’s focus on Southeast Asia, which had been continuous from 1960 to 
1990, as the Middle East dominated American foreign policy for the next 20 years.  
We can see the four elements of the model present in Cambodia. The international 
provocations were striking. Cambodia experienced genocide that rivaled the most extreme 
conditions in Nazi Germany during the Jewish Holocaust. Information about these conditions 
reached Rep. Solarz in 1975. He was so affected that he immediately organized hearings, despite 
being a freshman in the House, and his interest in Cambodia remained until he left Congress in 
1993. A hearing was the path of least resistance for Solarz during his early years in the House. 
Once Solarz became Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee in 1981, a hearing was no 
longer adequate as a response to the overwhelming information coming out of Cambodia. He 
was in a position to write legislation that would easily pass the Subcommittee and then pass the 
House. By the 1980s Solarz was a recognized authority, if not the expert, on Cambodia and a 
slew of other international issues, so legislation by his subcommittee was almo t guaranteed to 
pass the House. The only challenge was the Senate. His strategy in the Senate was to find allies 
who could influence other senators.  
The personal background of Senator Robb made him a suitable ally for Solarz. Robb was 
a celebrity because President Lyndon Johnson was his father-in-law, and Robb had become a 
major player in Southern politics. Sen. Robb had used his celebrity status to get a seat on th  
SFRC and he emphasized his foreign policy credentials more than his domestic policy oncerns. 
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Senator Robb’s celebrity status was a valuable asset for Solarz because it enabled Solarz to turn 
his strategic relationship with Robb into the coalition in the Senate that passed the l thal aid 
amendment. As mentioned in the first chapter, coalition-building is an important skill for 
political entrepreneurs, especially for those who take the path of least resistance. Few political 
entrepreneurs have the desire or skill to do everything on their own, so having influential allies is 
critical for passing legislation.  
 
El Salvador 
 El Salvador has a history of political oppression, starting in 1932. Its politics, economy 
and military are linked to preserve the power of the 14 families that control 60 percent of its farm 
land. Its economy is concentrated in agriculture, but the land is unequally distributed. “Four 
percent of the farms account for over 60 percent of the land area, while 70 percent of all farms 
account for only 11 percent of land area. Two percent of the citizens own 60 percent of the land, 
while most peasants have no land or such small holdings that they must work for the larger 
landholders to supplement their incomes.” (Vogelgesang 1980, 167) This unequal distribution of 
land and income leads to extreme poverty among the peasants. In the 1970s there were over 400 
people per square mile, which was the highest population density in Latin America. Moreover, at 
that time over 200,000 peasants were landless. This was the most severe imbalance of land and
labor in Latin America. (LeoGrande and Robbins 1980, 1085)  
These economic inequalities caused periodic political turmoil in El Salvador, with the 
most extreme occurring in 1932 with La Matanza (Anderson 1971), when the armed forces to k 
control of the government to suppress a massive peasant uprising. The 14 families that control 
the country joined forces with the military to kill the organizers of peasant revolts, using death 
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squads that went from village to village and killed all peasants who were suspected of being 
sympathetic to the rebels. 30,000 Salvadorans were killed in La Matanza. (LeoGrande and 
Robbins 1980, 1085) After 1932 the military was always suspicious of the peasants and the 
peasants did not trust the army or ruling families. The government denied the peasants the right 
to organize, and elections were rigged in both 1972 and 1977 (Vogelgesang 1980, 168-169).  
The peasants started to fight back in the mid-1970s by organizing into the Popular 
Revolutionary Bloc. They kidnapped and killed members of the fourteen families. Th  
government retaliated by creating right-wing paramilitary organizations that went into the 
countryside to harass and kill peasant leaders. “According to some estimate, as many as half of 
the approximately 40,000 victims of the current conflict in El Salvador were killed by death 
squads, most of them rightist in their orientation.” (Livingstone 1984, 240) Death squads were 
common in Latin America and they were effective. “Some reports describe custom-built vans 
outfitted as mobile torture chambers that cruise the streets of San Salvador se rching for victims. 
Once abducted, victims are subjected to electric shocks and other torture in the va, and then 
either released or their bodies dumped along the roadside.” (Livingstone 1984, 243) These 
hostile conditions caused thousands of Salvadorans to leave.  
Salvadoran refugees started an exodus to the United States to escape the civil war. They 
entered illegally along the Mexican border, transported in many cases by r ligious groups (Brett 
1994). The religious groups turned thousands of churches into sanctuaries for Salvadorans. In 
addition, the religious groups tried to conceal the identities of the Salvadoran refugees. They 
often defied U.S. immigration laws based on their sense of religious duty (Mims 1989, 60-61). 
At the time, American immigration law identified Salvadorans as economic refuge s, not 
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political refugees, and thus Salvadorans were immediately deported back to El Salvador once 
they were captured by immigration officials.  
In addition to rejecting Salvadoran refugees, the Reagan administration began sending 
financial aid to the Salvadoran government to combat communism. Reagan followed Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick’s advice to distinguish totalitarian governments from authoritarian governments. For 
Reagan, totalitarian and communist were identical, and he saw Latin America as the place where 
the United States faced the greatest threat from the Soviet Union (Bright 1990). Therefore, 
Reagan increased foreign aid to Latin American governments to help them defeat communist 
insurgencies. El Salvador was one of the main targets of this aid (Fisher 1982, Weissman 1995). 
In addition to aiding the government, the United States trained military officers rom El Salvador 
at the School of the Americas (SOA) (Fitch 1981). 
This combination of foreign aid, military training, and immigration policy provided the 
ingredients for political entrepreneurship by Representative John Joseph “Joe” Moakley (D-
MA). Rep. Moakley’s district included an area of Boston called Jamaica Plain. He was elected in 
1972 and expressed no interest in foreign policy. He described himself as a “bread-and-butter” 
congressman who devoted himself entirely to constituent services. That changed in the early 
1980s.   
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many Salvadoran refugees began moving into Jamaica 
Plain. They were transported by Catholic organizations and placed in Catholic churches. At the 
same time, residents in the neighborhood began to become frustrated by American policy toward 
El Salvador. Virginia Vogel Zanger had close friends living in El Salvador wh m she had met 
when she was an anti-war activist in 1971, protesting the Vietnam War. As the civil war 
escalated in El Salvador, Zanger decided to start organizing her community in Jamaica Plain. 
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Zanger had a meeting with other Jamaica Plain residents in her house. Most were neighbors, 
some were friends. The organization Zanger co-founded was the Jamaica Plain Committee on 
Central America (JPCOCA).  
Once JPCOCA became active, the members noticed Salvadoran refugees living in the 
neighborhood and learned they faced deportation if caught and then a grim fate at the hands of 
the death squads. After consulting with some professional lobbying groups and Zanger’s brother, 
who worked for a congressman, JPCOCA sent a letter to Rep. Moakley asking for a meeting 
with him to discuss U.S. policy toward El Salvador. At the meeting, JPCOCA told Moakley 
about Salvadoran refugees being sent back to certain death, and Moakley asked his aid, Jim 
McGovern, to determine if this was happening. Once McGovern confirmed it, Moakley wrote an 
amendment to the immigration law allowing Temporary Protected Status for allrefugees from El 
Salvador.  
Rep. Moakley tells a somewhat different version of the story. He reports that he metwith 
constituents at post offices in Jamaica Plain and that refugees from El Salvador met with him to 
explain their situation. After meeting with these refugees, Moakley contacted McGovern and set 
out to change the immigration law. Moakley’s effort to create Temporary Protected Status (TPS) 
for all refugees from El Salvador took nearly a decade to pass into law. (Moakley, John Joseph. 
Interviewed by Robert Allison. John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-001. 2 April 
2001) 
Moakley was not the only member of Congress to take an interest in El Salvador. 
Representative Robert F. Drinian (D-MA) was a Catholic priest who visited El Salvador in 1978. 
Rep. Drinian had held a press conference in Washington in which he revealed reports about 
murders, disappearances, or imprisonments of peasant men. (Vogelgesang 1980, 175)  
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The Carter Administration had started sending foreign aid to El Salvador’s military when 
the civil war begun. However, this aid was cut when a National Guard death squad raped and 
murdered four American nuns and a laywoman on December 2, 1980. The Carter Administration 
cut aid as a way to pressure El Salvador’s government to eliminate the death squads and improve 
its human rights record. The Reagan Administration took office six weeks later and reinstated the 
aid.  
Rep. Moakley began pressuring the Reagan administration to cut foreign aid to El 
Salvador’s military. When he learned from his constituents that refugees in his district were 
being deported, he began to target changing the immigration law. He learned from his aide, Jim 
McGovern, that 50,000 noncombatants were being killed in a country that had the same 
population as Massachusetts. First he wrote to Reagan’s attorney general, Ed Meese, to change 
the immigration law so that Salvadorans in the United States could remain under a limited 
extended volunteer departure with green cards (Moakley 2001). When that did not work, 
Moakley decided to write legislation to give Salvadorans Temporary Protected Status. Starting in 
1983, Moakley introduced legislation to protect Salvadoran refugees using the “Extended 
Voluntary Departure” provision that allowed a temporary stay of deportation and work 
authorization.  
Moakley faced resistance from two sources: the Reagan administration and the fe eral 
courts. The Reagan Administration defined Salvadoran refugees as economic refugees, or illegal 
immigrants, instead of as political refugees requiring sanctuary in theUnit d States. The 
Attorney General had the power to grant refugee status to the Salvadorans, but he ref sed. The 
Reagan Administration believed that the Salvadoran problem was essentially an immigration 
problem unrelated to the civil war. The United States had experienced increased illegal 
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immigration in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and, the administration argued, allowing TPS for 
Salvadorans would send Salvadorans a message that illegal immigration was acceptable. The 
Salvadoran immigration problem was huge, according to the Reagan administration, with about 
25,000 illegal migrants entering the United States each year (Vogelgesan  1980, 172). Hence, 
the Reagan Administration feared a flood of new immigrants if TPS became law. The 
administration argued that other countries provided asylum, including Mexico, and yet 
Salvadorans went to the U.S. border instead. The administration ignored the harsh conditions for 
Salvadoran refugees in Mexican camps. 
On the other hand, the federal courts rejected asylum requests by Salvadoran plaintiffs. 
When political refugees sought asylum in the United States, the courts would grant asylum only 
to those refugees who faced specific persecution, and thus certain death, back in their home 
countries. The Supreme Court held that allowing refugees to stay in the United Stat s because of 
a general fear of returning to their home counties would compel the U.S. to let the majority of a 
country’s population relocate to the United States for an indefinite period of time, which would 
be infeasible (Mims 1989). 
Faced with these two obstacles to changing the immigration status for Salvador n 
refugees, Moakley was hesitant to get involved in the issue. He knew he would not receive any 
electoral rewards from his constituents. “Of all the issues that I’ve been involved with… it was a 
no-win issue, because…when I first got involved with it, I was getting calls from my 
constituents, ‘Hey, what are you doing down there with them, if you want to bring people in this 
country, what about the Irish and the Italian?’ That wasn’t a win.” (Moakely 2001) Moreover he 
knew that other members of Congress could easily focus on this issue and achieve similar re ults. 
He usually followed Representatives Gerry Studds (D-MA) and Tom Harkin (D-IA) on foreign 
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policy issues. Thus, he had to know that they were not going to pursue this issue in order to 
claim it as his own. Moakley asked his assistant, Jim McGovern, to find out where Studdsand 
Harkin stood on Extended Voluntary Departure for Salvadoran refugees. McGovern told him 
that both Studds and Harkin considered the issue an internal matter for El Salvador and we e ot 
active on the issue. At that point Moakley agreed to take it on. Moakley thought of his effort  on 
behalf of Salvadoran refugees as one of the most important things he did in his career. 
Karen Harraghy, a member of Rep. Moakley’s district staff from 1983 to 2001, notes that 
the legislation Moakley crafted for the Salvadoran refugees initially covered only Salvadorans 
and thus was too limited in scope to pass the House. To win congressional approval, Moakley 
had to include protection for other refugee groups (Harraghy 2003). As Moakley included more 
refugee groups in his legislation he was finally able to build a big enough coalition in the House 
to pass it. However, passage of the bill provoked a veto threat from President Bush if the 
Salvadorans were included. The critical moment for the legislation was in the conference 
committee to reconcile the House and Senate versions. Moakley demonstrated to the 
Republicans that he was willing to sacrifice the entire bill if the Salvadorans were not included. 
Attorney General Edwin Meese contacted the conference chairman in 1988 and thre tened to kill 
the bill. Moakley told Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX) and Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), 
the chairs of the conference committees, that he would use his position as Chairman of the Rules 
Committee to kill any bill that did not have TPS for Salvadoran refugees. After some negotiation 
with President Bush they settled on 18 months for extended volunteer departure.  
Thus was Moakley finally able to pass legislation that granted Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS) to Salvadorans in the Immigration Act of 1990 (PL. 101-649). TPS grants 
temporary legal residency and work authorization to immigrants fleeing civil wars, natural 
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disasters or other conditions in their home country for a set period of time. In El Salvador’s case, 
TPS has been extended several times since 1990. The TPS designation has been used by other 
countries experiencing civil unrest and is administered by the U.S. Citizenship ad Immigration 
Services (USCIS). (See http://www.uscis.gov.)  
 As the bill was nearing final passage, events in El Salvador took a turn for the worse. On 
November 16, 1989, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter were murdered by El 
Salvador’s military at the University of Central America in San Salvador. The crime was the 
culmination of El Salvador’s antagonism toward Jesuit priests, and specifically their advocacy of 
liberation theology. Catholic priests had been using their sermons to focus on the plight of the 
poor in El Salvador, and these sermons were instrumental in sparking peasant rebellions. When 
the six Jesuit priests were murdered, Congress took action by authorizing an investigation 
(Weissman 1995, 140). House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) organized a special House 
committee to investigate the murders and he asked Rep. Moakley to lead the committee.   
So Tom Foley called me. I was down in Florida, giving a speech…. He said, “Joe, 
I don’t like the way that investigation is going down there… I want you to handle 
it. .. I want you to be chairman of the committee and task force.” I said, “Mr. 
Speaker, … if you’d put a request on the bulletin board, you’d have 434 members, 
but you wouldn’t have me on it.” He said, “I know, that’s why I’m calling. I 
wanted somebody who didn’t have … baggage; all their other foreign affairs 
meanderings.” So we went in there and [it] didn’t cost a penny; I just worked out 
of my Rules Committee … The embassy … didn’t want us to get near anything. 
And it was very, very awakening…frightening at times. … a couple of times I 
thought I was going to get killed…. But it turned out all right, and we were able to 
put the Moakley Report into … the case against them. (Moakley 2001) 
 
Moakley was an ideal selection to lead the committee in part because he was chairman of the 
House Rules Committee, and in part because he was very tough (Weissman 1995, 141).  
Moakley enlisted Leonel Gomez, a Salvadoran who became his man on the ground, 
investigator, and interpreter. Gomez had grown up among the elite in El Salvador because his 
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family owned coffee plantations. When the political turmoil started in the 1970s, Gomez started 
organizing peasant unions and he became chief adviser to the president of the Salvadoran land 
reform agency. Unfortunately his boss was assassinated and Gomez fled to the United States. He 
started to testify at congressional hearings. Gomez returned to El Salvador in 1989 to help 
Moakley because he knew the local scene (Weissman 1995, 141-142). Gomez was a critical link 
because of his numerous contacts in El Salvador (Whitfield 1994, 165). With this team, the 
Moakley committee was effective (Weissman 1995, 142). Sean Ryan, a member of Moakley’s 
congressional staff from 1992 through 2000, notes that Moakley became passionate about his 
involvement in this committee because he thought the Bush Administration was stonewalling the 
investigation. “He got the feeling that our government was protecting a government that was 
really filled with bullies and people that were performing terrible human rights violations as a 
result of our government’s assistance to them.” (Ryan, Sean T. Interviewed by Paul Caruso. John 
Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-004. 18 April 2003.) 
The work required knowing the details of the Jesuit murders as thoroughly as possible. 
The team worked with the American Embassy in El Salvador, read court documents, talked with 
Salvadoran investigators, judges, and the attorney general. They contacted the military and 
government officials. They interviewed human rights groups and witnesses, including the 
accused murderers, in hopes of implicating any leaders who had authorized the killings. A 
critical turning point in the investigation came when the team learned that an American military 
officer had heard first-hand accounts from an El Salvadoran soldier who was presentat th  
killings. The military officer had written down this information and brought it to his superiors. 
Rep. Moakley set out to get this incriminating document, only to encounter resistance from both 
the State Department and the Defense Department. Moakley then threatened to issue a Rules 
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Committee subpoena and he was finally allowed to at least talk to the officer. Moakley 
persuaded the officer to make a copy of the document for him. The Moakley committee learned 
that the Salvadorean Armed Forces Chief of Staff had ordered that the soldiers kill the Jesuit 
priest, Father Ignacio Ellacuria, and leave no witnesses.  
This information convinced Congress in November 1990 to make military assistance to 
El Salvador “conditional on its ‘thorough and effective’ investigation and prosecution of the
Jesuit case, as well as both the government’s a d FMLN’s respect for human rights and pursuit 
of peace. Half of the requested aid would be initially withheld, but it could be restored or cut off 
depending on both sides’ performance.” (Weissman 1995, 146) Senator Christopher Dodd (D-
CT) had conceived of this approach, but Moakley was instrumental in putting it into motion in 
the House. Moakley used both is chairmanship of the Rules Committee and an alliance with R p. 
John Murtha (D-PA), who had visited El Salvador and been on the Moakley Committee. 
“Murtha’s cooperation grew out of both the investigation and his personal relationship with 
Moakley. Murtha also had considerable clout as chairman of the important Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee.” (Weissman 1995, 147)  
When the Moakley Committee finished its work for Congress, Moakley became even 
more invested in El Salvador. Moakley learned that the military officers involved in the killings 
had been trained at the SOA. He focused, unsuccessfully, on closing the school, but he did help 
change it. Stephen LaRose, a member of Moakley’s congressional staff from 1993 to 2001, notes 
that Moakley was horrified that the U.S. military had trained the killers. So Moakley sponsored a 
bill to close the school. The bill failed but it started a dialogue with the Pentagon that ultimately 
changed the leadership and culture at the school (LaRose, Stephen M. Interviewed by Beth Anne 
Bower and Zenelky Ortiz. John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-002. 7 April 2003)  
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The murders of the Jesuit priests coincided with a massive offensive by the FMLN, 
demonstrating that the civil war would require a diplomatic solution instead of a milit ry one. 
This caused the Bush administration to advocate openly a political settlement (Munck 1993, 80).  
With the help of the United States and the United Nations, El Salvador accepted UN Peace 
Accords in 1992 and held democratic elections the following year. Moakley went to El Salvador 
to observe the elections in 1994.  
Moakley visited El Salvador a few more times in the 1990s, including in 1999 to 
commemorate the 10th anniversary of the killings of the Jesuit priests. He went because he had 
bonded with the El Salvadoran people. “[I]t was like a love affair of some sort. I mean, th y 
embraced him. He had done so much for them to create peace in their country that he was like a 
god down there. He felt the same way about them, I think. He felt the warmth coming back, and 
he wanted to continue to help.” (LaRose 2003) Moakley focused on helping El Salvador reduce 
its violence, rebuild political institutions, build a functional judiciary, and build a functio al 
police force. He also bonded with the Jesuit priests at the University of Central America.  
We can see the four elements of the model in Rep. Moakely’s interaction with El 
Salvador. First, the international provocations included the killings of the nuns in 1980 and the 
priests in 1989. The international provocations also included paramilitary organizations kill ng 
thousands of Salvadoran peasants. Second, the information about these killings reached Rep. 
Moakley through several sources, including congressional hearings, meetings wi h refugees 
living in his district, meetings with civic groups, including JPCOCA, that were based in his 
district, and information produced by his assistant, Jim McGovern. Third, there is ample 
evidence of deep personal impact for Moakley, as recounted by his staff and members of 
JPCOCA. Moakley’s intensity and focus on Salvadoran issues was sparked by hearing the 
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testimony of Salvadoran refugees. Zanger, who co-founded JPCOCA, said the memb rs of 
JPCOCA “were just amazed not only by the tenacity of Jim [McGovern] and Congressman 
Moakley, but to watch Moakley really change and take on this issue and become so passionate 
about this issue.… His decision to pick it up,…what I got from Jim…was that as they brought 
Salvadorans in to testify at these hearings, he became so moved by their stories that h  really 
changed as a person.” (Zanger 2003) 
Finally, Moakley took the path of least resistance. Initially his level of involvement was 
restricted to sponsoring legislation for TPS, but as he acquired more resources as chair of the 
Rules Committee his involvement increased, but only when he realized that the Reagan and Bush 
administrations were blocking Congressional investigations into El Salvador. Moakley’s 
legislative activities on behalf of El Salvador started in 1983. It took seven years to get the 
legislation passed, and by that time he was leading the committee to investigate the murders of 
the Jesuit priests. Once Moakley finished his work on the Commission, his deep personal 
affection for the Salvadoran people sustained his political interaction with them. Moakley had an 
endowed university chair named after him, as well as a scholarship, at the University of Central 
America (LaRose 2003). Moakley once “met with the chief of police down in El Salvador, and 
he invited them up to Boston to meet with Commissioner [Paul] Evans here in Boston and teach 
him about community policing in Boston. The Salvadoran police officer brought up several of 
his lieutenants in the Salvadoran police force, and they met with Boston police and learne  about 
community policing.” (LaRose 2003) Moakley essentially did case work for El Salvador, such as 
after Hurricane Mitch hit the country in October of 1998. He helped to rebuild churches and 
restore electricity. “Moakley got the U.S. government—the Embassy—to run electricity 
wires….And within a couple of months, they had electricity.” (LaRose 2003) 
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It is difficult to explain Moakley’s activities on behalf of El Salvador from the
perspective of constituent rewards. Politically, El Salvador was a no-win issue for him (Moakley 
2001). His constituents were mainly Irish and Italian, and they repeatedly asked him to focus on 
immigration issues concerning their ethnic groups. He was an unlikely lawmaker to become 
involved in foreign policy issues such as El Salvador because he maintained an intense focus on 
the needs of his constituents, devoting all of his time to case work. The presence of Salvadoran 
refugees in his district and the request of a small minority of his constituents to do something to 
help the refugees sparked his initial involvement. The support given to him by JPCOCA and 
other interest groups, such as Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), helped 
sustain his involvement during the 1980s.  
A better explanation for why he got involved requires understanding the confluence of 
rational calculations and affective motivations. El Salvador presented a policy window. Up until 
1983 Rep. Moakley had followed the leadership of Rep. Studds on foreign policy issues. 
However, once he learned that Studds was not moving on Salvadoran refugees, Moakley decided 
to fill the gap by sponsoring legislation. Once the legislation became law, his affective 
motivations took over when he started serving on the committee. He continued traveling to El 
Salvador as it ended its civil war in 1992, held elections in 1994, suffered the ravages of 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, and commemorated the 10th anniversary of the killings in 1999. He 
died while in office on May 28, 2001. Moakley entered Congress in 1973, but El Salvador 
occupied nearly two-thirds of his time in Congress. Through his involvement he earned deep 
affection from the Salvadorans (LaRose 2003). His Roman Catholic background helped him 
bond with the Jesuit priests and gave him strong emotional reasons to return to El Salvador. 
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In addition to revealing the explanatory value of the model, Rep. Moakley demonstrates 
that it is robust. It is easy to apply the model to someone like Rep. Solarz, who was interested in 
many different foreign policy issues and was one of the most traveled members of Congress. It is 
challenging to apply the model to someone like Rep. Moakley who initially had no interest in 
foreign policy issues. The fact that Rep. Moakley essentially became the Congressman from El 
Salvador demonstrates the power of deep personal impact to motivate a member of Congress 
over many years.  
 
South Africa 
South Africa had created a racist state based on an ideology of racial superiority (in its 
case, white supremacy). The very nature of its economic and political system, Apartheid, was 
oppressive for its African majority. However, the United States and most other c untries ignored 
this oppression until the 1970s when African-American activists started to focus American and 
international attention on South Africa. (There had been efforts by black activists prior to the 
1970s. The Council of African Affairs (CAA) tried without success to get the U.S. government 
to condemn South Africa between 1937 and 1955.) (Aziabu 1997). Congress began to pay 
attention because of the efforts of Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI, 1954-1980). Diggs entered th  
House in 1955 and worked with Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY) to develop his foreign 
policy expertise. Based on this expertise, Diggs became Chair of the House Subcommittee on 
Africa in 1969. 
In 1971 Diggs started the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC intended to 
unify, articulate, and disseminate the pro-Africa voices within Congress. The caucus held Africa-
focused hearings, sponsored resolutions, held press conferences, and wrote dissent letter  to the 
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State Department protesting American policy toward South Africa. The CBC also informed and 
nurtured ties with black officials to organize a disciplined anti-apartheid strategy. (Aziabu 1997, 
125-126) The CBC became active in foreign policy issues mainly because Diggs persuaded 
black House members that foreign policy success would earn them the credibility they needed to 
advance in domestic politics (Tillery 2006). Diggs and most of the members of the CBC were in 
safe districts, so they did not need financial capital to win re-election. However, unlike most of 
the other members of the CBC, Diggs was very ideologically committed to ending South African 
Apartheid. Diggs used his seniority on the Foreign Affairs Committee to build up support for 
sanctions on South Africa. Diggs focused on building grassroots support in majority-minority 
districts from 1973 to 1975. He sponsored more bills sanctioning South Africa from 1973 to 
1975 than any other time in his career. Diggs organized the Black Forum on Foreign Policy and 
toured Democratic-leaning districts with black populations to raise black America’s 
consciousness about Africa. The result was that black voters began demanding action and CBC 
members reincorporated sanctions bills into their legislative portfolios (T llery 2006, 99).  
Although Diggs was forced to resign from the House in 1980 during a scandal, his efforts 
were not in vain. Randall Robinson served as a legislative assistant for Diggs from 1975 to 1977, 
before starting and becoming the executive director of TransAfrica, a permanent and 
professional grassroots foreign policy organization modeled on the American-Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). TransAfrica was designed to transcend ideological divisions within 
the black community while simultaneously managing organizational linkages among black 
activist constituencies. TransAfrica was designed to transcend ideological div sions within the 
black community while simultaneously managing organizational linkages among black activist 
constituencies. TransAfrica was credible as a coalition-builder and powerful enough to get the 
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attention of Washington (Aziabu 1997, 193). Robinson brought zeal and expertise to 
TransAfrica. He had traveled extensively in Africa, had solid knowledge of Southern Africa as a 
foreign policy issue, and had general knowledge about third world politics (Aziabu 1997, 194-
195).  
Once Diggs left the House, more representatives – all members of the House Africa 
Subcommittee – became leaders on South African sanctions. Rep. Solarz became Chair until the 
same position opened up on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. Once Solarz moved to Asia 
and Pacific, Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI) became Chair of the House Africa
Subcommittee. Starting in 1980, Solarz and Wolpe began collaborating with Representative 
William Gray III (D-PA) on sanctions legislation.  They persuaded the House to adopt bans on 
new investment and loans, and on sales of gold Krugerrand coins (Weissman 1995, 170). In 
addition, Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA) submitted an amendment in the final 
legislation that imposed a total economic embargo on South Africa.  
In the Senate, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) took the lead. Kennedy began to focus on 
the apartheid system in South Africa during a 1984 luncheon with South African Bishop 
Desmond Tutu, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize that year. Tutu told him ‘‘the world will 
not pay attention until someone like you comes to South Africa and brings the cameras nd the 
spotlights with you’’ (Clymer 1999:363 cited in Carter, et al 2004). Kennedy told South African 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha to make progress on forced removals of blacks, South African 
citizenship for all, and black voting rights. Starting in 1985, Kennedy introduced sanctions 
legislation with Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) that included elements similar to the House bill 
(Carter, et al 2004). As part of his effort to pass the legislation, Kennedy testified a  hearings 
before the Banking and the Foreign Relations Committees, and he gave numerous speeches 
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calling for an end to apartheid. He spoke in early 1985 to the Combined Chambers of Commerce 
in Johannesburg. He published an article in Ebony to argue for sanctions. “I came away from my 
trip with a deep-seated feeling that the U.S. should not be passive in its opposition to apartheid in 
South Africa and that U.S. policies should in no way be neutral. On the contrary, we should be 
much more vigorous and much more visible - politically, economically, and morally - in the 
effort to end apartheid.” (Kennedy 1985a cited in Carter, et al 2004) 
 Back in the House, Solarz, Wolpe, and Gray assembled the coalition of members who 
would eventually pass sanctions legislation. They consulted with the CBC, TransAfrica, and the 
Washington Office on Africa. They had to go to every member of the House to negotiate specific 
proposals and build a veto-proof coalition (Weissman 1995, 171).They were assisted by 
increased numbers of black representatives in the House, who were in positions on many 
committees to influence sanctions legislation (Aziabu 1997, 198).   
Furthermore, the actions of political entrepreneurs in Congress were critically supported 
by the efforts of TransAfrica to build grassroots support. TransAfrica developed influence 
despite its small staff. The leadership studied potential partners closely to build a viable 
coalition. TransAfrica connected with major black political caucuses and institutions nationally 
and locally to advocate divestment. Finally, TransAfrica coodinated investigations and public 
hearings with the CBC, using celebrities to testify and shape public opinion (Aziabu 1997, 200-
201).  
 TransAfrica used all these resources to persuade Congress to act after the South Africa 
government started its violent campaign against black South Africans. Starting in September 
1984, there was a burgeoning black revolt across South Africa’s townships. On television 
Americans saw police officers beating black youths. Antiapartheid protests provoked the 
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government to arrest key leaders and kill people. By late 1985 that average daily death toll was 
four people (Jentleson 1990, 157).  
Rep. Wolpe said that these images were instrumental in creating the environment that 
made sanctions legislation possible. “People were back in the civil rights movement with these 
pictures. It humanized the struggle, made it real and concrete.” (Weissman 1995, 168) Jentleson 
notes that South African apartheid had become a domestic civil rights issue in Congress. “Prime 
Minister Pieter Botha was Governor George Wallace; Bishop Desmond Tutu was the Reverend 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and the Anti-Apartheid Act was the Civil Rights Act. ” (Jentleson 
1990, 158) Jentleson also notes that Republicans voted for the sanctions legislation to appeal 
more to black voters.  
In November 1984, TransAfrica began its campaign against apartheid at the Sout 
African embassy in Washington, D.C. Robinson was arrested with a group of civil rights leaders 
and a few elected officials while picketing the embassy. These arrests continued over months and 
provoked divestment moves by academic institutions and states (Aziabu 1997, 216). This Free 
South Africa Movement (FSAM) was also critical for putting pressure on Congress. As Rep. 
Dellums describes the changed environment: “It was very interesting to see clleagues from both 
sides of the aisle and of all races, who had previously paid little attention to our efforts, scramble 
to get arrested in front of the South African embassy and introduce sanctions bills when the 
[effects of the] movement hit home in their districts.” (Tillery 2006, 100) The FSAM attracted 
several thousand activists, including members of Congress and representatives of many different 
human rights groups (Weissman 1995, 169).  
This dramatic campaign paid political dividends in the House. Members from left to righ  
lined up to endorse sanctions. Conservative Southern white Democrats were forced to support 
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sanctions in order to retain the support of their black constituents. There were also conservative 
Republicans, some former civil rights demonstrators, who wrote to the South African 
ambassador threatening to support sanctions as a way to align the Republican Party with racial 
justice and human rights. This coalition helped the House pass a sanctions bill in June 1985. The 
Senate passed a similar bill in July. At that point, President Reagan signed an executive order 
that put in place many of the provisions of both bills, thinking this would placate the House and 
Senate. However, events in South Africa compelled Congress to take further action. South Africa 
intensified its crackdown on political dissidents. The pro-sanctions forces united to pass the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) over President Reagan’s veto, mainly w th help 
from Senator Richard Lugar (R- IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lugar 
had been mayor of Indianapolis during school desegregation efforts and had helped avoid rioting 
in 1968 after Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated (Weissman 1995, 173-174). Lugar helped 
craft the legislation to sustain the veto-proof majority in the Senate and in the Hous .  
The impact of the CAAA on South Africa was swift. In 1989 President F. W. De Klerk 
started taking the actions that allowed President George H. W. Bush to lift sanctions in 1991. 
Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress, was released from a 27-year 
imprisonment. The state of emergency was lifted and political parties were allow d (Weissman 
1995, 165).  
The four elements of the model are evident in the case of South Africa. The internatonal 
provocations from apartheid were well known within the American black community becaus  
information about the racial injustices under apartheid was widely shared within the black 
community (Aziabu 1997). The only obstacle the black community faced was communicating 
with a unified voice to Congress and the executive branch to place economic sanctions on South 
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Africa. This unified voice was missing until the creation of the CBC and TransAfrica. The CBC 
spread information about apartheid to black members of Congress and white members of 
Congress who represented majority-minority districts. TransAfrica also spread information about 
apartheid to a plethora of organizations within civil society. Members of Congress who traveled 
to South Africa, including Rep. Solarz, Rep. Wolpe, and Senator Kennedy, had personal 
encounters with apartheid that deeply affected them and convinced them to sponsor sanctions 
legislation in the House and Senate. The Carter Administration was responsive t congressional 
concerns about apartheid, but the Reagan administration pursued a policy of “constructive 
engagement” that Congress thought was a failure. The uprisings within South Africa from the 
late 1970s to the early 1980s provided the inputs for members of Congress to collaborate with 
TransAfrica until both the black community and Congress found their unified voice. In a sense, 
South Africa was a simmering pot that was finally brought to a boil with the crackdown by the 
South African government and the FSAM in Washington, D.C. 
In the South Africa case, unlike the others, many lawmakers played the role of political 
entrepreneur. The torch of leadership was passed from one political entrepreneur to another, 
burning brighter each time. Rep. Diggs lit the torch with the CBC and passed it to Randal 
Robinson and TransAfrica. TransAfrica passed the torch to Rep. Wolpe and Rep. Solarz, who 
helped build the veto-proof majority in the House. Senator Kennedy became a political 
entrepreneur to end apartheid after he visited South Africa. Senator Lugar used his position as 
Chairman of the SFRC to give the Senate a unified voice on South Africa, and he was personally 
affected because of his history of dealing with desegregation and racial tens on in Indianapolis. 
All of these political entrepreneurs lined up to help Congress speak with overwhelming c arity 
once South Africa demonstrated the extent that it would go to preserve apartheid through
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bloodshed. There never was a path of least resistance for any of these politicalentrepreneurs. 
They all knew that sanctions legislation, while morally correct, would be very difficult to pass. 
Thus, they combined their efforts to pass the CAAA over President Reagan’s veto.  
 
Uganda 
In 1971 Idi Amin came to power in Uganda by overthrowing President Milton Obote. 
Over the next eight years, he killed over 100,000 people (U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee 
on Africa, 1978: 5 cited in Nurnberger 1982). Many victims received international press 
attention, including two Americans. In 1977, Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) introduced Senate 
Resolution 175, condemning Uganda after the murder of Ugandan Anglican Archbishop Janai 
Luwuum. Other media, including a "60 Minutes" broadcast and a film on Idi Amin, kept 
Americans aware of events. Amin was portrayed as a tyrant. In response to this attention, 
Ugandan exiles and prominent Americans began a campaign against him, testifying in Congress 
and before civic organizations. Ugandan exiles formed the Committee on Uganda in 1973, and 
by 1977 the committee was lobbying Congress.   
Congress focused attention on American coffee imports from Uganda, which provided 
Uganda with much of its foreign capital. In addition, Congress focused on American companies 
that supplied Amin's jets, a telecommunications satellite system, and pilot training. Coffee had 
become the sole remaining foundation for Uganda’s economy, as all other sectors of the 
economy collapsed under Amin. He controlled the coffee industry in Uganda, and this control 
gave him his money. Freshman Rep. Donald Pease (D-OH) was the first member of Congress to 
see this connection because his legislative assistant, William Goold, researched the subject for 
his senior thesis at Oberlin College. Rep. Michael Harrington (D-MA) had revealed Uganda's 
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reliance on coffee in 1974 (Congressional Record, October 10, 1974: E-35539, cited in 
Nurnberger 1982), but Pease made the connection to American coffee companies. The United 
States imported only four percent of its coffee from Uganda in 1971, and that increased to seven 
percent in 1977 (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 139; U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on 
Foreign Economic Policy, 1978: 52-53, cited in Nurnberger 1982). 
Rep. Pease decided that an American-led boycott of Ugandan coffee would deprive Amin 
of his funds without hurting Americans.  
The problem was that the Carter administration did not support the boycott. The Carter 
administration had already taken extensive diplomatic action against Amin.It had, for instance, 
closed its embassy in Kampala and discontinued all assistance. It had withdrawn all Peace Corps 
and AID personnel. Representatives to the World Bank and the African Development Fund were 
instructed to vote against loans to Uganda. The administration had excluded Uganda from U.S. 
programs designed to promote trade and investment. The Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) had both ceased activity in Uganda after 1973. 
The administration did not grant general trade preferences to Uganda, and it reviewed all 
applications for export licenses to Uganda, denying them if exports contributed to human rights 
violations. William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, noted that 
the administration had worked to prevent activities that contributed to human rights violaions 
and worked with concerned governments to pressure Uganda to improve its human rights 
situation (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1978: 126-27, cited in Nurnberger 1982). However, this was as 
far as the Carter administration wanted to go. It did not want to overthrow Amin because this 
would set a dangerous precedent of overthrowing foreign governments. The administratio  also 
did not want to punish Amin. The final risk was the continuing presence of American citizens in 
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Uganda, including missionaries, students, dependents of Ugandans, pilots, and contract 
technicians. The Carter administration did not want to provoke retaliatory actions against these 
people.  
The problem with economic sanctions, according to the Carter administration, was that 
they would violate free trade principles and would likely be ineffective.  General Ag eement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles required extraordinary circumstances to cease trade. The 
Carter administration argued that the human rights violations did not constitute extraordinary 
circumstances. Finally, even though African countries were embarrassed by Uganda’s actions, 
they saw the situation as an internal African problem and did not want the U.S. to intervene. The 
Carter administration argued that the risks were too high if it got involved, but would be lower if 
American companies took the lead in any boycott.  
In the face of the Carter administration’s resistance to trade sanctions, Pease released the 
names of the thirty-three American companies that purchased Ugandan coffee in 1975 and 1976 
in the hopes of pressuring those companies to voluntarily boycott Uganda. The American coffee 
industry resisted Rep. Pease’s pressure. Representatives of the industry argued that this was a 
foreign policy decision that was best handled by the United States government and not by the 
private sector. Moreover, the American companies did not purchase coffee from Uganda 
directly, but instead went through brokers. The problem was also that an American ban would 
simply pressure Uganda to sell coffee to other markets. However, the American coffee 
companies admitted that they did not like Amin’s government and wanted to change it. They
were concerned about both the domestic repercussions of not boycotting Uganda, and the 
possible repercussions in Uganda if they did boycott. They wanted Congress to take the lead. 
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This created an impasse that Congress had to work through. Private companies wanted 
the United States to set official policy in order to avoid retaliation for their busines  decisions 
and the United States wanted the private sector to take the lead to avoid retaliation from Uganda 
and other trade partners. To resolve this impasse, Congress began to apply pressure on American 
businesses that were doing business with Uganda or helping it in some way. Members of 
Congress, including Rep. Jim Mattox (D-TX), targeted a company in Texas that trained pilots for 
Amin’s private jets. They also targeted a company in Ohio that sold a telecommunications 
satellite system to Uganda, and an airline company in New York that had sold a Gulfstream II jet 
to Uganda.  
Pease submitted legislation, including: H.R. 9252, to amend the Export Administration 
Act of 1969 to prohibit American exports to Uganda; H.R. 9253 to amend the International 
Coffee Agreement Act of 1968 to prohibit the importation of Ugandan coffee into the United 
States; and H.R. 9254 to prohibit the importation of Ugandan goods into the United States 
(Nurnberger 1982). When Pease introduced his legislation, thirty-five Representatives co-
sponsored the bills and Rep. Don Bonker (D-WA) joined the boycott movement. In the Senate, 
Mark Hatfield (R-OR) became interested after talking with Ugandan Anglican bishop Festo 
Kivengere. Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-CT) became involved upon the urging of the former 
ambassador to Uganda, then the president of Sacred Heart University in Bridgeport, CT. Weicker 
introduced the Pease bills in the Senate. Senator Frank Church (D-ID), Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, became involved because of  
staff memo and called for hearings. In both houses the congressional staff had access to 
information from the Ugandan community in the United States, which enabled Congressional 
knowledge to surpass the knowledge of the executive branch.   
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Reps. Bonker and Pease introduced House Concurrent Resolution 426, which called on 
the Carter administration to close the Ugandan embassy in Washington, restrict the movement of 
Ugandan diplomats to the United Nations, prohibit imports and exports of all Ugandan products, 
prohibit Ugandan citizens from being trained in the U.S., prohibit Ugandan aircraft fom landing 
in the U.S., and prohibit Ugandan equipment with military applications from being maintained in 
the United States (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 302-4, cited in Nurnberger 1982). The House 
Committee on International Relations held hearings on this resolution. Committee chairman 
Clement Zablocki (D-WI), with the State Department’s support, argued that the resolution be 
weakened. Rep. Pease also faced a political battle within his own Africa Subcommittee. Rep. 
Diggs thought a congressional investigation of Uganda would divert attention from South Africa 
and joined Zablocki in supporting a non-binding resolution. Bonker gave in and substituted 
House Concurrent Resolution 612, urging the president to support and implement measures to 
discourage United States support of Uganda (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 305-6, cited in 
Nurnberger 1982)  
This weaker, non-binding resolution was the congressional signal that the coffee industry 
needed to implement a boycott of Ugandan coffee. Immediately the Folger Coff e ompany 
interpreted the resolution as an expression of government policy and suspended all purchases of 
Ugandan coffee. The rest of the industry quickly followed (New York Times, 1978; Cleveland 
Press, 1978, cited in Nurnberger 1982). The non-binding, “sense of Congress” resolution helped 
resolve the impasse between the government and the coffee industry because it let th  companies 
initiate a boycott without violating their belief that foreign policy should be conducte  by 
governments, not corporations. The House adopted the resolution, then the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee held hearings. Senator Church introduced an amendment to the 
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International Monetary Fund Supplementary Financing Facility Bill imposing a trade embargo 
against Uganda. The Senate passed the embargo amendment, then went into conference with the 
House to reconcile the different versions. The amendment was approved on October 10, 1978. 
After this legislation passed Congress, Amin sent soldiers to the Tanzanian border and 
initiated a civil war within Uganda. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania retaliat d against Amin 
by using a combined force of Ugandan exiles, dissidents, deserting Ugandan troops, and the 
Tanzanian army to drive out Amin in April 1979. President Carter informed Congress that the 
human rights situation in Uganda had improved and Congress removed all restrictions on trade 
and assistance.  The actions by Congress likely had no direct impact on Uganda, but they 
signaled to Nyerere that the United States would support his military action against Amin. 
Nyerere assumed the embargo would lead to American assistance and admitted disappointment 
that the United States did not help pay for the invasion force (Nurnberger 1982).  
The four elements of the model are present in the Uganda case. The international 
provocations by Idi Amin were well known and publicized around the world. American media 
organizations and Ugandan refugees provided information to members of Congress, who then 
submitted non-binding resolutions expressing the “sense of Congress” and binding resolutions 
restricting trade with Uganda. Specific members of Congress, including Reps. Pease and Bonker, 
and Sens. Hatfield and Weicker, were deeply personally affected by conversations they had with 
people from Uganda. Finally, they took the path of least resistance. Rep. Pease tried at first to get 
the Carter administration to impose a coffee embargo. When that did not work he tried to 
convince American coffee companies to voluntarily implement an embargo, and he submitted 
legislation. When neither of those worked he submitted a binding resolution that was weakened 
in committee. The non-binding resolution was the easiest legislative mechanism to get through 
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the committee system, but it proved to be enough to convince the coffee industry to start the 
embargo. Congressional signaling became a critical tool as it influenced both industry behavior 
and Tanzania’s behavior.  
Uganda also demonstrates that non-binding resolutions can have more impact than 
binding legislation on the behavior of domestic constituents and foreign governments. This i  
surprising because we usually assume that binding legislation has a bigger impact. However, 
Uganda shows that congressional signaling to domestic and foreign actors is an important 
component of American foreign policy and international relations. Congressional sigling can 
take many forms in addition to non-binding resolutions.  
 
Comparing the five cases according to the model 
 Now that the model has been applied to five countries, it is useful to analyze each 
element of the model so that we can draw some additional lessons about the roles of political 
entrepreneurs in these cases.  
 
1. International provocations: Each of the cases presents obvious human rights abuses.  
(a) The Soviet Union cracked down on political dissidents, imprisoning them and 
torturing them. The Soviet Union also prevented Jews from going to Israel to unite with 
families. (b) Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge killed about 2 million people through torture, 
execution and forced labor. (c) El Salvador sent paramilitary units, or death squads, into 
villages to kill peasants suspected of supporting rebels. (d) South Africa maintained a state 
that practiced racial discrimination. (e) Uganda’s Idi Amin killed over 100,000 people, 
including an American journalist and a teacher.  
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2. Information: For each of the cases there are intermediaries who tell members of Congress 
about the rights abuses (the international provocations).  
(a) Soviet dissidents and American Jews in the SJM told members of Congress about 
the plight of political prisoners in the Soviet Union and refuseniks who were trying to leave. 
(b) Cambodians fleeing the killing fields of the Khmer Rouge met with Rep. Solarz and told 
him horrible stories of mass death. (c) Salvadorans fleeing death squads told members of 
JPCOCA about certain death after being deported back to El Salvador and JPCOCA brought
this information to Rep. Moakley. (d) Members of Congress traveled to South Africaand 
witnessed the immoral conditions under apartheid, or TransAfrica and the CBC 
communicated this information to them. (e) Dr. Thomas Melady, the last American 
ambassador to Uganda, spoke to members of Congress, and Ugandan exiles presented their 
case to Congress through the Committee on Uganda. 
 
3. Deep personal impact: For each of these cases there was at least one member of Congress 
who was deeply affected by information about human rights abuses.  
(a) Senator Jackson and Rep. Vanik learned about the plight of refuseniks. Rep. 
Fenwick met with a refusenik in Russia and was so deeply affected that she had nightmares. 
(b) Rep. Solarz met Cambodian refugees and was reminded of the Jewish Holocaust. (c) Rep. 
Moakley learned about the death squads roaming El Salvador and he decided to take action. 
He investigated the killing of Jesuit priests in El Salvador and he formed a deep bond with 
Salvadorans and the Jesuit priests. (d) Rep. Diggs and Randal Robinson equated South 
African apartheid with Jim Crow in the American South before the Civil Rights Movement. 
Rep. Wolpe and Solarz traveled to South Africa and decided that apartheid was immoral. 
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Senator Kennedy traveled to South Africa and reached the same conclusion. Senator Lugar 
remembered his experience dealing with desegregation in Indianapolis and decided to 
support sanctions legislation.  (e) Senator’s Case, Church and Weicker introduced resolutions 
after having conversations with people who lived or worked in Uganda.  
 
4. Path of least resistance: For each of these cases the member of Congress got involved only 
to the extent that his/her institutional support and support from colleagues made legislation a 
viable option, and only after realizing that the executive branch would likely resist hi /her 
efforts. 
(a) Senator Jackson and Rep. Vanik amended the 1974 trade act to make trade with 
the Soviet Union contingent on refuseniks being allowed to leave for Israel. Rep. Fenwick 
submitted legislation to create a commission that would monitor compliance with the 
Helsinki Final Act. It was supported by her colleague in the Senate, Senator Clifford Case 
(R-NJ), and other House members who were both interested in human rights and interested in 
placing pressure on Henry Kissinger’s State Department. (b) Rep. Solarz org nized a hearing 
on human rights in Cambodia as a freshman in the House, but he did not pass a non-lethal aid 
amendment until he was Chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee in 1985. He submitted 
his UN Interim Trusteeship plan to the international community and the executive branch, 
where there was a policy window, before submitting it to the House and the Senate, with he 
Senate being the most resistant obstacle to his plan. His plan passed the Senate only after the 
UN and the Cambodian factions announced their support for the plan and the Bush 
administration brokered a deal with key senators.  
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(c) Rep. Moakley submitted legislation granting TPS to Salvadoran refugees, but he 
did not play hardball until he was Chairman of the Rules Committee. He used his Chair 
position to investigate the murders of Jesuit priests in El Salvador, to provide funds to build 
Salvadoran Society, and to place pressure on the warring factions to broker a peace 
agreement. (d) Rep. Diggs used his Chair position on the House Africa Subcommittee to start 
the CBC. When Reps. Solarz and Wolpe occupied the same Chair positions, they started 
shaping sanctions legislation for South Africa. Senator Lugar used his Chair position n the 
SFRC to shape legislation that could pass Congress with a veto-proof majority. (e) Rep. 
Pease tried unsuccessfully to get the Carter administration to implement an conomic boycott 
against Uganda. Then he tried, again unsuccessfully, to get the coffee industry to voluntarily 
boycott Ugandan coffee. His effort succeeded only when he passed a non-binding “sense of 
Congress” resolution through committee.  
 
Understanding the role of political entrepreneurs 
 The model helps us understand the specific role that political entrepreneurs and interest
groups had in each of the four cases, and in other cases not discussed here. Every case discussed
here required political entrepreneurs to change American foreign policy. However, the presence 
and organization of grassroots interest groups differed across the cases.  
In the case of Cambodia the Cambodian-Americans were poorly organized and had no 
electoral strength. It took Rep. Solarz, an effective political entrepreneur, to argue effectively to 
both Congress and the executive branch to change American foreign policy. In the case of El 
Salvador, Salvadoran refugees were not organized, but American citizens were very organized. 
Yet Rep. Moakley had no interest in foreign policy issues. Citizen groups, including JPCOCA, 
brought the plight of Salvadoran refugees to the attention of Moakley and his staff and thus 
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sparked Moakley’s interest. For South Africa there was a strong grassroots component, with 
TransAfrica combining with many effective political entrepreneurs in Congress. It took the 
united efforts of the House Africa Subcommittee, the CBC, political entrepren u s Solarz, 
Wolpe, Gray, Dellums, and Kennedy, and finally TransAfrica, to craft sanctions legislation and 
pass it over President Reagan's veto a mere two years after TransAfrica began FSAM. As the 
South African government increased its crackdown TransAfrica stepped up its campaign.  For 
the Soviet Union, there was a strong grassroots component, with the Soviet Jewry Movement and 
American Jews putting pressure on members of Congress to help free the refuseniks. Sens. 
Jackson and Case, and Reps. Vanik and Fenwick, both harnessed this grassroots pressure to pa 
legislation. For Uganda, there was a strong grassroots component with Ugandan exiles 
organizing and placing pressure on Congress to end trade relations with Uganda. Rep. Pease  
successfully passed a resolution that facilitated an economic boycott. Senator’s C se, Church and 
Weicker passed binding legislation that restricted trade.  
Moreover, we can see in each case that the political entrepreneurs had secure seats that 
gave them the liberty to pursue foreign policy issues. In the chart below, the Margin of Victory 
on the Y-axis indicates the percentage points separating the winner in the elecion from the 
closest competitor. With the exception of Rep. Lester Wolff, all of the winners sustained large 
margins during their congressional careers. In Wolff’s case,  he had razor-thin margins in the 
first, second, and fifth elections of his career. He received a boost from the Democratic waves in 
1974, 1976, and 1978. He was defeated by a Reaganite Republican, John LeBoutillier, in 1980 
after LeBoutillier ran an advertising campaign showing Wolff spending more time in other 
countries as chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee than in his district. Wolff’s defeat is 
sometimes cited as an example of what happens when members of Congress care more bout 
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foreign policy than their districts, but the electoral margins show that Wolff’s seat was never 
really safe without the help of national political forces.3  
 
As I argued in the first chapter, the main difference between a citizen, a lgislator, and a 
president is the time frame. A president has the constitutional authority to act quickly on foreign 
policy issues. The path of least resistance for a member of Congress or a citizen who wants to 
change American foreign policy is to ask the president to change policy. When the president is in 
the same party as the member of Congress, the change in policy may come quickly after a letter 
or meeting from the member of Congress. However, when the president is from the opposition 
party and becomes unresponsive to the entreaties of members of Congress and citizen groups, 
members of Congress have a motive to change policy through their own efforts. The motive is 
                                                      








































































dependent on the means: as members of Congress acquire more institutional resources, they do 
more. A member of Congress who is in the minority party in the House or Senate and lacks 
tenure on a committee (or celebrity status) may try to use media resourc  to shape the debate 
and change American foreign policy (Kedrowski 1992). In each of these cases, it was the 
combination of both congressional resources and executive opposition that sparked political 
entrepreneurship.  
Based on these cases, a plausible argument can be made that there are threeelements that 
need to exist to facilitate a change in American foreign policy toward a specific country. First, 
there must be one or more political entrepreneurs, either in Congress or in civil society. They 
take advantage of institutional resources and a policy window to create policy toward a specific 
country or region. Second, compelling international events create a window of opportunity for 
action. Third, there must be a conduit for information from the target country to Congress, 
possibly provided by citizens groups and ethnic interest groups. The first two elements are 
essential. The last element speeds up the process. What citizens groups do is shorten the tim  
frame for activity. Instead of waiting decades to take action, Congress may move within months 
or a few years. When all three elements are combined, Congress can act quickly and override a 
presidential veto. 
The model presented here can probably be applied to other cases of human rights abuses. 
Possible cases include Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, where milita y coups led to 
death squads and disappearances, causing refugees to flee to the U.S.  Scholars may examine 
African countries where human rights abuses provoked members of Congress to target bil teral 
trade relations and economic development assistance. There is the alleged Armenian genocide in 
which the Ottoman Turks killed 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1923. Their 
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descendents moved to the United States and placed pressure on Congress to recognize the 
genocide (Cannon 2009). There are also the cases of Cuba (Zook 2004), Haiti (Gomis 2000), 
Lithuania (Hartman 1996), and Poland (Podbielski 1997). These, and other cases, may further 
demonstrate the explanatory power of the model. 
The model also demonstrates the connection between international relations, 
transnational politics, and domestic politics. In the cases of the Soviet Union and Uga there 
were organized transnational movements that spread the information to the United States 
Congress. In the cases of Cambodia, South Africa and El Salvador the transnational movements 
either were not organized enough (Cambodian and Salvadoran refugees) or they did not exist
(South Africa). However, they still had voices in the United States because of American interest 
groups (JPCOCA for Salvadoran refugees, TransAfrica for South Africa) or champions in 
Congress (Solarz for Cambodia).  
The second element of the model, information, simplifies this complexity for the sake of 
clarity, but it is important to recognize that these cases demonstrate complex interdependence 
and the power of transnational networks to connect domestic politics and international relations 
through United States foreign policy. The limitation of these examples is that the transnational 
movements dissipated once Congress responded and the international provocation ended. There 
is no longer a Soviet Jewry Movement because the Soviet Union no longer exists. There is no 
longer a movement of Ugandan refugees because Idi Amin fled Uganda. In the next chapter, we 
will examine what happens when the transnational movement, the Taiwan Independence 
Movement, persists even after Congress acted and most of their demands for change on Taiwan 





Taiwan Independence Movement and the Congressional “Gang of Four” 
 Taiwan has a unique position in international relations. It is, in practice, an independent 
country with its own political system, history and economy. However, legally it is not recognized 
as independent by the United States and most other countries in the world because it is 
considered to be part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is within this complex situation 
that we can apply the model developed in the previous chapter.  
After the United States shifted its official relationship from the Republic of China (ROC) 
to the PRC in 1979, Taiwan’s government began a systematic crackdown on political dissidents, 
committed human rights abuses against political opponents, and even killed Taiwanese-
American citizens who had fled the political oppression on Taiwan. Information about these 
human rights abuses was brought to the United States Congress by the Taiwan Independence 
Movement (TIM), which traces its origins to February 28, 1947, when the military forces of the 
ROC systematically killed thousands of political dissidents who posed a threat to the ROC 
(Wang 1999). In 1982 TIM created the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a 
grassroots organization that built relationships with four members of Congress: Rep. Stephen 
Solarz (D-NY), Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA), Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-
RI) (Lin 2006, Chen 2007). These members of Congress made public statements, held 
subcommittee hearings, gave press conferences, and passed non-binding resolutions and 
legislation that communicated to Taiwan’s government the need to end human rights abuse nd 
create a viable democracy. They did this because the Reagan administration refused to condemn 
the government crackdown, even though it condemned government crackdowns in other 
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countries. Taiwan’s government responded both to these actions by Congress and the changing
political dynamics on Taiwan. In 1987 Taiwan liberalized; in the 1990s it democratized.   
This chapter will not prove a direct causal link between the actions of Congress and 
Taiwan’s transition to democracy, but Taiwan’s government seemed to respond to Congress. 
This chapter focuses on the role of transnational politics in the information component of the 
model as it applies to Taiwan. The cases of the Soviet Union and Uganda demonstrated the 
power of transnational networks in providing information to Congress that ends up in non-
binding resolutions and binding legislation. Taiwan demonstrates the persistence of transnational 
networks after Taiwan ended its human rights abuses and democratized. Previous work has 
demonstrated TIM’s impact on Congress, through FAPA, from the 1990s to the present (Chen 
2007). This chapter focuses on the 1980s. There was often a direct exchange of information 
about human rights abuses in Taiwan with members of Congress during the 1980s through 
FAPA.  
 
Taiwan’s Unique International Position 
Any discussion of Taiwan must recognize the complex relationship between the Unied
States, the PRC, and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. American foreign policy toward
China and Taiwan is complex because China’s culture, people, and vast resources have posed 
significant challenges for the West in general, including European colonial powers, and for the 
United States in particular. The United States has used its China policy to articulate ts national 
identity and its international relationships, from the Open Door Notes that the Secretary of State 
sent to the European Powers in 1899 to argue for open trade in China, to the recognition of the 
ROC in 1911, to the decision to not recognize the PRC in 1950, to recognition of the PRC in 
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1979 and eventual support for the PRC to enter the World Trade Organization (Holdaway 2002). 
The United States has used its China policy to advocate democracy around the world and 
demonstrate that it is a loyal ally to friendly countries.  
China had been carved up by European powers during the 18th and 19th centuries, with 
different treaties articulating the commercial rights of each European power. Then China entered 
an anti-colonial, revolutionary period as it came under the military and political dominion of Sun 
Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Nationalist government (Kuomintang or KMT). The U.S. 
recognized this government and allied with it during World War II. The U.S. was about to 
recognize the PRC after the Chinese Communist Party forced the KMT to move to Formosa 
(Holdaway 2002), but the PRC’s intervention in the Korean War on behalf of North Korea 
forced the U.S. to maintain its official alliance with the KMT government on Formosa. The U.S. 
had to engage in a delicate balancing act between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on Mainland 
China. On the one hand, the United States Congress passed the Formosa resolution in 1955 that 
authorized President Dwight Eisenhower to defend Taiwan and its smaller islands from attacks 
by the PRC (Briggs 1994). On the other, the U.S. did not want to commit itself to Taiwan’s 
defense such that it got dragged into a war between the ROC and the PRC if Taiwan or one of its 
smaller islands were attacked. This created a political and military stalemate, a situation that held 
until the Nixon administration renewed relations with the PRC in 1972 and the Carter 
administration officially recognized the PRC in 1979. 
Between 1949 and 1979, relations between the United States and the ROC were shaped 
primarily by the “China Lobby”, a group of American business leaders, politicians, and 
missionaries who had been actively involved in Chinese business, politics, and culture (Koen 
1974, Chao 1990). The China Lobby helped turn the ROC into an American ally despite 
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extensive evidence of corruption within the Nationalist Party and ineptitude in the government 
(Ericson 2004). When the Nixon administration sought a new relationship with the PRC, the 
China Lobby cast a shadow over negotiations, forcing Nixon and Kissinger to conduct all 
diplomacy in secret in the lead-up to the 1972 Shanghai Communique (Oksenberg 1986) and the 
Carter administration to do the same prior to official recognition of the PRC (Holdaway 2002, 
Sutter 1980). The China Lobby joined forces with the official lobby for the ROC to maintain 
U.S.-ROC relations from 1949 to 1979. Later the Taiwan independence movement effectively 
displaced both the China Lobby and the official representatives of the ROC on Capitol Hill. 
 
The 228 Incident 
The majority of the population on Taiwan is descended from Chinese who migrated there  
in previous centuries. Mainland-born Chinese who settled there at the end of WWII, along with 
their Taiwan-born offspring, constitute a sizeable minority. For 50 years after Japan defeated 
China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) Formosa was ruled by the Japanese Empire. 
The Japanese turned out to be enlightened leaders, building roads, hospitals, and schools for the 
native population on Formosa. The natives learned Japanese and witnessed their island turn into 
an industrial power. After the Allied powers defeated Japan in World War II, Formosa was left in 
limbo for a couple years as the Chinese government struggled for survival against Mao Zedong’s 
Communist rebellion. Unlike the progressive Japanese, who developed Formosa, the Nationalist 
government on China, led by General Chiang Kia-shek, decided to treat Formosa like a prize 
from the spoils of war. Chinese troops pillaged Formosa from the moment of their arrival on the 
island (Kerr 1965). The natives switched from hailing the conquering Chinese heroes to fearing 
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them and rebelling against them. Chinese corruption on Formosa was rampant, and the natives 
seethed with anger until, finally, a single spark became the catalyst for a conflagration of terror. 
On February 27, 1947, a woman on the island of Formosa started selling cigarettes 
without a license. She was promptly arrested by police working for the Nationalist Government 
controlling Formosa. Her arrest symbolized to the island natives all the corruptin in he Chinese 
government and its oppression of the people on Formosa. The natives rebelled, catching the 
Chinese government off guard at first. The Chinese government on Formosa tried to negotiate, 
but the governor of the island communicated the troubles to the Nationalist government on the 
mainland and the government sent troops for a crackdown. The next day, February 28 (the 228 
incident), the crackdown began, and it was horrific. In scenes reminiscent of the worst days of 
the Nazi regime in Germany and the purges in Stalin’s Russia, the Nationalist troops murdered or 
arrested ten thousand natives on Formosa, especially student protesters. The carnage became 
Formosa’s holocaust (Kerr 1965; Lai et al 1991). The massacre was followed by martial law and 
an era of “White Terror.” The crisis caused many Taiwanese students, especially upper-class 
Taiwanese, to travel abroad and oppose the KMT (Mendel 1970; Wu 2003).  
 
Spreading Information Through the Taiwan Independence Movement 
Thus was born the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) which consisted of advocates 
who began to call themselves “Formosans,” to distinguish themselves from Chinese born on
mainland China, after the Dutch name for Taiwan (Kerr 1974, Ma and Cartier 2003). After the 
228 incident, TIM spread to Japan, Sweden, Canada, and the United States. TIM pursued three 
goals after the initial 228 incident: (1) an end to martial law and the “White Terror”, which 
included improving human rights on Taiwan; (2) democratization, including legal opposition 
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parties; and (3) independence for Taiwan based on self-determination of the Taiwanese people 
(Wang 1999; Bush 2005; Tang 2005). Emotion-laden factors, such as national self-image, are n 
essential part of every national movement (Femenia 2000). Their need for internatonal 
recognition gave independence activists the energy to spread the message of Taiwan’s 
independence. Their self-image is still tied to an independent Taiwan. They will continue to 
advocate independence until Taiwan becomes legally independent. Their emotional cnnection 
to advocating Taiwan’s independence also provides the mechanism for collective organization, 
which we know through the concept of bonding social capital.  
The Nationalist government lost the civil war with the Chinese Communists and was 
forced to move to Formosa, which became Taiwan. Native Taiwanese thought Formosa was 
betrayed by the government that was supposed to be its benefactor, and, just as its identity was 
erased, its freedoms were erased as well. The Nationalist government was oppre sive, but it tried 
to maintain the pretense of democracy so that it could sustain its alliance with the Uni ed States 
and retain a veneer of legitimacy with the native people on Taiwan. Michael Fonte, the S nior 
Policy Analyst at the FAPA from 1986 to 2002, said “I lived in Taiwan from 67 to 70 so I 
experienced this all myself -- under tight martial law, a lot of human rights abuses, you were not 
allowed to speak out in any way…. The native Taiwanese who came here became professional 
people - scientists, doctors, engineers, etc. -- very well educated, hard-working people, but very 
dedicated to seeing a change in their home country …and so they carried an awful lot of that 
passion into their organizing.” (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008) 
The 20 years of TIM activity in the United States from the early 1960s to 1980 can be 
seen as a learning process as the same people created different organizations to dvocate 
Taiwan’s independence, and discovered the most viable method, creating political capital in 
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Congress, only after previous attempts at advocacy failed. The Taiwan independence activists 
learned to use the appropriate terminology, target the appropriate politicians, and moderate their 
goals sufficiently to find supporters in Congress. TIM efforts in the United States were 
disorganized until the 1980s when the activists created the Formosan Association for Public 
Affairs (FAPA). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Formosans traveled via student visas to Japan, Canada, and the 
United States, among other countries, to promote a free and independent Formosa. The KMT 
oppressed Formosans abroad by canceling their visas if they engaged in anti-KMT activity and 
harassing their relatives on Taiwan (Peng 1972). Nevertheless, Formosans started many 
American organizations to raise awareness about their plight: Taiwanese Association of America 
(TAA), Free Formosans for Formosa (FFF), United Formosans for Independenc (UFI), United 
Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI), and World United Formosans for 
Independence (WUFI) (Lin 2006). “I think the key to my mind lies in the community of 
Taiwanese Americans who came here. Many of them, especially the FAPA core people, came 
here in the ‘60s as students, or maybe early ‘70s, around that time.” (Michael Fonte, interview 
with author, October 22, 2008) 
The key organizer was Trong Chai. Chai is from Jiayi, Taiwan, a location of the worst 
forms of KMT oppression after the 228 incident, and had been active in the Taiwanese-Amrican 
social organization TAA. In 1970 he organized WUFI, a successor organization to FFF which 
was started in 1955 in Philadelphia and became UFI until merging with other groups to form
UFAI in the 1960s. In April 1970, Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Taiwan’s president Chiang Kai-
shek, visited the United States. Peter Huang, a member of WUFI, attempted to assassin te him. 
After the failed attempt, Trong Chai asked Peng Ming-min to join WUFI. Dr. Peng had been a 
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professor of political science and law in Taiwan and been forced into exile after distribut ng a 
document calling for democratically elected government. He eventually established roots in the 
United States through the University of Michigan (Smith 1970), and in September 1971 he 
agreed to move to New Jersey to establish Formosan Studies, Inc., under the auspicesof WUFI. 
In January 1972, Dr. Peng was elected chairperson of WUFI, but the Chiang assassination 
incident compelled many members to withdraw from WUFI. Dr. Peng was an ineffective 
administrator, functioning more as a “thinking-type intellectual”, as WUFI fell apart (Shu 2005). 
“Worse yet, he was haughtily lofty, obsessively confident, and he lacked political savvy. Unable 
to handle the situations, after only half of a year on the chairpersonship, Ming-min resig ed.” 
(Shu 2005) 
TIM reached its high point in terms of visibility with the attempted assassination of 
Chiang Ching-kuo, but the connection of TIM activists, especially WUFI members, with violent 
tactics caused Taiwanese around the world to disassociate themselves from the independence 
movement. Thus, there was little activity as the major international events of the 1970s 
transpired.  
 
The Chung-li Incident and Kaohsiung Incident 
In the late 1970s, two incidents united Taiwan independence activists on Taiwan and 
abroad, and galvanized them to take political and sometimes violent action. The Chung-li 
Incident in 1977 was the first political protest on the streets of Taiwan since the 1940s, and it 
was aimed at preventing election fraud by the KMT. This incident provoked activists to start 
organizing again. On Dec. 10, 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident occurred, with the government 
inciting violence against peaceful demonstrators at a United Nations Human Rights Day 
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celebration. The government arrested and imprisoned many opposition leaders. The Chung-li
Incident and the Kaohsiung Incident gave activists a sense of urgency about the dire situation on 
Taiwan. These two events fomented organized political opposition and intense activism by 
Taiwanese exiles in Europe and North America (Gregor and Chang 1983).  
The oppressive actions of the KMT occurred in five main areas following the Kaohsiung 
Incident. The first area was the arrest, imprisonment, and torture of people that the government 
linked, fairly or unfairly, to the peace demonstration. It arrested politicians, human rights 
activists, lawyers, ministers, journalists, and other citizens. The government i prisoned many 
people on Green Island and tortured them in various ways, including sleep deprivation, inflicti g 
bodily injury, denying them access to food, water and toilets, and denying them accss to the 
outside world. The second was the impediment of democratic processes, including preveting 
non-KMT candidates from campaigning for public office. The third was the denial of press
freedoms, such as the right to publish materials concerning human rights, the need for 
democracy, or documentation of the human rights abuses committed by the KMT. The fourth 
area was the denial of religious freedoms, particularly involving the rights of the Presbyterian 
Church and its leaders. The fifth area was persistence of martial law, which started in 1949 as an 
anti-communist measure, and involved the imprisonment or assassination of politicians, human 
rights activists, lawyers, ministers, journalists, and other citizens the KMT deemed a threat, 
whether they lived in Taiwan or in the United States.  
 
Spreading information 
Information about these human rights abuses went out to the world through Amnesty 
International, the State Department’s annual report on human rights, international magazines and 
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newspapers, and publications of organizations associated with the Taiwan independence or 
democracy movements. The Formosan Association for Human Rights (FAHR), founded in 1976, 
published literature on the KMT’s human rights abuses. The Society for the Protection of East 
Asians’ Human Rights (SPEAHR) published SPEAHRhead between 1979 and 1984 to document 
the plight of prisoners, both those held in connection with the Kaohsiung Incident and those 
imprisoned for longer periods of time. The International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan 
began publishing the Taiwan Communique in December 1980; FAPA took over the publication 
in 1988. The Taiwan Communique became a valuable source of information for politicians, 
policy makers, human rights activists and researchers concerned about the developmnts n 
Taiwan. It still publishes to this day. Most of the material is culled from other publications as 
well as the Congressional Record so that readers have access to the speeches and resolutions by 
members of Congress on behalf of Taiwan.  
Members of Congress, including but not limited to Rep. Solarz, Rep. Leach, Sen. Pell ad 
Sen. Kennedy, directed their staff to gather information on Taiwanese government rights abuses 
by arranging for activists, scholars and government officials to speak at hearings. 
Representatives of FAPA were witnesses at many hearings. In addition, Taiwan independence 
activists spoke at these hearings. After the Kaohsiung Incident, congressional activity -- 
hearings, press conferences, press releases, speeches, binding resolutions, non-binding 
resolutions, legislation, casework -- focused on events, both in Taiwan and in the United States. 
The events received press coverage both in Taiwan and the international press, often sparking 
hearings in Congress that resulted in legislation. The congressional activities signaled the KMT 
about the intentions of the United States government and thus often led to changes in the KMT’s 
behavior.  
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Deep Personal Impact: Staff and Members of Congress 
 As we examine the motives of members of Congress and their staff as they interacted 
with Taiwan democracy activists, we find evidence of deep personal impact.  
Rep. Stephen Solarz: Rep. Solarz explains why he not only met with refugees, but also 
turned his office into a refugee camp for oppressed people from all over the world. It owed 
largely to his Jewish background.  
My view of history has been shaped profoundly by the destruction of Eurpean 
Jewry in the Holocaust and the failure of the United States and other countries to 
come to their assistance when it could have made a difference. I believed as a 
Congressman that wherever there were people in distress, I had a responsibility to 
do whatever I could to relieve their suffering. That is why, whether it involved 
protecting the right of people to practice their religion, to freely migrate, or to 
express themselves without fear of persecution, I kept my office door open to 
Timorese, Bahai,  Vietnamese, Cambodians, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Pakistanis, 
South Africans, Bangladeshis, and anyone else in harm’s way, seeking help from 
the U.S. government. (Excerpt from unpublished memoir) 
 
Solarz’s deep interest in oppressed people made him the ideal champion for Taiwan. Solarz’s 
introduction to the Taiwan democracy movement started with Trong Chai. Solarz had already 
traveled to Taiwan, and by 1981 he was the chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. His 
chief of Staff, Edward Friedman, had also spent time on Taiwan duri g the 1960s. Thus, Solarz 
was the natural contact point for Taiwan democracy activists.  
Shortly after I became chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia in 1981, I was 
approached for help by a Taiwanese American, Trong Chai, who was a professor 
at Medgar Evers College, which is part of the City University of New York. More 
importantly, he was a skilled political organizer and president of the Formosan 
Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)… FAPA‘s members were Taiwanese 
Americans who were committed to the creation of real democracy and the 
eventual establishment of an independent Taiwan. (Excerpt from unpublished 
memoir) 
 
A key problem between Chai and Solarz was impact of U.S.-Beijing normalization. 
Solarz knew U.S. policy on Taiwan could not change, given the rapprochement with the People’s 
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Republic of China in 1972 and the official recognition of the PRC in 1979. But Chai did not 
recognize this limitation.  
There was always a little tension in my relations with Chai and FAPA. While I 
strongly supported their desire for an end to martial law and the establishment of a 
real democracy on Taiwan, I was not prepared to unequivocally endorse their goal 
of formal independence. I believed that if the U.S. had come out in favor of an 
independent Taiwan it would have resulted in a rupture in our relations with 
China…I tried to square the circle by securing the adoption of a Congressional 
resolution stating that the future of Taiwan should be determined peacefully and 
in a way that was acceptable to the Taiwanese people. (Excerpt from unpublished 
memoir) 
 
Once Solarz became Chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, following Lester Wolff’s 
defeat in the 1980 election, he asked Edward Friedman to lead his staff. Friedman explains 
Solarz’s motivation as deriving from his commitment to human rights, which had started in the 
1970s.  Friedman says, “Solarz had a tremendous and ongoing and global commitment on these 
kinds of issues. You can see it already when he is on the African Subcommittee chairing it on the 
issue of South Africa. No one has to put pressure on him to care about these kinds of issues.” 
(Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010) Once Solarz got involved in 
Taiwan issues he became very impressed with the Taiwanese-Americans, most of whom were 
wealthy and educated doctors, scientists, businessmen, professors, engineers, and so on.  
That group of people really was very impressive. These are people who had left 
Taiwan early and their grouping had unbelievably high percentage of doctors. 
That’s why they had some money that they could give to causes. So it was a very 
impressive group of professional people. If you met them it’s very hard not to be 
impressed. (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010) 
 
Richard Bush, who succeeded Edward Friedman as Majority Staff Consultant, explains Sol rz’s 
nuanced approach to Taiwan issues during the 1980s, which included balancing China-U.S. 
relations with Taiwan-U.S. relations and, simultaneously, developing a fundraisi g base.   
Solarz … understood … that U.S.-China relations was important to the Unitd 
States; understood that promoting an explicit independence agenda would be 
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inconsistent with that, so he reached an understanding with the leaders of FAPA 
early on that he would support democracy and human rights in Taiwan, which if 
…successful would create the ability of people on Taiwan to make their own 
choice, and then it was up to them… that allowed him, he felt, to simultaneously 
support … U.S.-China relations. … Solarz was interested in developing as many 
fundraising bases as possible, and he saw this as an attractive one. (Richard Bush, 
interview with author, August 4, 2009) 
 
Bush also explains that Solarz’s activity was far above the average for most representatives 
because he had so much energy.  
Solarz…did more than the average congressman. He did have a general and deep 
interest in promoting democracy and human rights everywhere - something he 
really believed in. He did not really focus on Taiwan until he becam  chairman of 
the subcommittee and until he was approached by Taiwanese. They got more out 
of him in terms of hearings and other things than they would have gott n ut of 
somebody else. It was an interactive process. … I think he used his chairmanship 




Edward Friedman: Friedman, Solarz’s long-time friend, in 1980 was a professor of 
Chinese politics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Friedman had completed his Ph.D. in 
Political Science in 1968 at Harvard after spending three years on Taiwan going thrugh the 
archives of the Nationalist government. As a graduate student he had lived in dorms run by the 
military, had encounters with the secret police, and visited Green Island. In 1981 he agreed to 
work with Rep. Solarz until Solarz was sufficiently knowledgeable about Asian issues, especially 
China.  Friedman explains that the most important factor for Solarz in interacting with the KMT 
and FAPA was the intersection of interests in areas that corresponded with the national interest. 
“American interests and FAPA’s interests overlapped in particular places. Overlap is very 
different from coincided. The key to FAPA’s interest is independence. We don’t support that. 
But they also, for their own reasons, have an interest in supporting human rights and democracy 
in Taiwan. That overlaps with us. The KMT … want to have good standing in the United States 
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so they have the ability to get weapons from the United States and so on. That creates a basis for 
a conversation with them to promote our interests having to do with human rights and 
democracy.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010) 
 
Rep. James Leach: Rep. Leach’s personal involvement derives mainly from his 
background and his staff’s backgrounds. “I had become active on Taiwan democracy issues in 
the 1970s, starting in January 1977, partly because I have a background in the State Department. 
I had a wonderful staff member [Cindy Sprunger] who was … raised in Taiwan. Her fath  was a 
missionary there -- a Mennonite. So we developed our own contacts from the island backwards. 
… This would have been an interest that sprung from my office and me personally.” (Rep. 
Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) Cindy Sprunger and her family had lived on Taiwan 
as Christian missionaries. Her concern for Taiwan motivated him to become more active. 
Leach notes that his motivation for interacting with the Taiwan democracy movement 
also derived in part from this sincere desire to promote democracy on the island, and in p rt from 
his personal impression of Taiwanese-American immigrant groups.  
I remember talking to that group in Illinois of Taiwanese activists. … they were 
all doctors and engineers and extremely successful, extremely int lligent people. 
But when they talked about American politics you had a sense of a little bit of 
naivete. And then they became very much a part of the American system. … so 
this was an integration of groupings of new Americans into American politics in a 
very profound way, and particularly on the democracy side. I found it wonderfully 
uplifting.  (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
Based on these affective impressions, Leach became active on issues pertaining to Taiwan in the 
late 1970s. He had submitted an amendment to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act advocating 
democracy on Taiwan.  
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Finally, Leach was interested in the intellectual puzzle that Taiwan presented. Taiwan is a 
country that has de facto independence without legal independence. During the 1980s and before 
it was technically a democracy but not really a democracy because the representatives had 
permanent tenure. Taiwan had developed economically but had a horrible human rights record. It 
was important to the United States but officially part of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
Senator Ted Kennedy: Senator Kennedy was one of the few celebrity senators in the 
United States Senate during the activities of the Gang of Four. Given Kennedy’s ational stature 
and his human rights advocacy, it was natural for Taiwan democracy activists to seek his support 
when he ran for president. Kennedy’s motivation for supporting Taiwan came from his previous 
history of advocacy for oppressed people around the world. Nancy Soderberg, the Foreign Policy 
Advisor to Kennedy from 1985 to 1988, describes Kennedy as being “very involved in 
democracy movements around the world.” This made Kennedy an obvious target for any group 
of people who wanted to promote democracy and human rights in their countries.  
As the Cold War ended, democracy movements around the world took on a new 
significance and had a new freedom to be active. …those who had a strong human 
rights agenda such as Kennedy were an open door to those who were pushing for 
democracy and human rights around the world. So, Kennedy worked with 
Solidarity in Poland, ANC in Africa, obviously Ireland, the Philippines, the South 
Koreans, and the Taiwanese….It was really a lifelong commiten  to standing up 
for the little guy and pushing democracy and human rights. (Nancy Soderberg, 
interview with author, February 10, 2010) 
 
Soderberg also mentions that Kennedy helped Taiwan because he thought he could be a force for 
improvement on the island. “It was a movement that he thought he could help develop into a 
democratic Taiwan… He really had a true feeling that if his weight and voice c uld help make 
progress in a certain area, he was willing to do it.” (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author, 
February 10, 2010) 
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Senator Claiborne Pell: Senator Pell was involved in the Gang of Four for personal 
reasons, having served in the military during World War II and trained at Columbia University to 
take over the governance of Taiwan once the United States defeated Japan. Pell never served in 
the capacity for which he trained because Taiwan instead reverted to Nationalist Chinese control. 
However, because of this war-time experience and friendships among the Taiwan democracy 
activists, Pell had a strong personal connection to Taiwan. His most important connection to 
Taiwan was through his friend Mark Chen, one of the key founders of FAPA. Thomas Hughes 
was his chief of staff during this time period, and recounts how the friendship between Pell and 
Chen motivated Pell to work on Taiwan issues.  
[It was] a special relationship between two significant but dramatically different 
personalities who during this period came together by sheer happenstance, bonded 
and really became true friends…working together [they] accomplished a great 
deal to help Taiwan on the road to democracy, human rights, and self-
determination.  [Pell] was then in his third of what turned out to be six terms … 
He was both by his family tradition and his own personal interest somebody who 
had a lifetime interest and involvement in foreign policy. And he had a very very 
unique and unusual interest in, and affection for, Taiwan … The other personality 
was Chin Dong Chin, better known … as Mark Chen. [He became] an advocate 
for democracy and an end to martial law in his native land.  Pell … never forgot 
the lessons learned at Columbia and always cherished the affection that he had 
gained even from a distance for the people of Taiwan. (Hughes 2009) 
 
Hughes said Pell’s interest in Taiwan stemmed also from a fondness for small countries.  
Throughout his entire legislative life, Claiborne Pell had a passion for what you 
might call “small states”. In fact he had a passion for small st tes that he thought 
were being picked on by their bigger neighbors. (Hughes 2009) 
 
Once Senator Pell became friends with Mark Chen, the friendship bothered the KMT. As a 
result, the KMT became very active in its lobbying effort with Pell’s office. When staff from 
Pell’s office met with the ambassador from Taiwan, they were told that Mark Chen worked with 
WUFI, the infamous terrorist organization.  
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Pell never could quite figure out what WUFI was.  It really didn’t impress him 
very much. But many of these accusations, I was present for many of them. They 
were done in sort of whispered innuendo.  “Oh senator, I wish I could tell you all 
the details, because you’d be horrified. But just suffice to say that these ar  very 
dangerous people.” Well at this point, Pell had come to know Mark Chen really 
quite well and liked him enormously. He was impressed by the fact th t Mark was 
very understated, that he was calm, and that he had a very restrain d manner.  He 
felt he could trust him and that he could rely on Mark’s version of events.   
 
So you can imagine Pell’s reaction the first time a CCNA representative… in the 
same whispered sort of way, told Pell that Mark Chen -- and he had this on the top 
authority from Taipei -- Mark Chen as a leader of WUFI, was a terrorist.  Pell 
typically did not react, he was a very calm figure, but later he made it very clear 
to me that he was offended by this.  He knew Mark Chen.  These accusations 
were nothing more than a libel against his friend, and it just made him all the 
more determined to work harder on the issues that they shared. (Hughes 2009) 
 
This friendship motivated Pell to help Mark Chen go back to Taiwan after Taiwan liberalized.  
 
This was not an easy cause.  In fact, one of my favorite recollecti ns is when Fred 
Chen, the legendary Fred Chen, was then the CCNA representative here. And he 
came to see Pell as he did regularly, bearing some kind of very, very good news.  
So he came in and Pell expected it was something he really cared about. It wasn’t. 
So Pell listened  politely and he said very nicely, “that’s very nice, thank you very 
much, now tell me, what about Mar..” and he just got the first syllable of Mark’s 
name, when Chen went, “Stop talking about Mark Chen, I can’t do anything with 
Mark Chen, please don’t talk to me anymore about Mark Chen.” Of course that 
didn’t stop it. And indeed in 1987 they relented, Mark Chen was allowed back 
into Taiwan. (Hughes 2009) (See also “Mark Chen: from Exile to Lawm ker”, 
Taiwan Communique October 1992) 
 
We get a sense of the intensity of this friendship from Hughes’ d cription of the last meeting 
between Chen and Pell after Pell had left the Senate.   
In 2004 in Newport, RI, Senator Pell was very, very seriously afflicted by 
Parkinson’s disease. He was in a wheelchair, slumped over, quite alert, but unable 
to talk primarily. And Mark Chen, the then Foreign Minister of Taiwan, came to 
Newport to present him an award and to give an address.  In presenting the award, 
Mark got incredibly emotionally touched by seeing his old friend and by seeing 
his old friend so incapacitated, and … he simply stopped and started to sob.  One 
of the most moving things I’ve ever seen in my life. …he went over and embraced 




The tight emotional bond between Pell and Chen was a key element in Pell’s motivation in 
advocating democracy and human rights on Taiwan.  
Pell’s relationship with Chen reflects the strategic interaction between the Taiwan 
democracy activists and the Gang of Four. Pell met mainly with Mark Chen. Trong Chai, the 
first president of FAPA, related mainly with Rep. Solarz. Peng Ming-Min, the third president of 
FAPA after Mark Chen, visited mainly with Rep. Leach. This pattern of relationsh ps was 
tailored to the positions and the personal relationships each activist had with each politi ian. 
Friedman describes the interaction he had with the Taiwan activists. “I just know him [Mark 
Chen] to be very good. He’s a very nice person. I think he’s a delight to talk to. I think he had a 
much better feel than the other two [Trong Chai and Peng Ming-Min] for the politics and 
political life in the United States. You could take him more seriously. … I thought that he had a 
very good understanding of the difference between his cause and our cause so that you could 
have a much more honest conversation with him. We had no interest in promoting an agenda of 
independence.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)  
 
Cindy Sprunger: Cindy Sprunger stands out among the congressional staff within the 
Gang of Four. She sparked Rep. Leach’s personal interest in Taiwan, and she provided the 
emotional energy to sustain the activities of the other staff on Taiwan issues. She has a 
background as a human rights activist before the Taiwan democracy activists started interacting 
with members of Congress. She knew of, and interacted with, key people in the Taiwan 
independence movement before she worked in Congress. She was a natural contact for the more
sophisticated Taiwan democracy activists in the 1980s. Sprunger was active in thes mov ments 
during the 1970s, then she went to the University of Michigan for graduate school. She returned 
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to Congress in early 1980 and started working on issues involving FAPA. From 1981 to 1985 
Sprunger worked with the Subcommittee on Human Rights while Fulton Armstrong, in Rep. 
Leach’s office, was working on Taiwan. After Rep. Leach became the ranking member on the 
Asian subcommittee, Sprunger moved to that subcommittee as the Minority Staff Consultant.  
Sprunger notes that the human rights angle was a critical issue for dealing with Taiwan in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Sprunger describes the human rights issues that involved Taiwan in terms 
of getting political dissidents out of prison and improving harsh prison conditions.  
It was getting people out of prison, it was getting the head of the Presbyterian 
Church out of prison, it was getting other people out of prison, making sure there 
was no pressure being brought on Taiwanese-Americans for their activities in 
support of human rights. We took a staff delegation to Taiwan in 86 for elections 
to see how the election process was going, to see how the DPP was being 
handled, just to kind of monitor this evolution on Taiwan. (Cindy Sprunger, 
interview with author, July 25, 2009) 
  
Sprunger says her involvement in Taiwan springs from moral motivations as well as h r personal 
background. She appreciates the fact that immigrants and exiles can flee to th  U.S. and put 
pressure on U.S. policy to agitate for democracy and human rights in their home countries. 
Friedman explains that, while Solarz had the most energy on foreign policy issues in general, it 
was Cindy Sprunger who showed the greatest drive on Taiwan issues in particular.  
 
Fulton Armstrong: Fulton Armstrong lived on Taiwan and became an advocate for 
democracy and human rights during this critical period of time as Taiwan was liberating 
politically. From 1980 to 1984 he was the Foreign Affairs Aide to Rep. Leach. Armstrong 
describes himself as a “long, long student of Taiwan.” He says Cindy Sprunger set up the 
“Taiwan camp in the House of Representatives in Jim Leach’s office” before he arrived.  
I started in Congressman Leach’s office after four years in Taiwan, including 
some close association with government entities. I worked at the broadcasting 
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corporation for China and watched Taiwan from both the street and from inside 
the Kuomintang propaganda apparatus….We saw normalization as inevitable, 
overdue, and very much in the U.S. national interest.  We didn’t resist that. If we 
are upset about anything we are upset with the KMT’s inability to prepare for 
normalization, to engage with the world community, including the U.S. a number 
of times in previous decades on how to solve the national identity or legal status 
issue.  (Armstrong 2009) 
 
Armstrong said the Kaohsiung Incident and the murders of Lin’s mother and daughter 
demonstrated that the KMT was doing to crackdown during this period of transition.  
The Kaohsiung incident and the Lin family massacres - those were huge powerful 
signals that they were not going to move, or if they were going to move, they 
were going to move on their own terms. (Armstrong 2009) 
 
Armstrong says the recalcitrance of the KMT became the biggest motivatin for the Gang of 
Four because the members of Congress and their staff were trying to fix the rela ionship between 
the United States and Taiwan.  
We thought we were filling an important void in giving this relationship 
something more than the technical stuff in the Taiwan Relations Act. In other 
words, I think that what we were  doing was encouraging… a new strategy, not 
just for our relationship with Taiwan and people of Taiwan, but for Taiwan itself. 
And that is: What [do] you do now with your national identity issue and your 
internal stability and democratization issue? … we said … Taiwan's governance, 
its survival and its national identity, all would be served with one magic formula, 
and that is human rights and democracy. … it was the insurance policy that 
Taiwan needed. (Armstrong 2009) 
 
The motivations for members of Congress and their staff derived from both moral convictions 
and personal relationships with Taiwan activists. The affective relationships existed both in the 
congressional offices, between members and their staff, and in their interactions with ethnic 
interest groups. Members of Congress and their staff expressed affective motivations in the ways 




Safe seats for the Gang of Four 
As the four charts demonstrate below, all of the members of the Gang of Four had safe 
seats. The “Margin of Victory” on the Y-Axis represents the points separating the winner from 
the second-place vote-getter. In 1976, for example, there were four points separating Rep. Leach 
from his Democratic opponent. In 1962 there were thirty-seven points separating Sen. Pell from 
his Republican opponent. In 1974 there were fifty-nine points separating Rep. Solarz from his 
Republican opponent. In 1962 there were fourteen points separating Sen. Kennedy from his 
Republican oppenent. Kennedy stayed in his seat until his death in 2009. Solarz suffered a 
























































































his seat in the Democratic wave of 2006. All of them sustained large victory margins over many 
election cycles.4 Rep. Leach ran unopposed in 1990. His closest races were in 1996 and 2002 
when he defeated his opponents by seven points. Rep. Solarz had victory margins above fifty 
points for all of his races except 1984, when thirty-three points separated him from his 
Republican opponent. Sen. Pell’s closest race was in 1962 when eight points separated him from
his Republican opponent. Sen. Kennedy’s closest race after 1962 was 1994 with seventeen poits 
(Statistics of the Congressional Election).  
This political security gave them the freedom to become foreign policy entrepreneurs. As 
we recall from the first chapter, Carter and Scott (2010) categorize foreign policy entrepreneurs 
as policy specialists, process specialists, policy strategists, and process strategists. Both Solarz 
and Leach were policy specialists. As leaders on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, they were 
deeply concerned about American policy toward Asian countries after the Vietnam War and the 
recognition of the PRC. Both Kennedy and Pell were process specialists and process strategists. 
They wanted Taiwan to approach its democratic transition in the proper way without interference 
from the United States or the PRC, and find a way for Taiwan, the PRC, and the United States to 
relate peacefully over the long term. As policy specialists, Solarz and Leach r sponded first to 
specific events on Taiwan. As process specialists and process strategists, Kennedy and Pell 
focused more on martial law and democratic freedoms. They expressed this focus in their Senate 
resolutions. 
 The Gang of Four expressed their policy interests through the events on Taiwa during 
the 1980s. There are four events after the Kaohsiung Incident that provided the catalyst for 
members of Congress to act on their affective motivations. In 1981 Wen-cheng Chen, a 
                                                      
 
4 For election years and vote totals, see the Appendix B 
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Taiwanese-American professor at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA, was killed in 
Taiwan. In 1985 Henry Liu, a Taiwanese-American journalist was killed in the Unitd States. In 
1991 Huang Hua, an advocate of independence, was sentenced to a long prison term. In 1992 
members of Congress learned about the KMT blacklisting of Taiwanese-Americans, preventing 
them from entering Taiwan after social or political activities in the United States. 
 
The Impact of Wen-cheng Chen’s Death  
Wen-cheng Chen was killed on July 2, 1981, by the Taiwanese Garrison Command 
(TGC) after spies for the KMT alerted the KMT to Chen’s various political a tivities in the 
United States (Taiwan Communique July 1981, December 1981, October 1982, February 1988, 
February 1989). When Chen went to Taiwan to visit his family, he was interrogated and killed. 
On the morning of July 3, his body was found by local jogger under a fire escape on the campus 
of the National Taiwan University in Taipei.  
He had 13 broken ribs, a broken spine and numerous internal injuries. Chen's 
family had last seen him 22 hours before when he was taken away by the Taiwan 
Garrison Command, the national security police, for questioning about his 
political activities in the United States.  According to the official Taiwanese 
account, Chen was interrogated for 13 hours about letters, speeches and phone 
calls he had written or delivered in the United States. (Peterson 1981) 
 
The KMT claimed it was an accident. This sparked a series of hearings by the Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Subcommittee that revealed a network of spies for the KMT spread across American 
college campuses. These spies reported to the KMT and the KMT applied pressure on 
Taiwanese-American college students by threatening their relatives on Taiwan. Through these 
hearings, the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee learned that immigrants who had fled 
other countries for similar reasons of oppression were being similarly spied on and targeted for 
killings or repercussions for relatives in the home country. Based on these findings, the 
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committee passed legislation banning U.S. arms sales to any country that killed immigrants in 
the United States. 
The first reporting on Prof. Chen’s death was done by the Pittsburgh Press and the 
Pittsburgh Post Gazette. Rep. Leach learned about the death and, on July 9, entered a statement 
in the Congressional Record requesting a speedy conclusion to the investigation. On July 10 
Leach made a statement about Taiwanese agents spying on American college campuses. “Given 
the admitted surveillance by Taiwanese authorities of Professor Chen in the Pittsburgh area and 
the chilling message his death leaves with everyone of Taiwanese descent living in America, I 
am convinced of the necessity of highlighting the intelligence activities of the Taiwan 
Government as well as those of certain other foreign governments and to demand at the highest 
government levels that these surveillance activities cease.” (Taiwan Communique, December 
1981) Following Leach’s statement, many other national newspapers and magazines picked up 
the story.5  
Hearings before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee began on July 30, 1981. 
Rep. Donald Pease (D-OH) entered a statement in the Congressional Record, as Chairman of the 
Human Rights Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, applauding the 
hearings. The Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee discovered that there was an extensive 
spy network. This information was widely reported in the press.6 
Fulton Armstrong described the investigation into Chen’s death.  
                                                      
5 Articles appeared in the International Herald Tribune (‘US legislator claims professor’s death is related to spying 
by Taiwan students.’, July 15, 1981), the Honolulu Advertiser (‘Another Chen case ?’, July 20, 1981), the N w York 
Times (‘Death of Taiwan professor causes uproar on a Pittsburgh campus.’ July 21, 1981), the Wichita Eagle-
Beacon (‘What happened to Dr. Chen ?’, July 22, 1981) and the Washington Post (‘After police interrogation, a 
death.’, July 28, 1981). (Taiwan Communique, Decembr 1981)  
6 Articles appeared in the Chicago Tribune (“ Spying on foreign students” , July 30, 1981), the Los Angeles Times 
(‘Taiwan harassment of students in U.S. reported.’ July 31, 1981), the Chicago Sun-Times (‘Taiwan spies on U.S. 
students, House panel told.’, July 31, 1981), Newsweek (‘Professor Chen goes home.’ August 3, 1981), the C ristian 
Science Monitor (“Professor’s death linked to alleged Taiwanese spying.’, August 6, 1981), and TIME Magazine 
(‘Spies among us; outrage at a professor’s death.’, August 10, 1981). (Taiwan Communique, December 1981). 
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If you’ve ever driven to Pittsburgh, you have to go through this funny little truck 
stop called Breezewood. We met the Howard Johnsons in Breezewood… we 
interviewed his [Chen’s] friends, we met also with [the] president of the 
University, we read the full autopsy reports. We were actually the official U.S. 
government custodians of the autopsy report and photographs and files in 
congressman Leach’s office.  We did all this not because we wanted to pick up 
dirt and make a political case.  We actually wanted to make everybody appreciate 
the true shock value and have everybody appreciate the implications of what was 
going on here in the United States of America.  
 
We got to look at a model resident of the United States of America, a model 
immigrant, who was a respected academic embarking on a solid career,  young 
father, a good husband, well-liked by everybody, being harassed, interrogated, 
tortured, and killed, purely for his political views…. political views that had been 
reported through channels by people at the University in Pittsburgh that we found 
to be a quintessential apparatus, a foreign apparatus repressing its people, 
suppressing democracy, and killing people … we thought it was a very powerful 
signal. It was a warning not just to the Taiwanese on the island. It was a warning 
to Taiwanese in the United States: We’re watching you, we’re not just going to 
blacklist you, we’re going to punish you…. We looked at how the KMT ran 
campus spy networks. (Armstrong 2009) 
 
The congressional hearings were designed to send signals both to the KMT and supporters of the 
KMT on Taiwan who had believed in the good behavior of their government.  
Rep. Leach presented a statement at the first hearing, on July 30, 1981, in which he 
described the intelligence network that Taiwan had created. He noted that files had been kept on 
Taiwanese students and faculty in the United States since the 1960s.  
For more than fifteen years, students have been receiving parents’ s cret letters, 
hand-carried here by close friends, informing them of family harassment. A 
respected civil engineer working in the Provincial Government was told how 
"unfortunate" it was that his son associated with "Taiwan Independence elements" 
at Harvard and, coincidentally, was not promoted once during the last fifteen 
years of his career. A younger sister, accepted to study at a prominent American 
university, was denied an exit visa because her brother signed an open letter 
critical of the arrest of veteran Taiwanese leader Yu Teng-fa. A history teacher 
was denied a position in a national university because of his sister's "indiscreet 
political activities" at the University of California. Taiwanese in the U. S. are 
harassed too, particularly those who have commenced careers here.  
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They are told directly by Taiwanese Government representatives of potential or 
actual punitive actions that can be taken against them. It is common to hear of a 
Taiwanese receiving a note saying, "your visa application to return to the 
Republic of China has been denied" or "your passport renewal cannot be 
processed at this time (i.e., you must return home)." Another common essage is: 
"Your application for property sale or transfer has been rejected spending [sic] 
clarification of a case currently being investigated by the Taiwan Garrison 
Command." When someone tries to clear up the problem through a Taiwan office 
in this country, he is either given a confession form (as well as an offer to become 
an informant") or a run-around. (“Taiwan Agents in America and the Death of 
Prof. Wen-Chen Chen”, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific
Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, July 30, 1981)  
 
Rep. Leach said he learned that many countries hunted down and killed their emigrants who 
became American citizens. The human rights abuses practiced in authoritarian countries were 
routinely practiced in the United States. 
Do not underestimate the coercive dimension of the reach of foreign societies in 
the United States. … It took some courage of the pro-democracy people to 
become active… I mean the word “courage”. …for years… if you were a 
Taiwanese student in the United States, you would have reports on you made up. 
Every campus of every size would have someone reporting on everybody else. 
you were expected never to criticize the government…if you criticized the 
government, there could be ramifications for your younger brother ever g tting a 
scholarship. There could be ramifications for your father’s employment. This was 
a very serious phenomenon. And very coercive. … I don’t want to suggest this 
just of Taiwan. It was true in the Philippines, it was true in Yugoslavia - 
Yugoslavian-Americans, Filipino-Americans might be killed. (Rep. Jim Leach, 
interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
The congressional hearings sparked many journalistic investigations and concurrent 
congressional investigations into the KMT’s American spy network. The trail, followed by 
college newspapers and national newspapers, revealed that campus spying by the KMT was an 
old problem going back to the 1970s.7 
                                                      
7 News stories had appeared about campus spying at MIT in the Christian Science Monitor  (“Spy charges surface at 
MIT” , March 30, 1976). The University of Chicago newspaper, The Chicago Maroon, had reported on spying 
(“Spying charge found nationwide.” May 21, 1976). The University of Washington Daily had reported on campus 
spying (“Students charge Taiwan government spies”, December 7, 1977). The Washington Post reported on foreign 
intelligence activities (“Foreign Spy activities found rampant in the U.S.”, August 9, 1979). (Taiwan Communique 
January, 1983, August 1983). For more evidence on campus spying by the KMT and other foreign governments, as 
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The KMT’s spy network created a climate of fear for any Taiwanese stud nts at 
American college campuses. In addition to MIT, the University of Washington, the Univ rsity of 
Minnesota, the University of Illinois, and the University of Hawaii, the KMT had spies at 
Columbia, Cornell, Iowa State University, Princeton, State University of New York, University 
of Californian at Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Florida, and University of 
Wisconsin at Madison (Glennon 1984). 
Based on the information gathered at these hearings, the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee 
passed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act.  
Sec. 6. Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of Individuals. -- No letters of offer 
may be issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export licenses 
may be issued under this Act with respect to any country determin d by the 
President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or 
harassment directed against individuals in the United States. The President shall 
report any such determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate.  (22 U.S.C.A. § 2756 cited in Glennon 1984) 
 
The problem with this amendment, Glennon notes, is that it places the burden on Congress to act 
on the information the president provides instead of letting the president act on the information 
independent of Congress. Moreover, it affects only states that depend exclusively on the U.S. for 
arms sales, thus limiting the impact of the amendment. The Reagan administratio  p oduced the 
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, to commemorate the 10-year anniversary of 
the 1972 Shanghai Communique. This time, the United States promised to gradually reduce, an  
ultimately end, arms exports to Taiwan. These actions, from the president and the Congress, 
placed pressure on the KMT to dismantle its spy network in order to continue receiving 
defensive weapons from the United States. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
well as relevant laws, see Glennon 1984 and Activities of “Friendly” Foreign Intelligence Services in the United 
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The Assassination of Henry Liu 
The murder of Henry Liu was ordered at the highest levels of Taiwan’s government. The 
KMT paid a gang in San Francisco, CA, to assassinate Liu in front of his home. Whil  the death 
of Prof. Wen-cheng Chen was likely unintentional on the part of the KMT (Chen died after 
receiving multiple injuries as a result of his nearly 13 hours of interrogation), the murder of 
Henry Liu was intentional, took place on American soil, and thus posed a direct challenge to the 
Arms Export Control Act amendment. 
Henry Liu was a Taiwanese-American journalist who was killed by KMT-sponsored 
agents on Oct. 15, 1984 (Taiwan Communique November 1984). Liu had published a book that 
was unflattering to Chiang Kai-shek. Initially the KMT was uncooperative in the investigation, 
but became cooperative as the FBI discovered that the assassins had connections with the Ta wan 
intelligence community and were following the orders of Chiang Hsiao-wu, the de facto head of 
Taiwan’s intelligence organizations and Chiang Ching-kuo’s son. The revelations that the KMT 
ordered members of a Taiwan underworld gang to murder an American citizen outraged 
members of Congress, sparking hearings and resolutions. The KMT investigated, and then tried, 
convicted, and sentenced the key people involved with the murder, but denied any connection to 
Chiang Hsiao-wu and the KMT. The widow of Henry Liu, Helena Liu, was not satisfied with the 
KMT’s explanation, so she sued the KMT for a wrongful death in United States district court in 
San Francisco, CA. The district court followed the Taiwan court’s rulings u der the “Act of 
State” doctrine, but the federal appeals court sided with Mrs. Liu, arguing under the principle 
respondiat superior that the KMT government could be held liable for Henry Liu’s death. 
Finally, the KMT appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and settled with Mrs. Liu when it realized 
that the Supreme Court would likely side with Mrs. Liu.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
States: A Case Study. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, June 1978 
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Henry Liu’s killing received a great deal of press attention, starting wth the Washington 
Post, which reported that Liu was shot in front of his home in Daly City, south of San Francisco. 
Following the assassination, the KMT began a campaign against organized crime. On November 
12 the KMT arrested Chen Chi-li,  the leader of the “Bamboo Union Gang”, Taiwan’s large t 
underworld gang with 10,000 members, including government officials, business leaders, an  
movie stars. The KMT arrested three officials of the Military Intellignce Bureau of the Ministry 
of Defense, including Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, who had ordered the assassination (New 
York Times January 19, 1985; Taiwan Communiqué February 1985).  
Based on these events, Rep. Solarz called for hearings (“Coast Murder Spurs Inquiry in 
Congress on Taiwan Activities”, January 19, 1985, New York Times) to investigate whether the 
murder of Henry Liu violated the amendment to the Arms Export Control Act. In addition to 
Solarz, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Rep. Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA) asked President Reagan 
to request extradition. ''How can Chinese-Americans feel safe when the President remains silent 
over this terrorism?'' Mineta told the New York Times. The Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Subcommittee started its hearings on February 7 and received testimony from Helena Liu, Rep. 
Mineta, William Brown, deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
and Michael Glennon. Helena Liu expressed her belief that high government officials in the 
KMT ordered the murder for three reasons: “1) to punish him for writing about the ruling Ch ang 
family; 2) to prevent him from writing books and articles in the future about the Chiang family, 
and their political and family history; and 3) to scare other journalists and writers who might also 
be interested as Henry was in writing about this family and its history.” (The Murder of Henry 
Liu, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985) 
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During the hearings, Rep. Solarz made the point that aliens living in the United Stats 
must be protected from their home governments.  
I cannot exaggerate the sense of outrage which the reported involvement of 
officials of the Taiwan government in the murder of an American citizen on 
American soil provokes in me. … Part of my outrage stems from the knowledge 
that this is not the first time that Taiwan has abused the freedoms of individuals in 
the United States. In the past, there have been numerous credible charges of 
surveillance, intimidation, and harassment in the United States by agents of 
Taiwan’s intelligence services, particularly with respect to Taiwanese students in 
our country.” (The Murder of Henry Liu, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 
1985)  
 
Rep. Mineta spoke as the most senior member of the House of Representatives of Asian 
ancestry. He recounted the racism and denial of justice that Asian-Americans suffered in the 
United States. He argued that the Reagan administration’s failure to condemn the Henry Liu 
murder was another injustice against people of Asian-American.  
I am concerned about acts of violence against other Americans of Asian ancestry. 
… I am forced to believe that if Henry Liu was white, then this ca e would be 
handled differently by our government and other groups. On June 19, 1982, a 
young American of Chinese ancestry was enjoying a last night out before his 
wedding, when two autoworkers in the bar with him blamed him for the troubles 
in the auto business. Such scapegoating is not at all rare, but in thiscase the two 
men followed Mr. Chin for half an hour, later beating him to death with baseball 
bats. For this crime, the Michigan courts sentenced the two men to $3,000 fines 
and probation. Neither spent one night in jail. As you can imagine, protests 
mounted, and it took 8 months of hard work to convince the Department of 
Justice to indict these two men on Federal civil rights charges. When the two men 
were finally prosecuted on Federal charges, one was convicted of violating Mr. 
Chin's civil rights. 
 
The same sort of situation appears to be developing here. How many of these 
cases have to be endured before the rights of Americans of Asianancestry are 
fully respected and protected by our government? Americans of Asian ancestry 
are sick and tired of the failure of the Federal Government to vigorously enforce 
the civil liberties they possess as citizens of the United States. I urge this 
subcommittee to send a signal that the time has come to put an end to the 
hypocrisy that condemns terrorism against U. S. citizens abroad, but turns a blind 
eye to it here at home… We cannot allow Taiwan to be a safe haven for those 
who murder U.S. citizens. (The Murder of Henry Liu, Hearings before the 
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Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
February 7, 1985)  
 
On April 2, 1985 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a Concurrent Resolution 
advocating democracy on Taiwan, with Jesse Helms (R-NC) as the only senator voting against it 
(Taiwan Communiqué April 1985). On April 16, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 
approved the Senate resolution as House Concurrent Resolution 49, which called for an 
extradition agreement and cooperation between American and Taiwan authorities. This 
Concurrent Resolution passed the House as Concurrent Resolution no. 110 by a vote of 387 to 2 
(Taiwan Communiqué June 1985). On July 31 the U.S. Senate passed an amendment to the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986. The amendment called for democracy 
on Taiwan. On August 1 the House passed the Act (Taiwan Communiqué August 1985). On 
August 17 President Reagan signed the bill into law (Taiwan Communiqué October 1985). 
As the investigation continued, more revelations came out about the KMT targeting 
people for harassment. Chen Chi-li admitted to planning the killing with three top-officials of the 
Military Intelligence Bureau (San Francisco Examiner, February 24, 1985, cited in Taiwan 
Communiqué April 1985) On March 14, Representatives Mineta, Solarz and Leach requested 
Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives, to initiate a congressional investigation into the activities of foreign 
agents in the U.S. who harass and intimidate American citizens.  
During a hearing in Taipei District Court on March 20, 1985, Chen Chi-li revealed that 
Vice-Admiral Wang Hsi-ling had told him to “teach Henry Liu a lesson” because Liu had written 
“bad things about our country and about President Chiang Ching-kuo.” Chen had received the 
order from Wang on August 14, 1984. For a month he received training at the Intelligence 
Bureau’s training school at Yanmingshan (“Grass Mountain” near Taipei). The Bureau gave him 
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materials, including Liu’s home address and daily schedule. In the U.S., an associate of Chen’s 
revealed that Chen had met with Chiang Hsiao-wu on three occasions. Chen recorded the 
conversation during one of these meetings. On a recording made October 17, 1984, Chen Chi-li 
had said:  
Four years ago, government agencies of all levels came to see me, because I was 
originally the leader of the biggest gang in Taiwan. Moreover, I had great “hidden 
potential” all over Taiwan. Therefore the government wanted me to come back to 
the gang and reorganize the Bamboo Union Gang. The government wanted me to 
develop the Gang.... The main purpose was to deal with the non-KMT politicians 
and Taiwan Independence Movement members. (Taiwan Communiqué April 
1985) 
 
On April 9, 1985 Chen Chi-li and Wu Tun were both sentenced to life imprisonment. On April 
12, 1985, Vice-Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, Major-General Hu Yi-ming, and Colonel Chen Hu-men 
were tried for the murder of Henry Liu. On April 19, Wang Hsi-ling was sentenced to life in 
prison and his codefendants received sentences of two-and-a-half-years in prison (Taiwa  
Communiqué April 1985). 
Media reports indicated that Chen Chi-li had been part of the KMT’s systematic 
crackdown on domestic and foreign dissidents following the Kaohsiung Incident. The KMT had 
asked Chen to reorganize the Bamboo Union Gang as an unofficial arm of the national security 
apparatus. Kaohsiung “convinced the government that it needed to enforce martial law without 
dirtying its hands.. In the ensuing years, according to Bamboo Gang members, the underworld 
syndicate grew from 1,000 members to 40,000, forming a pervasive intelligence network that 
spied on opposition leaders and dissidents in Taiwan and gathered sensitive information on 
China.” (Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1985, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985) 
Underworld gangs were used in Taiwan during the 1970s to collect information on dissidents and 
disrupt election campaigns of opposition politicians (Newsweek, “The Gangs of Asia”, April 1, 
1985, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985) 
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Following the actions by Congress and the Taiwan government in 1985, the Henry Liu 
murder case was mainly resolved through the American federal courts. Tung Kueisen, the third 
killer in the case, was arrested in Brazil in September 1985 and brought to the U.S. for trial On 
March 16, 1988, he was convicted for his role in the Henry Liu murder and sentenced on May 
11, 1988, to “27 years to life” in prison (Taiwan Communiqué May 1988). Despite prison terms 
for the killers and the officials at the Military Intelligence Bureau, Mrs. Liu sued the government 
of Taiwan for $200 million in California district court in September 1987 to link the murder with 
Chiang Hsiao-wu and the KMT. The district court cited the “Act of State” doctrine o deny 
summary judgment to Mrs. Liu. U.S. District Court judge Eugene Lynch said he was bound to 
accept the finding of the KMT’s courts that the intelligence director, Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, 
had acted on his own and not in his official capacity. The “Act of State” doctrine is th judicial 
system’s reasoning that the executive branch is given the primary role in foreign affairs and that 
the American courts will refrain from overruling foreign court decisions or trying foreign 
governments for their actions (Alford 1989). The district court’s decision was reversed on 
December 29, 1989, by the U.S. Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco. The court ruled that the 
KMT could be held directly responsible. The appellate panel argued that Wang acted within “the 
scope of his employment.” (Taiwan Communiqué April 1990) The appellate court used the legal 
doctrine of respondiat superior (Scheven 1991), recognizing that the “Act of State” did not apply 
in cases of human rights violations. On May 14, 1990, the KMT appealed the appellate court’s 
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court (Taiwan Communiqué August 1990). The KMT settled with 




Applying the Model 
In the cases of Wen-cheng Chen and Henry Liu, we can see the elements of the model. 
First there were obvious international provocations: the KMT was linked to the deaths of two 
American citizens. Second, members of Congress received information about both the deaths and 
the links to the KMT through American media organizations and congressional hearings. In both 
cases the hearings revealed the existence of a spy network. In the case of Prof. Chen, the network 
consisted of students paid by the KMT to spy on students suspected of dissident activities. In the 
case of Henry Liu, the network consisted of a criminal gang paid by the KMT to disrupt dissident 
activities in Taiwan and in the United States. Third, members of Congress were deeply 
personally affected. Rep. Mineta spoke about his sense that Asian-Americans were being killed 
without bringing the killers to justice. Fourth, members of Congress took the path of least 
resistance. They knew the Reagan administration was unresponsive to these events, so they held 
hearings and passed non-binding concurrent congressional resolutions to signal to the KMT ow 
they wished these cases to be resolved. If the Reagan Administration had been more vocal about 
the KMT’s activities and active in resolving these criminal cases, members of Congress would 
likely not have held hearings or passed resolutions. Rep. Leach’s office would likely not have 
been the official U.S. government custodians of the autopsy report, photographs, and files in 
Prof. Chen’s case.  
 
Congressional reactions to political oppression on Taiwan and Taiwan’s response 
Congress responded to the deaths of Taiwanese-American citizens as a function of its 
investigative role. Congress is not obligated to respond to political oppression in other countries. 
Yet, in the case of Taiwan it did exactly that. Members of Congress responded to arbitrary 
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arrests, bad prison conditions, curtailment of press freedoms, persecution of the Presbyterian 
Church, and martial law. For example, the Taiwan Garrison Command arrested Mrs. Lee Ya-
ping on September 17, 1985 while she was visiting Taiwan, for publishing the International 
Daily News, a Chinese-language newspaper in Los Angeles. The State Department immediately 
published a statement, saying, “Arresting a United States newspaper publisher for her 
professional activities in the United States must be seen as an act of intimidation and harassment 
directed against individuals in the United States. We are asking the Taiwan authorities t  review 
the case immediately and to release Ms. Lee without further delay.” (Taiwan Communique 
October 1985) On September 19, Rep. Solarz, issued a statement, saying that the arrest of Lee 
Ya-ping was like the murder of Henry Liu, and “ a frightening example of the long arm of 
Taiwan’s martial law tearing at the fabric of American democracy. The authorities of Taiwan are 
not content to destroy basic liberties on the island of Taiwan, but insist on violating the ri ht to 
free speech of people in the United States as well. The Kuomintang needs to be remind d that the 
State of California is not a province of Taiwan.”  (Taiwan Communique October 1985) 
The imprisonment of Presbyterian ministers and confiscation of church property became 
a catalyst for congressional hearings. The KMT made repeated attempts to limit the influence of 
the Presbyterian Church. Information about religious persecution in Taiwan reached the House 
of Representatives through a hearing on “Religious Persecution as a Violation f Human 
Rights”, September 23, 1982, before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International 
Organizations, chaired by Rep. Don Bonker (D-WA). The subcommittee received testimony 
from Reverend Dr. Arie Brouwer, General Secretary of the Reformed Church in America, Dr. 
Shoki Coe, former director of Theological Education with the World Council of Churches in 
Geneva, and Mr. Tong Hwan Moon, pastor of the Capital Union Presbyterian Church. Their 
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testimony revealed that over the course of the 1980s, the KMT tried many ways to limit the 
influence of the Presbyterian Church, including preventing the church from being represented at 
international meetings and trying to infiltrate the church to control its governance. The KMT 
focused on the Presbyterian Church for persecution because it is the oldest Protestant Church in 
Taiwan, with over 170,000 members at that time, and was often the first organization to 
condemn bad prison conditions, violations or press freedoms, and other forms of political 
oppression. 
Congress responded swiftly to any incidents on Taiwan intended to prevent opponents of 
the KMT from advocating democracy, especially their arrest under martial l w. For example, on 
May 20, the Gang of Four – Rep. Solarz, Rep. Leach, Sen. Kennedy, Sen. Pell – held a press 
conference to urge Taiwan to end 33 years of martial law (“Congressmen Ask Reagan to Press 
for End to Martial Law in Taiwan,” New York Times, May 25, 1982). The Gang of Four 
repeated these press conferences every May 20 until 1987 (Taiwan Communiqué June 1983, 
August 1984, May 1986, May 1987, September 1987). That same day, May 20, 1982, the Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee held a hearing on “Martial Law on Taiwan and United States 
Foreign Policy Interests.” The subcommittee passed Resolution 591, calling for the end of 
martial law in Taiwan.  
On February 28, 1983, the United States Senate passed a resolution that called for 
Taiwan’s future to “be settled peacefully, free of coercion and in a manner acceptable to the 
people on Taiwan.” The same resolution was introduced in the House by Representatives Solarz 
and Leach the next day. To recognize 35 years of martial law on May 20, 1984, Sen. Pell urged 
Taiwan to lift martial law. On May 31 the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held a 
hearing and passed House Concurrent Resolution 344 “Expressing the sense of Congress 
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concerning the need to achieve full democracy in Taiwan”. On November 18, Solarz and Leach 
introduced House Concurrent Resolution 233 expressing concern about the lack of political 
freedom and freedom of expression in Taiwan (Taiwan Communiqué January 1986). On March 
25, 1986, Senators Kennedy and Pell introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 121 calling on 
the Taiwan authorities to allow the formation of genuine opposition parties, end censorship and 
guarantee freedom of speech, expression and assembly, and move towards full representative 
government (Taiwan Communiqué May 1986). In June, 1987, the House of Representatives 
passed an amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill calling for sustained progress 
“towards a fully democratic system of government on Taiwan.” In October 1987, the Senate 
approved a similar amendment urging democratization on Taiwan.  
These efforts by members of Congress to pressure the KMT to liberalize began to 
produce results. After Congress passed resolutions in 1983 urging Taiwan to lift martial law and 
create a viable democracy, the KMT began to make some changes. They demoted General Wang 
Sheng, the internal security czar, after he was scolded by members of Congress for brutal police 
methods. The KMT allowed four non-KMT politicians to visit the U.S. and tour college 
campuses. The KMT also granted exit visas to the wives of two men imprisoned for the 
Kaohsiung incident (Eduardo Lachia, Asian Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1983, cited in 
Taiwan Communiqué June 1984).  
On July 14, 1987, Taiwan ended martial law (Taiwan Communiqué September 1987). 
One explanation for Taiwan’s responsiveness to Congressional actions is that theoriginal Gang 
of Four was building a following, including former Vice-President Walter Mondale, Senator 
Gary Hart (D-CO), Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-AK), Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), Sen. John 
Glenn (D-OH), Sen. David Durenberger (R-MN), and Rep. Pease. These and other membes of 
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Congress kept the pressure on Taiwan by repeatedly submitting congressional res lutions. This 
demonstrates two things. First, it shows the power of a coalition that is assembled by political 
entrepreneurs. Second, it shows the power of non-binding resolutions, subcommittee hearings, 
and press conferences to repeatedly send a signal for a country to change its domes ic behavior. 
 
Switching from a focus on political oppression to a focus on democracy 
Congress continued signaling to Taiwan the need to create a viable democracy. Congress 
and FAPA became partners in this process. FAPA took the lead by lighting a “torch for 
democracy” on October 31, 1987, at the Statue of Liberty in New York. Runners carried the 
torch to the steps of the U.S. Capitol on November 3rd, where members of Congress, opposition 
leaders from Taiwan, and hundreds of Taiwanese-Americans witnesses greet d FAPA Executive 
Director Trong Chai carrying the torch. In addition to the Gang of Four, speakers included Sen. 
Lautenberg and Rep. Pease, who called for general parliamentary elections in Taiwan. After this 
rally, the torch traveled to other American cities until November 14th, when Chang Chun-hung, 
an opposition politician who had recently been released from prison, tried to bring the torch in o 
Taiwan, only to have the police confiscate it. Despite this setback, the “run for demcracy” 
campaign continued until November 22 as mass rallies were held at 12 locations in Taiwa
(Taiwan Communiqué December 1987)  
Despite political liberalization, the KMT still cracked down on political opponents. On 
May 20, 1988, 4,000 Taiwanese farmers demonstrated against the agricultural policies of the 
KMT. The government sent riot troops to disperse the crowds, injuring and arresting more than 
100 people. On June 10 a coalition of 14 Taiwanese-American organizations held a rally in front 
of the Capitol to protest the excessive use of force by the Taiwan police and call for a fully 
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democratic system. They were joined by the Gang of Four and Rep. Matthew Martinez (D-CA). 
Kennedy made a speech noting that “[a]lthough martial law is a thing of the past, other laws, 
such as the ‘National Security law’ and the ‘Assembly and Street March Law’, restrict freedom 
of assembly and association and of peaceful political expression. Individuals continue to be 
arrested for peaceful expression of their political views and Taiwanese citizens continue to be 
barred from returning to Taiwan because of their political beliefs. Restrictions on the press and 
curtailed access to the media by the opposition continue. The right to forms labor unions and to 
strike remain restricted.” In addition, two opposition members of Taiwan’s parliament, 
Legislator Chu Kao-cheng and National Assembly-member Hung Chi-chang, were at the rally. It 
failed to have an immediate impact on the KMT regime. On June 16  the Taipei district
prosecutor’s office indicted 93 people for violating the Assembly and Demonstration Law, and 
“committing the crimes of obstruction of official duty, and obstruction of freedom” (Taiwan 
Communiqué August 1988). 
Another international provocation occurred on December 21, 1989, when Mr. Huang 
Hua, a member of the democratic opposition in Taiwan, was indicted for advocating Taiwan 
independence (Taiwan Communiqué January 1990). On December 8, 1990, Huang was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison (Taiwan Communiqué January 1991). In response, Senators Ted 
Kennedy, Claiborne Pell, Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), John Kerry (D-MA), and Paul Wellstone 
(D-MN) sent a letter on January 14, 1991, to President Lee Teng-hui:  
Huang’s imprisonment is a serious set-back to the progress your country has made 
towards democracy in recent years. His detention clearly violates in rnational 
human rights standards and contravenes the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights and Taiwan’s own constitution, both of which guarantee the right to 
freedom of speech. There is widespread public opposition in Taiwan to Huang’s 
imprisonment. … We urge you to commute Huang Hua's sentence and grant his 
immediate and unconditional release. (Taiwan Communiqué April 1991) 
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Huang’s arrest and sentence was part of a renewed KMT attempt to crack down on advocates of 
independence (“The KMT clamps down on Independence”, Taiwan Communiqué January 1991). 
A final international provocation was KMT’s blacklist of any Taiwanese who 
engaged in political dissent against the regime, both in Taiwan and abroad. For those 
people who dissented in Taiwan, the government denied them exit visas; for those who 
dissented abroad, the government denied them entry visas. Eight hundred to one thousand 
people were on the blacklist by 1991 (“Blacklisting of overseas Taiwanese continues”, 
Taiwan Communiqué June 1991). Between 1987 and 1992, many overseas dissidents 
were immediately deported once they entered Taiwan.   
FAPA encouraged its members to communicate with their congressional 
representatives about this blacklist. FAPA also coordinated with the Gang of Four to help 
a press conference on May 20, 1992. FAPA argued that the blacklist denied Taiwanese-
Americans legal equality and the human right to enter and leave Taiwan as they pleased, 
in that they could not freely leave or return to their homeland. Coen Blaauw, a FAPA 
employee, wrote a letter to President George H.W. Bush on May 7, 1991, stating the 
number of Taiwanese citizens in the United States who were on the blacklist, noting tha  
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared that everyone has the right to travel 
in and out of the country. In response, Bush organized a briefing for ninety 
representatives of Taiwanese-Americans on March 5, 1992, which was the first such 
meeting (Chen 2007).  
In Congress, Rep. Solarz introduced House Concurrent Resolution 248, stating the need 
to end the blacklist (“Solarz’s Asian Affairs Committee condemns blacklist”, Taiwan 
Communiqué December 1991). The Senate responded in kind when Senators Pell, Kennedy, and 
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Lieberman submitted Senate Concurrent Resolution 99, stating that the Taiwan authorities 
should permit Taiwan-born residents of the United States to return to their homeland 
(“Resolution on Taiwan Blacklisting in Senate”, Taiwan Communiqué April 1992). The Senate 
passed the bill on March 10, 1992. The House passed it on May 14.  The KMT responded by 
phasing out the blacklist system. On May 15, 1992, the Legislative Yuan amendment Article 100 
of the Republic of China’s criminal law so that political dissidence was no longer considered 
sedition (“Overseas Blacklist Disappears ... more or less”, Taiwan Communiqué June 1992; 
Chen 2007).  This blacklist campaign had been going for ten years, since FAPA was first 
created, but initially FAPA did not have the resources to engage members of Congress. By 1991 
FAPA had the resources (Chen 2007).  
 
Applying the Model 
 In each area of political oppression – the Kaohsiung Incident, imprisoning political 
opponents, censoring the press, persecuting the Presbyterian Church, arresting people under 
martial law, sentencing people to long prison terms, torturing people in prison – the oppression 
was reported by a variety of political institutions and organizations. Amnesty International 
produced reports on Taiwan, as did the United States Department of State. Information about 
political oppression also came to Congress through congressional hearings, as well as through 
congressional staff. The members of Congress who learned about political oppressi n were 
deeply personally affected. The Reagan Administration was silent, so members of Congress, 
including but not limited to the Gang of Four, used other means to communicate with the KMT. 
These methods included concurrent resolutions, press conferences, subcommittee hearings, 
amendments to biannual appropriations bills, rallies on the step of the Capitol, speeches in 
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Congress, and letters to both the executive branch and Taiwan’s government. These activities 
constituted the path of least resistance for members of Congress.  
The Taiwan independence activists communicated all of these events to members of 
Congress and their staff, if news of these events had not already reached them by other means. 
We again see bonding social capital as the members of Congress and their staff were deeply 
affected by these events and formed strong relationships with the independence activists. The 
activists helped to frame the events in terms of promoting democracy on Taiwan because the 
events were clearly attacks on democratic processes.  
 
Path of least resistance: Small effort, big impact 
 The Gang of Four became active primarily because Solarz chaired the Asian and Pacific 
Subcommittee and the Reagan administration was silent. Solarz told Lin that if he had not been 
chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, he would not have been as active. “I would feel my
ability to have an impact would be much less.” (Lin 2006) Fulton Armstrong expressed the 
frustration Rep. Leach’s office had with a president from his own political party. Once the U.S. 
recognized the PRC instead of the ROC, the ROC stopped being a bastion of democracy fr m 
the Republican perspective. From the Democratic perspective, Taiwan’s human rights abuses 
were no longer important. Thus, Leach’s office decided to take the lead because it encount red 
resistance from the executive branch. “We tried to get meetings with the Assistant Secretary and 
even with the Deputy Assistant Secretary level of the State Department to talk with us, the lead 
people, and try to talk about what is this relationship, and what could we do to help.  If you can’t 
do it government to government, we can do it because we’re Congress, and we had trouble doing 
this on occasion.” (Armstrong, 2009) 
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In the context of this political resistance to acting on behalf of Taiwan after the TRA, the 
Gang of Four used hearings and press conferences to send congressional signals to Taiwan’s 
government. Rep. Leach said that Congressional activities, notably hearings and press 
conferences have a symbolic power in foreign affairs that members use to advocate changes 
abroad. The American media tend to ignore announcements the reference foreign countries, but 
the media in those countries pay close attention.  
The United States Congress is very symbolic to many countries in the world, and 
no place depended more on good relations with Congress than Taiwan. … The 
Gang of Four symbolized Congress being an advocate of principles which were at 
direct variance with the KMT model - this was the great significance of it. … at 
this time, the activism of just a few members of Congress made a very significant 
impact on a timetable of movement of Taiwan toward greater democracy. (Rep. 
Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
Rep. Solarz explained that simply by holding hearings, Congress could send important signals to 
countries that would influence their behavior. “Many of the things we did in Washington that 
attracted scant attention in the U.S. media were often big news overseas. They were brought to 
the attention of people abroad through the VOA, the BBC, and the ‘jungle telegraph’ operated by 
exiles and Diaspora communities in the U.S. which closely followed events in Washington. For 
those suffering from oppression in foreign lands these manifestations of American concern were 
a source of tremendous encouragement.”  (Rep. Solarz, Excerpt from unpublished memoir) 
 From this perspective, even non-binding, concurrent resolutions that expressed the “sense 
of Congress” became valuable signaling devices for Congress to articulate ts desires about a 
country’s internal behavior. As the previous chapter demonstrated in the case of Uganda, non-
binding “sense of Congress” resolutions send important signals to American corporati ns that do 
business with foreign countries and to their leaders and organized opposition. The signals 
communicate how Congress wishes a crisis to be resolved if the target regime wished to continue 
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good relationships with the United States. Congress is incapable of writing binding resolution  
that have legal force on another country’s behavior because acts of Congress are lgally binding 
only on the United States. Yet, members of Congress do want to influence behavior in other 
countries. Passing concurrent resolutions through the House and Senate sends a message abroad, 
and Taiwan demonstrates that the intended audiences do change their behavior. 
Another explanation for Taiwan’s responsiveness to non-binding resolutions is the 
patron-client relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. In a patron-client relationship, a single 
powerful country provides security and economic assistance to a country that it thinks is 
strategically important. The United States has these relationships with Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan (Bobrow and Chan 1986), Iran (Ghassemi 1988), Israel (Helman 2002), and Zaire 
(Pachter 1987). Within patron-client relationships, the patron exercises greater influence over the 
client than with other countries, and vice-versa. Therefore, individuals and organizatio s from 
patron and client states will likely have a greater impact on each other than individuals and 
organizations from states that are not part of that relationship. Solarz learned that his efforts were 
heeded by the KMT. 
I’ve been told by Lee Teng-hui and [Chien-Jen] C.J. Ch’en [the unofficial 
ambassador to the United States from 2000 to 2004] and other senior KMT 
figures that, while they were very unhappy with what I was doing to focus 
attention on the absence of democracy and suppression of human rights in Taiwa
at the time I did it, in retrospect they feel like I did them a favor by encouraging 
them to recognize the need of change if they were going to maintain healthy 
relationship with the U.S. One of the main themes of my speech to Tang-w i was 
the security of Taiwan which very much hinged on the support of the United 
States, and the support of the U.S. would be much more assured if Taiwan was a 
democracy than remaining a dictatorship. (Solarz quoted in Lin 2006)  
 
The patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan helped the Gang of Four to have an 
impact on Taiwan’s democratic transition.  
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An easy way a member of Congress could help an oppressed group in a foreign country 
was by making a strong statement. When Soderberg went to Taiwan as part of Kennedy’s staff, 
the Taiwan democracy activists would arrange meetings with opposition groups and then work to 
get a strong statement from Kennedy.  
What statements from Washington do…is give…credibility. It makes it a lot 
harder for the government to lock up the political prisoners.  It gives a voice to 
those who are trying to change… it makes it harder …for the government to 
ignore it. …Kennedy … worked very closely with his foundation for Robert 
Kennedy, which would give an annual human rights prize to various activists. So 
in China we were getting political prisoners out, and in South Korea w  were 
getting political prisoners out.  … the minute he would give the Robert Kennedy 
Award to a political activist, that person got some moral authority. The 
government’s not likely to execute them, they’re not likely to keep th m in jail 
forever, so they become a political force in their own right. (Nancy Soderberg, 
interview with author, February 10, 2010) 
 
Kennedy made many statements and speeches on behalf of the Taiwan democracy activists.  
Armstrong said the hearings and legislation that went through the Asian and Pacific
Subcommittee were essentially signals sent by Congress, especially its Gang of Four, to the 
KMT, pushing the message that it had to change.  
We kept trying to … ask the ruling party and the opposition: What do you want to 
be?  What do you want Taiwan to be? What is your party all about? And then we 
would say: How could Taiwan survive non-recognition… if this is what you want 
to be? Is this really your game? And the answer was always “no”, and we like to 
think, it might be vain, but we like to think that us asking that, and having them 
answer the question themselves on both sides of the divide in Taiwan, was a 
useful thing for us to do and led to the changes that … came later on. (Armstrong 
2009) 
 
Richard Bush emphasizes that the collective impact of the Gang of Four mattered more than any 
individual actions from a particular senator or representative.  
What was important in bringing about the change that they all wanted - and they 
did all want it - was the fact that it was a significant albeit small group of 
prominent members. Their activities got reported in the Taiwan Press much more 
than they got reported in the U.S. Press. I don’t think theirs was the major impact 
on Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision. I think the major reasons were in Taiwan itself. 
 144
But what they did together and separately was not trivial. (Richard Bush, 
interview with author, August 4, 2009) 
 
The transition from dictatorship to democracy on Taiwan was a dynamic that took place mainly 
on Taiwan, but the Gang of Four had input to this dynamic. Through joint press conferences, the 
Committee for Democracy on Taiwan, subcommittee hearings, speeches, and public statements, 
the Gang of Four and other members of Congress who followed their lead were able to send a 
clear message to the KMT about the way Congress wanted Taiwan to handle its democratic 
transition. This effort paid off.  
 
Conclusion: The Global Congress 
Armstrong’s description of the Gang of Four’s activities reveals two important things 
about congressional action in the 1970s and 1980s. First, congressional actions, including press 
conferences, hearings, resolutions, and legislation, were motivated by events both at home nd 
abroad. The events were newsworthy mainly to the people from the home country. Second, the 
intended audience was the ruling party and the opposition groups in foreign countries. 
Congressional hearings were held to send signals to other countries. Those signals were received 
by the intended audiences, and the audiences frequently reacted in a way that members of 
Congress intended. These two facts suggest that the formation of American foreigpolicy was a 
global affair. In this sense, Congress was becoming an internationally representative body.  
 Leach says the House of Representatives suddenly began to represent the entire world, 
with subcommittees devoting more attention to immigrant groups and exiles. 
This became a new trend and a new element in American politics, and also a 
reflection of another trend. In American constitutional history, if ou go back to 
the founders, one judgmental call that fit then that doesn’t fit now is the 
assumption…that the executive would have dominance in foreign affairs, because 
among other things it would have a near monopoly on knowledge. As time has 
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gone on, you have the smallening of the world in this globalization sense, the 
communications of the world that have shifted. And you have constituents who 
have concerns. And they cannot reach the executive branch. They can [reach] 
their Congress. And so Congress is beginning to play a more active lead rship 
role in foreign affairs in ways very different than they ever existed before. Of 
which, this issue, of Democracy in Taiwan, is an example. (Rep. Leach, interview 
with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
Soderberg also echoes Leach’s observation that Congress is better posi ioned to address these 
global human rights and democracy movements than the executive branch.  
Congress tends to be a little ahead of the Administration on many of these issues.  
Because you’re a member of Congress, you have a little bit more flexibility, 
you’re one of 535 people as opposed to the Administration making official U.S. 
policy. (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author, February 10, 2010) 
 
This openness of Congress provides many access points to any transnational movement. The 
movement must be both passionate enough about its missions to personally affect members of 
Congress and their staff. The movement must be sophisticated enough in its execution to build a 
coalition of members of Congress. TIM has both of these qualities.  
The problem TIM faced was that it did not have these qualities before the 1980s. It was 
passionate, but it directed its passion at the American public, not at members of Congress and 
their staff. It lacked sophistication in its execution. It recruited inept independence activists and 
tried to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo. However, suddenly in 1980 the same activists learned 
how to build long-lasting relationships in Congress that are based both on affective ties and 
rational electoral calculations. Moreover, before the 1980s Congress was not filled with people 
who were naturally sensitive to issues concerning Taiwan. Affective politics would not have 
worked in the 1960s and early 70s. The next chapter discusses how TIM learned to be effectiv






The Formosan Association for Public Affairs: Organization, Strategies, Successes, and 
Failures 
 
 The previous chapters demonstrated that Taiwan stands out in American foreign policy 
because of its human rights abuses on Taiwan and American soil, and because of the dedication 
of political entrepreneurs in Congress to Taiwan over the 1980s. These same political
entrepreneurs – Senator Ted Kennedy and Representative Stephen Solarz for example – also 
dedicated their efforts in foreign policy toward other countries, including South Africa, but 
within Congress only Taiwan consistently maintains political support, second only to the 
political support the Israel has maintained over three decades. This consistent support, des ite 
improvements in Taiwan since 1987, is based on the efforts of the Formosan Association of 
Public Affairs (FAPA). In the same way that the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) develops a membership base of people devoted to Israel that in turn cultivates political 
loyalties in Congress, FAPA develops a wealthy, passionate and sophisticated membership base, 
spread throughout the United States, that cultivates political loyalties in Congress.  
This is what makes Taiwan different. There is no Cambodia Caucus, South Africa 
Caucus, El Salvador Caucus, Russian Caucus, or Ugandan Caucus in the House or Senate. In 
many cases the members of Congress and staff members who became advocates of thos  
countries over the four decades since 1970 have left the House and Senate. The ethnic lobbies 
still exist. For instance, a dedicated group of Armenian-Americans, especially in California, still 
annually submit a resolution to a House Subcommittee to recognize the Armenian genocide, but 
there is no Armenian Caucus in the House or Senate, and this resolution almost never makes it 
out of committee. Many scholars have studied AIPAC’s influence to determine what accounts 
for its political support in Congress, but the same focus has not been placed on Taiwan except in 
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two studies (Lin 2006, Chen 2007). This chapter builds on the research done by Lin and Chen by 
first showing how FAPA built its political support in Congress. Next, this chapter demonstrates 
how FAPA sustains its political support in Congress, but with fewer resources than AIPIC and 
fewer resources even than TECRO, the official lobby associated with Taiwan’s government. This 
political support does not always produce the results FAPA wants in terms of resolutions, 
legislation, and ultimately de jure independence for Taiwan, but the successes are based on 
consistent strategies, just as the failures are based on consistent mistakes. It is these strategies 
and mistakes that this chapter will discuss.   
 
Shifting strategy: From independence to democracy 
Why has FAPA, as a representative of the Taiwan independence movement, been able to 
accomplish so much substantive congressional activity, as revealed in Chapter Three, while still 
being ostensibly for independence? The answer is that the independence movement shifted 
strategy by presenting itself to Congress as the Taiwan democracy movement.  
The international and domestic changes during the 1970s provided a window of 
opportunity for activists, but those activists - specifically Trong Chai and Peg Ming-Min - had 
to recover from the stigma of violence associated with the TIM since the failed assassination of 
Chiang Ching-kuo. This recovery, or renunciation of violence, required two distinct steps. The 
first step was to identify more closely with the larger Taiwan democracy movement instead of 
the smaller Taiwan independence movement. This had to be done while still retaining the loyalty 
of the Taiwan independence activists who had been agitating for Taiwan’s de jure independence 
since the 228 Incident. The second step was making the strategic transition from organizing just 
the Taiwan Diaspora to making political connections in the House and Senate.  
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Rep. Leach explained how, from the perspective of the Gang of Four, the independence 
activists began to identify with the democracy movement:  
The word independence doesn't exactly fit this circumstance at that ime. … It 
would never fit me for example. I was never an advocate for independence. … In 
world affairs, there are two concepts that are generally synonym us: One being 
the word independence, the other being self-determination. But Taiwan was the 
one place in the planet that these two concepts were juxtaposed. If Taiwan ever 
declared independence it would lose its self-determination. If it refused to walk 
down the independence route, it would have a lot of self-determination. 
 
This became a movement that was not an independence movement that the G ng 
of Four was interested in. It was a pro-democracy movement … sothe group that 
I became quite active in, and basically established  … was pro-dem cracy where 
we pressed for the movement of Taiwan in a more democratic direction. … And 
this movement was one aimed at getting people who were dissenting out of jail, 
and those who were jailed at the time were those who were seeking democracy. 
(Rep. Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
Friedman said the Gang of Four was an alliance between liberal Democrats and progressive 
Republicans.  “There is a natural relationship between the liberal Republicans, the moderate 
Republicans, and the more human-rights-oriented Democrats - which is how you’re g ing to get 
your Gang of Four - on the side of this kind of foreign policy.” (Edward Friedman, interview 
with author, February 5, 2010) Leach said one of the challenges the Gang of Four faced was 
translating the desires for independence, shared widely among Taiwan activists at that time, into 
more moderate policy that could be endorsed by the entire Congress.  
Now in the United States in this particular era, the majority of Taiwanese activists 
were pro-independence. But that did not mean that that was the direction of those 
that were active in this Gang of Four, although I think if you had surveyed most 
members of Congress, they might say, “well, independence makes sens”. I don’t 
think most knew the repercussions that would follow, which would have been 
gigantic. … with each passing year they become more gigantic. (Rep. Leach, 
interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
 
This tension between de jure independence and de facto independence was an ongoing struggle 
in Congress during the 1980s. It was also reflected in Taiwanese-Americans at the s me time.  
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Among Taiwanese-Americans and the larger Taiwan Diaspora that left Taiwan following 
the 228 Incident, there is significant disagreement about the virtues of de jure independence 
versus the de facto independence that Taiwan has enjoyed since the end of World War II. During 
the 10-year period from 1977 to 1987, advocates for democracy on Taiwan could find much 
more common ground amongst themselves than could advocates of Taiwan indepedence. The 
Taiwan democracy movement also found common ground with human rights and democracy 
activists in the United States and around the world because the need for democracy on Taiwan 
was obvious and because it connected with the larger human rights concerns that were prominent 
in the 1970s. 
In order to acquire political viability in the American political system, Taiwan 
independence activists understood that advocating independence for Taiwan would violate the 
“One China” policy that had been established in the Shanghai Communique. Key activists 
advocated democracy for Taiwan when they communicated with the offices of Rep. Stephen 
Solarz, Rep. Jim Leach, Sen. Edward Kennedy and Sen. Claiborne Pell. The staff members from 
these offices said they would have avoided meetings with Taiwan independence activists. For 
example, Cindy Sprunger explained that the only possible way the Taiwan democracy movement 
could make an impact on U.S. policy toward Taiwan was by leaving “independence” out of its 
language so that the US could maintain critical ambiguity, or what Henry Kissinger called 
“constructive ambiguity” after the US signed the Shanghai Communique. Maintaining this 
ambiguity was a necessity for any group of Taiwanese-Americans that wanted to get a hearing in 
Congress. Pei-te Lien, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara, said the independence activists were able to successfully morph int  democracy 
activists when they approached Congress in the late 1970s because they understood by that time 
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that they had to take a step-by-step approach toward independence for Taiwan, and the first s ep
was promoting democracy on Taiwan. She said there are at least three stages in his process. 
“There was a … liberalization stage… in order to push for independence you cannot just directly
jump from authoritarian to this state that you want. There has to be something in between. 
Liberalization first and democratization.”  (Pei-te Lien, interview with author, March 13, 2009) 
(See also Lien 2006). 
 The real issue for independence activists was thus not “what do we want?” but “how do 
we get what we want?” Analyzing the movement to independence as a three-step process, with 
liberalization coming first, helped the activists get access to appropriate members of Congress 
and their staffs. As these activists began to target Congress, they had to figure out how to 
connect with the American political system in a meaningful way. They learned that they had to 
share interests in the same outcomes with members of Congress and their staff in order to 
communicate. To sustain their shared interests, they had to tell a compelling and gripping human 
rights story that would capture the interests of members of Congress and their staff.  
Robert Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, said the reason the 
independence activists were able to become democracy activists is because they made a strategic 
political calculation, knowing that independence would not be supported by the U.S. Congress, 
but knowing that they could establish an “identity of interests” to build a coalition to promote 
democracy on Taiwan. “My sense is that FAPA as a political organization concealed their true 
intentions in order have more influence on Capitol Hill. I have always understood them to b  an 
independence group. They may say otherwise, but that’s what politicians do: in order to be 
influential they need to shape their reputation and their policies to maximize influ nce. … They 
were genuinely interest in democracy as well, but once democracy was achieved t ey did not end 
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their lobbying. They continued to lobby.” (Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14, 
2009) 
By the time FAPA started to lobby members of Congress, democracy promotion through 
advocacy of human rights had become a common agenda. Robert Sutter said the primary concern 
in Congress during the 1980s was helping Taiwan to make a transition from authoritarian ule to 
democracy. “Most people who want Taiwan independence also want democracy for Taiwan… 
The people in Congress wanted democracy for Taiwan, too. … I am sure there were hard-liners 
who wouldn’t want to do this type of cooperation on democracy, but they were pretty marginal I 
think in my judgment in the 1980s, and certainly in FAPA. FAPA’s approach was self-
determination. Rights for the people of Taiwan was their focus.” (Robert Sutter, interview with 
author, October 7, 2009) 
This strategic change begs the question: How were independence activists able to become 
politically savvy enough to start to build connections on Capitol Hill in the first place? After all, 
the key players remained. Trong Chai started WUFI, and he also served as the first pr sident of 
FAPA. Peng Ming-Min served as president of WUFI in 1972 before resigning, then he returned 
as president of FAPA following Trong Chai. Yet, WUFI never developed political connections, 
whereas FAPA started building on political relationships that had already been established. What 
changed in that 10-year period, from 1972 to 1982? This question is especially relevant in Peng
Ming-min’s case because he was older than Trong Chai and Mark Chen, and was brought on as 
president at both organizations because of his international prestige as an advocate of Taiwan 
independence. Yet, where in 1972 he proved inept as an organizer, in 1982 he became very adept 
at building FAPA’s Congressional presence and non-profit operations around the country. 
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Rep. Leach offers one explanation for the Taiwanese activists’ success in the 1980s 
following their failures in the 1970s. He argues that it took about 30 years, from the organization 
of the first Taiwan groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s to the organization of FAPA in the 
1980s, for Taiwan activists to learn how the American system works and take advantage of it 
appropriately. Leach refers to this process as the “maturization of citizenship” whereby new 
immigrants have to learn processes and “the limits of what can be said and how it s uld be said. 
And how to lead and how not to lead.” (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) 
Another possible explanation for the activists’ rapid learning curve is that they wer  an 
informal extension of the official China Lobby, specifically the efforts of the government of 
Taiwan to build support in Congress for the ROC. In this sense, Congress had already been 
softened up by three decades of interaction with the Taiwanese government, and the democracy 
activists simply piggybacked on that earlier foundation.  
Rep. Leach said the most important consideration for understanding the Taiwan 
democracy activists is that they were an updated version of the old “China Lobby” from the 
1950s and 60s.   
The Taiwan Lobby was one of the first major extraordinary lobbies from a foreign 
policy dimension in the modern-day 20th century. It became the model for 
virtually all of the others. And it was powerful in a cultural sen  and in a 
financial sense. This is not a cheap lobby. What Taiwan did in American politics 
absolutely preceded any other country. It is the model. It strengthens your tale, it 
doesn’t weaken it, and it makes it stunning. The influence of Madame Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Taiwanese lobby in the 50s was dramatic. And everything 
proceeded [from] that. … I really want to emphasize to you how early and strong 
the Taiwanese Lobby was. … And what’s interesting in this regard is that Taiwan 
had already set an unprecedented model, and this was a subset of that model at 
variance with the direction that had historically been in place. … part of your 
story is a break from the past, of Taiwanese lobbying of the US being all KMT, to 
an advocacy, not of the island, but of a group within the island, and precepts 
within the island. This is a phenomenal story. (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with 
author, July 25, 2008) 
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From Rep. Leach’s perspective, especially from the Gang of Four, the groundwork had already 
been laid by the old “China Lobby” for the Taiwan democracy activists to start making political 
connections on Capitol Hill.  
 Ross offers another perspective that helps explain why the democracy activists were able 
to replace the official Taiwan Lobby. The China Lobby had become too oppressive, too willing 
to violate human rights, for members of Congress. The Taiwan democracy activists gave 
members of Congress a better story.  
Taiwan has a nice story. You cannot help but like that story. And across the strait 
is a country with a story that is very hard to sell. Ideological support and 
sympathy for a little country dealing with big old nasty China. It’s a good story. 
(Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14, 2009) 
 
Leach was one of the few members of Congress who was very receptive to this story. As a 
former member of the foreign service and as a liberal Republican who was the ranking member 
of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, he had already made statements supporting huma  rights 
on Taiwan. Moreover, he refused out-of-state campaign contributions, and this gave him moral 
standing when acting on behalf of democracy in Taiwan. Leach specifically wanted to make 
Taiwan’s government more legitimate for its own people, and democracy was the best way to do 
that. The democracy activists gave him the tools to accomplish this goal.  
The strategic re-branding that independence activists undertook was very successful in a 
very short time because it occurred precisely when Congress faced a policy window on U.S. 
China policy. For 30 years U.S. China policy had been set by the president and the China Lobby 
in Congress. Recall that Congress passed a resolution asking President Carter to be informed of 
any changes in U.S. China policy. This was part of an effort to promote increasing trnsparency 
in the executive branch and greater collaboration between the two branches. When the Carter 
administration suddenly announced a new China policy without consulting Congress, members 
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became angry. The announcement symbolized not just a new policy toward China, but a return to 
the secrecy and deception used by the Nixon administration to get around Congress. Sutt r 
argues that the timing was critical because the shifting alignments of Cold War politics gave 
members of Congress a foreboding sense that Taiwan would be sacrificed to the needs of détente 
with the PRC.   
Congress had … sort of a backlash against the [Carter] administrat on’s policies 
toward Taiwan … There was a broad, bipartisan concern that Taiwan hadn’t bee  
treated fairly … So there was a lot of support for Taiwan… (Robert Sut er, 
interview with author, October 7, 2009) 
 
This sparked moral outrage and pushed many members of Congress to seek resources to 
seize control of U.S. China policy from the Carter administration. “Sen. Ted Kennedy, 
who was quite critical in the handling of normalization, …went out of his way to promote 
the Taiwan Relations Act.” (Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14, 2009). (See 
Gwertzman 1979). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was the legislative product of that 
effort. The political opening for democracy activist can be seen as the political product of 
that effort. The TRA did everything for Taiwan except create  separate immigration 
quota, and that issue provided the political window the activists needed.  
 
Window Opens on U.S. China Policy: Taiwan democracy movement enters Congress 
When the United States officially recognized the PRC in 1979, the withdrawal of support 
from the ROC was devastating to the KMT government. The KMT suddenly faced an 
environment in which it was no longer guaranteed help from the United States. The only thing 
the United States promised was aid in Taiwan’s defense in the case of a PRC attack. However, a 
PRC attack seem likely only if Taiwan declared independence, and the KMT had no intention of 
doing that. What the KMT did do was release its claims to authority over Mainland China. It 
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recognized that the US would no longer provide it with military assistance to retake the 
Mainland from the Communist government. Consequently, the KMT had to come to terms with 
the reality of its representative system of government. Nearly all the repr sentatives had been  
elected from the Mainland, and they were dying. In addition, non-KMT representativ s were 
being elected. Thus, the KMT faced pressure to make its government more representative of the 
population born on Taiwan, and it gave into this pressure during the 1980s.  
The Taiwanese-American exiles faced a window of opportunity. While they understood 
that America’s rapprochement with the PRC meant that it would not recognize Taiwan’s 
independence, they also understood that the shift from security issues to economic and human 
rights issues, facilitated by the rapprochement, gave them the ability to focus on changing 
Taiwan’s undemocratic government and improving its human rights record.  
All that was required was finding sympathetic members of Congress who would 
champion these causes.  
During the 1979 debate on the Taiwan Relations Act, Lester Wolff, Chair of the Asian 
and Pacific Subcommittee, traveled to Taiwan in the first Congressional visit since 
normalization, and returned with a vow to help the government and people of Taiwan. (Lee 
1987). Rep. Leach demonstrated his commitment to Taiwan by putting an amendment into the 
TRA that called for greater democracy on Taiwan. The passage of the TRA was a key 
development in Congress because it compelled House members and their staff to articulate a 
clearer relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Fulton Armstrong, who worked on 
Rep. Leach’s staff, notes how important the TRA was in focusing the attention of Rep. Leach on 
Taiwan issues. “We felt that the Taiwan Relations Act was a brilliant piece of legislation, but it 
was sterile. It didn’t have feeling. It didn’t really say what we were going to be, how our 
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relationship was going to be. It was quite technical, and I know that certainly in the Leach office, 
we felt that the relationship needed more feeling.” (Armstrong 2009)   
During the debate in the House on the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwanese advocates of 
democracy on Taiwan began communicating frequently with House members to educate them 
about human rights abuses by the KMT, arrests of peaceful demonstrators, and other anti-
democratic practices. This education convinced many representatives that the United States 
government could no longer continue supporting an authoritarian Taiwan against the PRC if 
Taiwan maintained its anti-democratic practices, especially considering their widespread 
concerns about democracy and human rights around the world since the end of the Vietnam War. 
Taiwanese-American activists used the common concern for human rights and Taiwan to 
establish a rapport with members of Congress known to be engaged by such issues. For example, 
Kenjohn Wang was a successful businessman in Taiwan and Brazil before immigrating to the 
United States. He participated in many community charity events, especially in the Taiwanese-
American community. Local politicians always approached him for help. The passage of the 
TRA, coupled with the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979, prompted Wang to combine 
forces with Trong Chai, Peng Ming-Min and Mark Chen to organize a letter-writing campaign to 
send 8,000 letters to Senator Edward Kennedy to show their concern over Taiwan’s arrest of the 
opposition activists on Taiwan. Kennedy responded in March 1980 by issuing a proclamation 
regarding Taiwanese civil rights, “vehemently reprimanding the KMT for its violation of human 
rights, freedom and democracy.” (Shu 2005) Trong Chai, Kenjohn Wang and other enthusiastic 
fellow Taiwanese-Americans showed appreciation for Kennedy’s help by holding a fundraiser 
banquet with one thousand participants for Kennedy to help him win the Democratic presidential 
candidate nomination.  
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The impact of the fundraiser on Senator Kennedy was profound. Wang said: “In addition 
to showing the consolidated power of the Taiwanese Americans, what hit Kennedy between the 
eyes were the achievements the Taiwanese have attained in all walks of life in America. He 
lavished praises on the Taiwanese repeatedly: the Taiwanese immigrants are the most 
outstanding among the minorities in America” (Kenjohn Wang 1999, 270, cited in Shu 2005, 
441). Kennedy’s praise for the Taiwanese immigrants convinced Wang, Trong, and Peng to
lobby Kennedy and Solarz to give Taiwan a separate 20,000 quota from China. The US 
Immigration Act of 1965 had set the quota for the ROC at 20,000 annually. After 1979 the quota 
applied to both Taiwan and the PRC. This outraged the Taiwanese-American community, which 
wanted a separate quota (Lin 2006, 142). This effort proved successful at the end of 1981. 
Based on their success in changing the quota, Wang helped Trong, Peng, and Mark Chen 
start FAPA in Los Angeles in February 1982. He contributed to FAPA’s funding and bought the 
first office buildings (Lin, 2006, 145, footnote 62). They moved FAPA’s headquarters from New 
York to Washington, D.C., and started providing critical information to the Gang of Four and 
other politicians on Capital Hill. Mark Chen formed a close friendship with Senator Claiborne 
Pell (D-RI), while Trong Chai became very active in Rep. Solarz’s office and Peng Ming-min 
worked closely with Rep. Leach’s office. 
Fonte said a key element in FAPA’s interaction with the Gang of Four was the presence 
of Taiwanese-American citizens in their districts or states.  
Solarz is from New York. There are a lot of Taiwanese-Americans in the greater 
New York area. … And Kennedy, in the Boston area a lot of Taiwanese 
Americans. Boston has its clutch of great schools, so a lot of Taiwanese went 
there. Same with Connecticut. Rhode Island had Brown and other schools. In 
Iowa there was a son of a famous dissident who was killed in the 228 incident. 
This man was a well-known scholar. He was the first Taiwanese to get a Ph.D. I 
think at Columbia. [He] was in Taiwan during the famous incident in 1947. He 
led, or was one of the leaders in the group that tried to get together and provide a 
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comprehensive list of their concerns to the government. And what the government 
did of course was wait to get more soldiers and then picked all thosepeople up 
and killed them all. So both his sons were very active, and one son is in Iowa. His 
name is Prof. TK Lin. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008) 
 
Just as important is the time period. Many members of Congress, Fonte maintains, felt guilty 
about American support for authoritarian regimes after the Vietnam W r ended, and this drove 
their support for Taiwan.   
I think that by the time you got to the 80s, people like Leach [felt gui y] … about 
US foreign policy…It’s not like Jim Leach felt personally responsible for the 
murder of X, Y, or Z person, but our policy had been such to support that, so in 
that sense of guilt, yes. The Vietnam war had heightened the general public 
interest in the oppressive nature of U.S. Foreign policy, and this softened the 
congressional members who were active in foreign policy arenas to be more 
sensitive to guilt-type associations vs. African issues or European issues – just 
like Jewish lobby was able to capitalize on the guilt feelings associated with the 
Holocaust. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008) 
 
Edward Friedman makes a similar point about the period of time following Vietnam.  
As a result of the American defeat in Vietnam, there grew a concern… that the 
U.S. should not be supporting authoritarian regimes and should care about human 
rights. …  Then you have the issues of the Shah of Iran leading on to Khomeni in 
Iran, and Somoza in Nicaragua leading on to Sandinistas in Nicaragua, ll 
happening at the end the 1970s. And at the same time you get going in Eastern 
Europe Charter 77 and the beginning of Solidarity. And a context gets set in 
which there grows within liberal democrats a concern that part of American 
foreign policy should be supporting democratization. That, not to do so leads you 
to be involved with the Diems of Vietnam and the Shahs in Iran and the Somozas 
in Nicaragua, and the consequences are not good for the United Stat s. (Edward 
Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010) 
 
FAPA took advantage of this general environment to build up its political support in Congress. 
The Gang of Four were the most active, but many other members of Congress contributed for the 
same reason.   
Richard Bush notes that the relationship between FAPA and Congress had strategic 
advantages, including rational electoral considerations. He describes the rela ionship between 
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FAPA and the Gang of Four as a marriage of convenience that served its purpose until Taiwan 
liberalized politically.  
Solarz was interested in developing as many fundraising bases as po sible, and he 
saw this as an attractive one. … The reason they were able to break th ough is the 
nature of campaign fundraising under the rules at that time madeit impossible for 
a member of congress or anyone running for office relying on a small number of 
large contributions. That was prohibited by law. So you needed to create 
fundraising bases made up of a large number of small contributors. There are 
thousands of these little fundraising bases around the country defined by group 
interest or policy interest, ideological interest. The Taiwanese-Am ricans just 
happened to be one of them.  
 
Solarz over time was able to create, was able to tap into, varius Asian-American 
groups, none of which provided a lot of money in the big scheme of things, but to
which he felt obligated to do something to show his agreement with some of their 
goals. There was a kind of marriage of convenience or like-mindedness between 
the Taiwanese and the members that they supported. … On a recurring basis, the 
Taiwanese donors were willing to pony up money. …In every two-year el ction 
cycle, which is when the fundraising occurs, members of the community would 
make their own individual judgments about how well this was working out. This 
was a relationship and understanding that was renewed incrementally. (Richard 
Bush, interview with author, August 4, 2009) 
 
An article in the Washington Post (“Solarz Raises Travel to New Heights; Foreign Policy 
Specialist Uses Trips to Solicit Campaign Funds”, July 13, 1989) revealed Solarz’s fundraising 
methods with Asian-Americans.   
Although he has more than $ 1 million in leftover campaign funds and faced only 
token opposition in recent elections, Solarz has mounted a wide-ranging fund-
raising campaign among ethnic American groups from the Philippines, Taiwan 
and India over the past few years. … Robert M. Hathaway, a Solarz spokesman, 
said the flow of funds in small amounts from the American-Asian community 
started unexpectedly several years ago when Solarz was approached by one of the 
groups, which offered to raise money for him because it liked his pro-democracy 
stand against authoritarian rulers in the region. … Why does Solarz need to raise 
money so vigorously, given his $ 1 million campaign bankroll? Hathaway cited 
Solarz's concern that redistricting after the 1990 census could f rce him to run 
against an incumbent in the expensive New York City media market.”  
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When I sent Solarz this article, he replied that it was “a snide and cynical desription of the 
facts.” (Rep. Stephen Solarz, email to author, May 10, 2010) 
 
Spreading Information through FAPA: Access and timing 
The reason FAPA became so influential as “the voice” of the Taiwan democracy 
movement, despite a great diversity of voices within the movement, and human rights activists in 
general, is because FAPA monopolized access to Congress and became a useful tool for 
Congress. Once FAPA arrived, it became the de facto path for all Taiwanese-Americans to 
interact with members of Congress. “If … they monopolize … access to … members of 
Congress, then they have the power to represent back to the group their description of what those 
events are. And that becomes a tremendous resource for them in their organization. … We 
wanted the U.S.-China normalization to work well.” (Edward Friedman, interview wth author, 
February 5, 2010)  The timing helped FAPA become a critical tool for Congress to deal with 
U.S.-China normalization. “The timing is so extraordinarily important. It really is that post-
Vietnam War period, added to by the fall of the Shah and the fall of Somoza, and the Kaohsiung 
incident and what followed it… it’s really that set of events which makes sort of the conditions 
right, makes the soil right for things to be done at that moment in time.” (Edward Friedman, 
interview with author, February 5, 2010)   
Another element of FAPA’s success was providing important information to key 
members of Congress. These included allies across the ideological spectrum. “In order to get 
[resolutions] through… the most important thing is to come out of the subcommittee 
unanimously [so that] …. even your most extreme hawk is on board on what you’re doing. [This] 
makes it more likely that the full committee will rubberstamp it.” (Edward Friedman, interview 
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with author, February 5, 2010) Friedman visited the staff of Senators Helms and Hayakow  
because they were hawks. The appropriate tactic to implement this strategy is to have the 
moderates be the spark for resolutions, then have the extremists approve it. “If you don’t get [the 
extremists] on board, you are going to have a fight at every level of the game.” (Edward 
Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)  
 Once FAPA identified the appropriate member of Congress to target, the organization 
started to tell the member about the human rights abuses on Taiwan. Michael Fonte was a Senior 
Policy Analyst at FAPA. He had connections with Peng Ming-Min at the University of Michigan 
and had lived in Taiwan during the late 1970s. Fonte explains that the human rights abuses by 
the KMT were obvious, so it was “relatively easy to get liberal Democratic congressmen 
involved because of democracy, human rights concerns. It also was relatively easy to get 
conservative members of congress, mostly Republicans, to support Taiwan because of anti-
communism … It was an ‘easy sell’ for people who were concerned about democracy and 
human rights to support the Taiwanese democracy movement, or FAPA.” (Michael Fonte, 
interview with author, October 22, 2008)  
Nancy Soderberg was the contact for FAPA in Senator Kennedy’s office. She explains 
that FAPA quickly established itself as a credible source of information. “FAPA established its 
credibility pretty early on and it worked with a lot of the other human rights groups in D.C., the 
Asian groups that knew the issues…they were responsible… they were the most credible
interlocutor out there.” (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author, February 10, 2010) Kennedy 
had a specific pro-democracy agenda with FAPA that included processes of political 
liberalization. “We always focused on the issue of democracy: You have the right to run, have 
the right to form a political party… civic rights, healthy …checks and balances among the 
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various parts of government, a healthy press, the right to organize … international observers, free 
and fair elections, that’s what the international community was pushing.” (Nancy Soderberg, 
interview with author, February 10, 2010) 
Once FAPA was able to successfully ensconce itself in the halls of Congress as a 
recognized lobby on behalf of Taiwan, it faced a dilemma. As the official voice of the Taiwan 
independence movement it spoke on behalf of independence activists, but it could not advocate 
independence to Congress. If it drifted too far from independence, however, it would lose the 
support of activists. On the other side, if the group went too far toward independence it would 
lose the support of Congress. Yet FAPA has been able to balance this tension ever since its 
founding.  
Fonte offers two explanations for this balancing act. First, despite being a grassroots 
organization, FAPA represents a small number of people in absolute numbers compared to oth r 
ethnic lobbies, such as AIPAC and Cuban-American National Foundation. This works to its 
advantage because it does not have to worry about pleasing a base that does not exist. Ist ad, it 
can rely on individuals with high social and economic status to approach members of Congress, 
in the same way that the Jewish community interacted with the government in the 1930s and 
1940s (Silverman 1996). Fonte said FAPA learned from AIPAC’s example. “AIPAC’s ability to 
get local communities of Jewish-American citizens to work with their local congresspeople was I 
think the key element. … AIPAC is everywhere, and where Taiwanese would be they would be 
as well. Because so many of the people who were activists were out of the New York and 
Washington area, and AIPAC is such a formidable force, anyone who works in Washington 
knows that. It clearly was an example to use.” (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 
22, 2008) 
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Second, FAPA takes advantage of geographical dispersal:  it claims a member with high 
social and economic status is in every congressional district. This enables FAPA to call on 
members to place pressure on their congressional representatives when necessary. 
So what you had then was a very fertile pool of Taiwanese-Americans, very well-
educated, very dedicated to seeing change come in Taiwan, People who are my 
age, in their 60s… who had seen the worst of KMT abuses, were really ad mant 
that there had to be change in Taiwan. [They were] spread around the country, 
many of them stayed within the university spheres … many of them stayed as 
professors. They were scattered around the country because of their prof ssional 
interests…. They were very well educated… they communicated well. [This] 
made for a mix out of which they could get congressional support. (Michael 
Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)  
 
Thus, professional success and their geographic dispersion allowed Taiwanese-Americans to tap 
into geographic representation and get the attention of Congress. “Geographic disersal was 
very, very important. Most Taiwanese-Americans are not rich … but they are professional 
people, and they were able to work hard and make enough money to be influential people in their 
communities even if they were not rich…So they had connections in their local communities. 
They were known in the communities as people who were of some substance.” (Michael Fonte, 
interview with author, October 22, 2008) 
 
Maintaining influence in Congress 
 There are two key strategies, one at the congressional level, and one at the organizational 
level, that FAPA staff point to as generating successful outcomes. At the congressional level, 
FAPA cultivates tightly-bonded friendships with members of Congess and their staff, e pecially 
their staff. At the organizational level, FAPA is run by staff who are essentially a tightly-bonded 
family, which brings issues to members who get very passionate about anything involving 
Taiwan, no matter how apparently mundane it may seem to an outside observer. This passion 
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springs from love for Taiwan, dedication to improving Taiwan’s condition, and intense loyalties 
toward each other. The staff members have been involved with Taiwan issues since before 
FAPA was founded, and they are often married to each other. By extension, they are often 
married to Taiwan. The staffs bring this intense passion and dedication to Congress. They hare 
their love for Taiwan with congressional staff and members of Congress and thus build end ring 
political support in Congress. All of this is an example of bonding social capital, both within
FAPA and in Congress.  
 
Married to Taiwan 
 The employees at FAPA are often married both to Taiwan and to each other, 
demonstrating the importance of affective relationships both in their concern for Taiwan and 
their work on behalf of it. For example, Michael Fonte, the Senior Policy Analyst at FAPA from 
1986 to 2002, came to Washington in late 1984 and started volunteering. “I had known Dr. Peng 
when I came back from Taiwan. In 1970 I went to the University of Michigan. Dr. Peng had just 
escaped from Taiwan. He was under house arrest there and Michigan gave him a place to st y. 
So I got to know him there. … I helped him do an English-language newsletter…. I’ve been 
connected with Taiwan for 42 years now [in 2008]. ” (Michael Fonte, interview with author, 
October 22, 2008)  
Coen Blaauw, the Public Relations Executive Director for FAPA, has been working at 
FAPA for 21 years. He met his wife, Iris Ho, by working with her. They married in 2004. He 
graduated from law school in the Netherlands and decided to study the legal status of Taiwan 
because he wanted to distinguish himself from most other legal scholars who studied Japan. 
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Moreover, he wanted to avoid the more mundane activities of being a Dutch lawyer. His initial 
interest in Taiwan’s independence has become a love affair to which he has dedicated his life.  
When I graduated from law school I think in 1988, Japan was very popular.  
Everybody studied international law, so everybody wanted to do something about 
Japan.  And I just wanted to stand out, and I just wanted to do something lse, and 
nobody did something about Taiwan.  That’s why I picked Taiwan.  I could have 
done Japan, but I picked Taiwan because I wanted to be different from all the 
others.   But then the moment I got involved I got to know the people, got to know 
the issue, the more, I think it’s an important issue.  … I could be alawyer in 
Holland and taking care of international, car crash litigation and pick up a new 
issue every three days.  But I think the Taiwan issue is one very important issue.  I 
always feel that no matter what, the problems that we face … ultimately Taiwan 
will be a full, independent country… every day we get a little bit closer to the 
ultimate goal.  … I want to be there when it happens…I’ve invested 20 years of 
my life into Taiwan and I don’t want to step out now suddenly….  It’s something 
emotionally… my in-laws live in Taiwan…  I’m riding on the tiger and I can’t get 
off. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw says nearly everyone working at FAPA has been involved with Taiwan issues for at least 
a decade. “It’s one big family.  It’s a mission really.  It’s a passion…It’s not a regular job…. It’s 
a cause I want to dedicate my life to.” Gerrit van Der Wies, another employee at FAPA and also 
of Dutch descent, has been writing on Taiwan issues since the late 1970s. Like Blaauw, he is 
married to a Taiwanese woman.  
In the late 1980s, when Blaauw started to learn about Taiwan, Europe was experiencing a 
wave of political liberalization. He assumed Taiwan would quickly follow. However, he learned 
that Taiwan is a tough issue in Asia because of its connection with Chinese identity. “Taiwan is 
so ingrained in the psyche of the Chinese as being part of China.” Blaauw thinks Taiwan will 
become independent only when China democratizes or the U.S.-PRC relationship ends. Until 
that point, Taiwan will remain a “pawn in the hands of the big powers… like it has been for the




Blaauw works with Ho on building relationships in the House. Gerrit Van Der Wies 
works on building relationships in the Senate.  Blaauw and Ho develop an idea of an issue they 
care about, then together they draft a non-binding concurrent resolution. They identif House 
members who will likely introduce the resolution as well as original co-sponsors. Once the 
resolution is introduced, they recruit co-sponsors and then gradually find a markup in the 
subcommittee. They see the resolution from the subcommittee to the full committee and then, as 
Blaauw says, ultimately coach “the whole thing to the floor. So whatever it takes from beginning 
to end, that’s what I do.  I come up with the idea, and I’m not resting until it’s passed by both 
houses of Congress, or especially the House, of course.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, 
April 4, 2010) Blaauw also writes speeches for members of Congress and press relea es.   
Blaauw identifies which members of Congress will be willing to champion causes for 
Taiwan. He says Taiwan issues are seldom taken up by members of Congress if FAPA and other 
Taiwanese organizations do not ask them. “Sherrod Brown, Congressman Andrews, Ros-
Lehtinen…are the people we’ve befriended, like we did with Solarz, Leach, and like we did ith 
Kennedy.  We befriended these people on the grassroots level or here [in Congress].  We helped 
them a little bit with their campaigns.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, Ap il 4, 2010) 
Blaauw said that, in the 1980s, when Taiwan still had martial law, it was easy to get members of 
Congress to care about Taiwan. It was an “easy sell.” In contrast, “the issues we campaign now 
are relatively -- to these members of Congress -- a little more luxury items… Taiwan trying to be 
[in the] UN.  Some of our members [of Congress] say, ‘We don’t like the UN.  We want us to get 
out of the UN.  Why do you want to get into the UN?’ … in a way, our issues are a little bit less 
severe at the moment and less on the human rights front.  So it’s our challenge to makhese 
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members of Congress still interested in our issues.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 
4, 2010) 
One challenge FAPA faces every day is figuring out which of the 535 members of 
Congress will be most willing to act on behalf of Taiwan. FAPA has few staff, so the staff must 
use guiding principles to select their target members.   
Who do we pick?  … The people who we know well, who we are friends with … 
The first line of defense is the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
… They have foreign affairs aides who know the difference between Taiwan and 
Thailand… So these are the people who really have been to Taiwan, they know 
the issues. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw emphasized that any member of Congress who is willing to work on behalf of T iwan 
issues is welcome, regardless of committee assignment. He cited as one example Congressman 
Andrews of New Jersey, who is on the Armed Services Committee, and advocated many issues 
for Taiwan, but not all related to the military. Nevertheless, the priority is to keep the members 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee very informed.  
Three more considerations help Blaauw identify a likely champion of Taiwan issues. Th  
first is seniority on a committee or seniority in Congress. Blaauw does not wat o t rget the 
most senior member, the chair of the committee or subcommittee, but he also does not want to 
target a person who is new and has no seniority. The reason is because championing Taiwan 
issues must help the member advance politically in Congress. Blaauw has observed that 
members with lots of seniority and a leading institutional position, such as Whip or Chair, tend to 
be more silent about Taiwan than members with less seniority because there isa higher political 
price to pay from the leadership. Speaking out on Taiwan becomes too risky. In contrast, 
members with some seniority, especially those who are ranking members or next in line to chair 
a committee, will likely seize on Taiwan to amplify their voice in Congress. It i  very easy to be 
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ignored in an institution with 535 members, so Blaauw sees Taiwan as helping a member with 
some seniority attract attention without the risk. 
We think members of Congress who are really up in the leadership have to be a 
little more careful… in sticking out their necks for issues like Taiwan becaus  [of] 
… the fact that they’re so senior. … a ranking member and the chairman will have 
their positions. When they were not chairmen of the committees, they were a little 
bit more willing to be outspoken.  Now, whatever they say will be used and 
challenged by everybody… so these chairs of committees are a little bit more 
careful, and also the Speaker, the Minority Leader, the Majority Leader 
 (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
The second consideration is whether the member of Congress is in the party that is not 
occupying the White House. A member of the opposition party will have more incentive to 
challenge the president on issues like human rights and democracy than a memberof the 
president's party. 
At the moment, we have a Democrat in the White House, the Chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee is also a Democrat, and the ranking member 
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen is a Republican.  So she doesn’t mind to challenge 
the Chairman.  She also doesn’t mind to challenge the White House.  If there 
would have been a Republican in the White House, with Berman, a Democrat, 
chairing the committee, then I would predict that Ros-Lehtinen, who is the 
ranking Republican member on the committee, would be a little bit morecareful 
challenging or supporting Taiwan issues because she doesn’t want to ge into 
trouble with a Republican in the White House. (Coen Blaauw, interview with 
author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw admits that FAPA benefits from divided government, when at least one house of 
Congress is held by the opposition party. He remembers when Bill Clinton was president and 
Rep. Tom Delay (R-TX), the House Majority Leader, became an outspoken supporter of Taiwan. 
This changed when George W. Bush entered the White House. Suddenly Delay, whose party still 
controlled the House, became quiet about Taiwan. (See also Javits 1970, Tower 1981) 
Thus, Blaauw advocates divided government. It is not just Taiwan that benefits from a
divided government. Blaauw said that Tibet and other countries with causes that require 
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members of Congress to go the “extra mile” and “put themselves a little bit on d splay to support 
these issues” also benefit from divided government. “The effectiveness of FAPA on all issues 
ultimately depends on the power relations between the White House and Congress and within 
Congress itself. For example, during the 1980s, because there was a Republican president in the 
White House, it was easier for Democratic members of Congress to criticize an opposition 
president. Republican members of Congress can also criticize a Democratic president’s human 
rights or security record. If FAPA continues to be sophisticated in aligning their issues according 
to the power relations in American politics, they can continue to assert an impact.” (Lin 2006) 
The third consideration is whether the member of Congress has a safe seat. In districts 
that are closely divided between Republicans and Democrats, Blaauw knows it will be hard to 
get members to support Taiwan issues because the voters may think the member is not working 
for them. For a lot of members “foreign affairs is not something sexy.  It looksbad to their 
constituents.  They don’t travel.  …  If you care about foreign affairs… that means you care 
about people on the other side of the world.  So foreign affairs is not really an attractive and a 
sexy thing for members of Congress to be too proud of, to be outspoken about.” (Coen Blaauw, 
interview with author, April 4, 2010) However, some members have safe seats. “If you’re a Dana 
Rohrabacher from California and you have 99% Republicans in your district, you’rea saf  
district. You can do whatever you want to.  If you’re a Steve Chabot in Ohio’s first district, 
which district is 50% Democrats, 50% Republicans, you have to be a little bit more extra careful 
to stick out your neck for a foreign issue because it means that your constituents will ot be 




Building relationships with congressional staff 
Another challenge FAPA faces every day is figuring out which staff to target for 
cultivating close relationships. The member staff stay at most for a few years, then they move on 
to another office, to the executive branch, or to the private sector. Blaauw says he deals with both 
challenges by building friendships that last for years after the members of Congress leave Capitol 
Hill.  
The staffers are really the number one person to talk to because they’re the 
specialist.  … members of Congress you take a photo with and you shake hands, 
and with staffers, you sit down and you brainstorm, you get stuff done.  [It] is
relatively easy to meet up with staffers instead of members of Congress. (Coen 
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw said staff exits are difficult to deal with after building up a relationship with staff that 
have expertise on Taiwan.  “The staffer that’s best is the one who’s likely to leave the office 
first.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) Blaauw copes with staff departures 
by building relationships with committee staff, who tend to stay longer. “The committee staff 
tends to … stick around longer and be a little bit more senior…so it’s key for us, of course, t 
know these people.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) But even in committee 
staff, there are problems associated with having too little seniority.   
The problem is the members of Congress who are not on the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee or who are at the bottom of the Foreign Affairs Committee.  
They have junior staffers who also do foreign affairs, so it means he does armed 
services issues, he does foreign affairs, he does tax and health…because the 
Congressman has five staffers, and he just has to distribute all th se 50 issues he 
has to deal with every day amongst his staffers.  So these guys it’s hard to keep up 
with because they move around all the time and just go from one job to the next. 
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Despite these challenges with staff exits, Blaauw still finds a way to make turnover work for the 
benefit of FAPA. 
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Sometimes what works out is that somebody …works for a Congressman in 
Arizona, and he becomes the LD [Legislative Director] for a Congresswoman in 
Minnesota…he was my pal in the Arizona Congressman’s office. He will still be 
my pal when he’s being the LD for Minnesota. … [This] happened to me just a 
few days ago. We gain a new friend because my friend, my pal, went to the other 
office, and I’m going to ask him to see if he can help me there too.  Sometimes it 
works out well, but most of the time, we just lose these guys, or they go off the 
Hill.  It’s critical to know these staffers, it’s relatively easy to get to know them, 
but there’s too much overturn…you cannot be friends with all these 435 offices, 
it’s too tough, there’s just too much. (Coen Blaauw, interview with autor, April 
4, 2010) 
 
Time constraints, then, limit the relationships that Taiwanese activists can form with 
congressional staff. Blaauw, Ho, and Van Der Wies are just threepeople.. However, within these 
limits they build strong connections.  
Blaauw prefers to start a relationship with a staff member who has very little knowledge 
about Taiwan because he knows that staff who are experts on Taiwan w ll likely have their own 
specific ideas about what do to on Taiwan’s behalf, and these ideas may not match FAPA’s 
goals.  
It’s more beneficial to me if I walk into an office and somebody doesn’t know 
anything about Taiwan, because if I go to somebody and talk to him about Taiwan 
and he’s completely a blank slate, then whatever we tell them, then they will take 
that as a basis for their… future action.  … it’s easier to have an empty canvas.  
So somebody who’s a specialist usually has his mind set in stuff which is hard to 
apply. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw admits that for every staffer who leaves a member of Congress, the blank slate of the 
new staffer offers an opportunity to develop an advocate for Taiwan. This simple human 
connection seems to be the best way Blaauw builds friendships in Congress.  
 Blaauw spends the majority of his time keeping Congressional aides informed about 
Taiwan and saving them the trouble of having to gather the information for themselves. He 
provides information to 140 members of the Taiwan Caucus because “these are members of 
Congress who have already shown a little bit of their colors.” This caucus is “a big chunk of 
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potential support.” When we spoke, Blaauw was trying to get a resolution introduced about the 
U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement. He drafted the resolution and looked for someone in the 
Taiwan Caucus to introduce it. If a member of Congress introduced a resolution in the past, that 
member is likely to introduce resolutions in the future. He looks for members on the relevant 
committees. In this case, he was looking at members on the Ways and Means Committee. He 
was also seeking out support from a Taiwan Caucus co-chair. His basic task is 
to identify the right person for the right job.  I don’t want to go to the C airman of 
the committee because I think that that will … probably not … work.  Also I 
don’t want to go to somebody who is too at the bottom of the committee because 
then the resolution is not going to go anywhere.  I want to find somebody who has 
been outspoken for Taiwan who has a track record … in all modesty, I’m pretty 
good at that sort of thing. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
In the case of free trade Blaauw had to convince Democrats first to be taken seriously because 
the Democrats did not generally support free trade agreements. The Democrats added credibility 
to the resolution. Once he obtained support from a Democrat, Blaauw planned to get support 
from a Republican, such as Ros-Lehtinen, who was, at the time the ranking member of the H use 
Foreign Affairs Committee, “because she has some gravitas.  She’s senior on the c mmittee, so 
she will lend a lot of credibility for lower Republicans on the committee for sure.” (Coen 
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Cultivating relationships with substance and grassroots passion 
Blaauw must approach Taiwan issues with two things in mind. The first is that Taiwan 
issues must always be considered in the context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He 
compares Taiwan-PRC issues with Israel-Palestine issues in terms of the c ntext of every 
discussion. Most members of Congress care about the PRC first and Taiwan second, if at all, so
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Blaauw focuses on bringing Taiwan back into the discussion of any issue related to th  PRC. “If 
China wouldn’t be there, we wouldn’t be having this campaign, we wouldn’t even be lobbying 
today.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
The second thing to which Blaauw pays attention is the moral element of Taiwan issues,
because he knows, from past experience, that members of Congress and their staff want o deal 
with issues that have feeling, not just with highly-paid lobbyists.  
A couple years ago, we did the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act… a follow-up 
of the Taiwan Relations Act initiated by Republicans in the Senate.  … we had a 
meeting with several lobby officers and … the lobby officers said, “This thing is 
never going to go through the Senate.  Why don’t you just forget about the whol  
thing” … These lobbyists were hired by Taiwan’s government.  …  after the 
meeting, the staffers for Jesse Helms, who was the Chairman at the time, said he 
was so disgusted by the fact that these lobbyists …were beingpa d for. We were 
the only ones who really cared about the substance… So he said, “From now on, I 
am only going to listen to you guys, the grassroots FAPA.  Forget about these 
guys who were paid by the hour to get something tangible to show to their bosses 
in Taiwan, to show that at least they did something.” (Coen Blaauw, interview 
with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw said FAPA’s strength comes from the substance behind its advocacy. Members of 
Congress are more savvy about who they meet with. “I even know some members of Congress 
who say … ‘don’t set appointments for me with lobbyists who can bill their clients by the hour.’ 
… Members of Congress are getting smarter about it nowadays.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with 
author, April 4, 2010) 
Blaauw gets lots of help from the grassroots organization that FAPA has built since 1982. 
FAPA has 55 chapters across the United States. This organizational capacity helps members go 
to the district offices of congressional representatives to ask for favors and talk. “If it were just 
me here in Washington, D.C., and with Iris and Gerrit … I think we could get something done 
because we are an established lobby efficacy organization, but having that capacity at the 
grassroots level makes a huge difference.” This grassroots organization helps FAPA do with 
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three or four staff what it takes TECRO twelve staff to accomplish. Blaauw told me what a 
legislator from Taiwan explained to him.  
He was talking to TECRO and he said, “How do you explain FAPA’s success?  
They only have three staffers… You guys have 12 staffers, and FAPA is equally 
successful and gets as much support from Capitol Hill as you do, maybe even 
more.”  … The [TECRO] representative said, “No, FAPA doesn’t have only three 
staffers.  They have over 2,000, 3,000 staffers all over the United States.”  That’s 
true.  That’s why we get so much stuff done, because we are everywhere. (Coen 
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
This grassroots support is useful because the members are so passionate about any issue that 
affects Taiwan. Taiwanese-Americans were, understandably, very passionate about ending 
martial law, the White Terror, and human rights in the 1980s. Over the past 20 years conditions 
have dramatically improved, but the passion remains.  
Our members have been in the United States for 30 to 40 years. Their children 
were born here. They are Americans. They have been Americans for the past 
decades.  But they still care about their homeland… about their family nd their 
friends.  I’m always surprised how much Taiwanese-Americans care still about 
Taiwan.  I’m from Holland and I don’t really care much about Holland…there’s a 
depth in their concern and their passion, and they cry all the time…wh n we have 
meetings. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
With this high level of passion FAPA has never lost members, but instead gained them over the 
past 20 years, Blaauw says. The members constitute families from all over the United States. 
They were very disturbed about martial law in the 1980s, and they are just as passionate today 
about issues that are not obviously about human rights abuses.  
Even today the little things, the relatively smaller things compared to martial law 
and white terror, like the … free trade agreement … with China that is currently 
being promoted by the Obama administration… [the members are] probably as 
passionate as [they were] under martial law.  For the members, th y just want to 
see Taiwan become a normal country and they can be outraged about the fact that 
President Chen cannot come to Washington, D.C.  … they can be outraged about 
the fact that… Taiwan only had week-long observership at the World Health 
Assembly [in 2009] in Geneva under the name Chinese Taipei and they wer  not 
allowed to vote.  They are outraged about these things in an equal way s… when 
Taiwan was in really … bad shape where people were thrown in jail all the time.  
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So passion and the concern is still there. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, 
April 4, 2010) 
 
This passion does not always translate into congressional support because members of Congress 
do not always share the same level of interest as Taiwanese-Americans. Blaauw admits that 
FAPA’s job is tougher “at the moment” because members of Congress will say that, with martial 
law over, there is no longer a compelling reason for Congress to come to Taiwan’s aid. Members 
of Congress will point to bigger problems around the world than what is currently happening in 
Taiwan or to Taiwan.  
Still, despite the differences in passion, Taiwanese-Americans still get the attention of 
members of Congress and their staff because of their high status and willi gness to contribute 
money. Blaauw said FAPA seeks out any Taiwanese-Americans who are willing to do 
something. Fortunately, many Taiwanese-Americans have high social and economi  status as 
doctors, business professionals, lawyers, engineers, professors, and investors. This status gives 
them an extra voice with members of Congress. They volunteer for congressional camp igns and 
donate money to fund those campaigns. “Congressmen Steve Rothman from New Jersey at one 
point a couple years ago in a… meeting with our members, said, you know, ‘If there’s anyplace I 
want to have a heart attack, it’s here and it’s right now because I’ve never sen so many doctors 
in one room’…. our members are all doctors, scholars and professors.” (Coen Blaauw, interview 
with author, April 4, 2010) 
To compensate for the lack of official representation, grassroots members of FAPA start 
building relationships with members of Congress at a very early stage. Unlike Jewish voters who 
elect members of Congress, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz, to represent their concerns about Israel 
or Cuban-Americans who elect members of Congress from Florida and New Jersey to represent 
their concerns about Cuba, Taiwanese-Americans do not have the voting power to elect their 
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own members of Congress. Occasionally a Taiwanese-American gets elected to Congress, such 
as in the case of former Rep. David Wu (D-OR), but that is rare. FAPA encourages its rassroots 
members to cultivate relationships with politicians who are at the very early st ges of their 
careers so that these politicians become personal friends and loyal supporters of Taiwan in 
Congress. An example is Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH). 
He used to be a House member… elected in 1990. … in 1989 we were already 
talking to him in Ohio, in his district of Elyria close to Cleveland, where we sat 
down with him… he had never really done anything Taiwan-related, didn’t know 
much.  … he became our number one supporter in the House of Representatives 
and later in the Senate. … we just sent people who knew him, who were anxious 
to meet with him, who could take him for dinner… educated him from day one, 
and that’s how we planted the seed for bigger Taiwan support… 20 years later. 
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
As the chart below shows, Sen. Brown has always had the luxury of a safe seat. In the House his 
margin of victory fell below ten points only in 1994 during the Republican sweep of Congress. 
In the Senate he was elected with a 13-point margin.  





















FAPA is a registered under 501(c)(3), so it cannot give money to members of Congress. 
However, members frequently give lots of money. The money provides extra support, but the 
real support is the relationship, the friendship, that develops over decades. “I always say that the 
secret to success is to make friends with members of Congress.  You don’t say no to a friend.  
And so we’re very smart …. honest and true. I think it’s just human nature, human interaction.” 
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
Michael Fonte echoes this point about seeking out congressional support at the very early 
stage of a politician’s career. In the case of Sherrod Brown, a key member of FAPA helped 
Brown understand Taiwan issues. 
There is a man there – Masal Yu – who worked with Senator Brown before he 
was even a congressman, helped him understand about what it was about Taiwan, 
helped organize people in the district, I think west of Cleveland, and from that 
beginning kept in constant contact with Sherrod Brown. And, you know, people 
don’t forget the fact that you helped them when they were nothing. Same with a 
congressman from Ohio named Steve Chabot, and the stories go on like that. 
 
[There are] a number of people who are strong supporters of Taiwan in the 
Taiwan Caucus in the Congress who were early on helped by Taiwanese-
Americans. … Robert Wexler, from Florida. Iliana Ross-Lichtenen from Florida. 
Dana Robacher is one of the key people in the Taiwan caucus. He’s just an old-
time Republican conservative who’s anti-Communist and loves Taiwan becaus  
it’s not China, shall we say. It’s different people, but the strongest supporters I 
would say come from people who are touched by the Taiwanese story a told by 
Taiwanese Americans. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008) 
 
Going to a member of Congress early pays dividends in political support for the duration of the 
member’s career. FAPA members do not have to go to Congress to share information. FAPA 
members can go to people who are running for Congress, when the politicians barely have any 
support outside of a few close friends, and educate them, fund their campaigns, help them 
understand the nature of Taiwan’s issues, to achieve a deep personal impact that will produce 
political support in Congress. We can conclude that FAPA, recognizing its limited resources, 
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pursues a long-term investment strategy.  It invests early, when its limited resources mean much 
more than they would to a well-established politician.   
 
Explaining FAPA’s continuing congressional influence 
Blaauw attributes FAPA’s success in Congress to its careful cultivation of relationships 
among members and their staff. These relationships start by persuading members of Congress 
that Taiwan’s issues represent “an American package of freedom, democracy, and human rights. 
It’s an American piece of wrapping paper.” Blaauw says members of Congress and their staff 
know American history, so they can easily recognize the American story in Taiwan’s story, 
making it hard to say no to resolutions that represent Taiwan’s issues. Blaauw uses the language 
of self-determination, freedom, human rights, democracy, safety, and security.  
Blaauw drew a parallel between the American experience and Taiwan. When John 
Adams was representing the American colonies to the French during the Revolutionary War, 
Adams worked with French Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes. Adams articulated 
Vergennes’s American policy: “He means… to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from
drowning, but not to lift our heads out of water.” (John Adams, David McCullough, 2001, 233) 
Blaauw believes the United States plays the same role with Taiwan today, and he is, in effect, 
playing John Adams’ role. 
Blaauw calls Taiwan a “good product”, whereas the Chinese have a “very bad product” 
in Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkistan, and prison camps. The Chinese can throw money at Congress, 
but the money will not go far. Yet, while the issues have nearly unanimous support, the 
challenge is to connect the general issues with specific resolutions. Blaauw’s job is to make this 
connection explicit every day. “We don’t get rich from this, we don’t make money, it’s no  for 
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our own self-interest.  It’s because we care about our brothers, sisters, families in Taiwan.  It’s an 
unselfish campaign that we’re involved in.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
This emphasis on self-determination, freedom, human rights, democracy, safety and 
security does not mention independence. That is a very strategic decision by Blaauw and FAPA. 
Blaauw said the focus on self-determination helps shift the discussion to procedural issues 
instead of outcomes.  
The philosophy there… is it’s not up to us to determine someone’s future, it’s not 
up to FAPA or to me Coen Blaauw being from the Netherlands in the first place 
… So we believe it’s an American value, self-determination.  Let the majority of 
the people in Taiwan determine Taiwan’s future, whether that means unification, 
whether that means independence, that’s only up to the people of Taiwan to 
decide.  So we believe that is a better way to sell our product, and ultimately, you 
know, we believe that the people of Taiwan will vote for independence or will 
choose independence, whether it’s through a referendum or any democratic 
mechanism.  … The current policy of the United States is that the fu ure of 
Taiwan should be determined with the express consent of the people of Taiwan. 
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) 
 
Blaauw said the people at FAPA believe the United States is the only entity that can work with 
the PRC to help Taiwan determine its own future.  
In addition, the American political system, with its institutional separation, is ideal for 
addressing these issues. FAPA focuses on Congress instead of the White House or the State 
Department because the White House has few access points while Congress has many, and the 
State Department represents foreign interests while Congress represents domestic interests. 
Congress is the best place to put pressure on the White House, the State Department, and the 
government of Taiwan. “We have the grassroots capacity, so we build up momentum in 
Congress, and the bills we write and do, they usually authorize… the State Department to do 




 In her study of FAPA’s successes and failures, Chen (2007) asks whether FAPA’s 
success depends on “the nature of the campaign issues or the domestic structure of the United 
States.”  Chen examines five campaigns, including the blacklist campaign (1982-92), when 
FAPA tried successfully to get the KMT to abolish its blacklist of citizens and non-citizens; the 
birthplace campaign (1992-94,) when it tried successfully to let Taiwanese-Americans to state 
"Taiwan" as their birthplace on their U.S. passports; the U.N. campaign (1992-present), when 
FAPA promoted Taiwan's bid for participation in the United Nations; the WHO campaign (1997-
present), when FAPA campaigned for Taiwan's full membership of the WHO; and the Taiwan 
Security Enhancement Act (1999-2000), when FAPA campaign for passage of legislation to 
improve Taiwan’s military arms. Chen concludes that FAPA’s success depends on its ability to 
find champions in Congress and on the nature of the causes it advocates. (DeGregorio, 1997, 
reaches the same conclusion, noting that a “network of champions” is critical.) Causes that 
depart from human rights and self-determination concerns encounter obstacles in Congress. This 
chapter has revealed why human rights and self-determination matter so much. Moreover, this 
chapter reveals that both the nature of FAPA’s issues and the domestic political stru ture of the 
United States are important. 
FAPA’s strategy has become more sophisticated. Not only does FAPA “find champions 
in Congress”, FAPA creates champions in Congress before they get to Congress. FAPA gains 
access not only to the policy-making apparatus in the United States (Risse-Kappen 1999), FAPA 
gains access to the political process that provides the input for the policy making apparatus. The 
political process includes the uses of primary and general elections to select congressional 
representatives. This is a key finding of this chapter. Congress will pass a concurrent resolution 
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expressing the “sense of Congress” on a given issue, but that resolution starts with a human 
being – a member of Congress, a staffer, a FAPA employee, a FAPA member – and FAPA 
devotes its resources to the human being, both in Congress and on the campaign trail that turns 
candidates into policy-makers (Lowery and Brasher 2004) Money becomes an important 
component of this process (Kollman 1998). FAPA cannot contribute money to Congressional 
candidates, but its members often contribute time and money (Lin 2006).  
FAPA’s strategy from one campaign to the next reveals how it became more effective. With 
the blacklist campaign, FAPA expanded its focus from Congress to the White House when Blaauw 
wrote a letter to President George H. W. Bush in 1992.8 With the birthplace issue, FAPA expanded 
its congressional efforts from resolutions to legislation. This was successful because it amended an 
annual bill instead of creating stand-alone legislation (Chen 2007). The UN campaign failed because 
it was too political and had no connection to human rights or self-determination. The WHO 
campaign made explicit connection to human rights. The 1999 Earthquake and SARS epidemic 
turned the issue into affective politics so that members of Congress were de ply personally affected. 
Congress passed the law and Clinton signed it. The TSEA had a too obviously political agenda nd it 
was an issue that was difficult to portray as involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or legal 
equality of opportunity (Chen 2007). With these lessons in mind, FAPA is focusing more on making 
the human rights issue explicit to members of Congress, and putting those issues into non-binding 













Conclusion: Using the Power Game in Reverse to Change the Home Country 
 This study has attempted to make ten contributions to the literature. First, with regard to 
Congress, this study aims to improve on Mayhew’s (1974) approach to studying Congress. 
Mayhew argued that getting re-elected is the proximate goal for everymember of Congress, and 
that defeat is always a possibility. The findings of this study corroborate M yhew’s argument, 
but also give the other half of the story. There are obvious cases when members of Congress 
have become so involved in foreign policy issues that they lose their bids for re-election. 
Prominent examples include Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), who lost his re-election bid in 
the 1970s after his constituents decided he focused too much on foreign policy and not enough 
on Arkansas, and Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY), who lost his re-election bid in 1980 after 
his opponent argued that Wolff cared more about foreign policy than his district. This study finds 
that, for members of Congress who have safe seats, they have the luxury to focus on foreign 
policy issues. Sen. Edward Kennedy, Sen. Claiborne Pell, Rep. Stephen Solarz and Rep. James 
Leach all had safe seats, rarely getting less than 70% in an election cycle, and often having no 
opponent. This was the case for many other members of Congress who got involved with 
Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan and Uganda.9 Thus, these 
political entrepreneurs could afford to absorb the transaction costs that are normally associated 
with getting heavily involved in foreign policy issues (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).   
Rep. Solarz, as the most active political entrepreneur in this study, is the perfect example 
of the benefit of a safe seat. Friedman explains Solarz 
felt that he was in a uniquely fortunate position, for essentially as long as he 
delivered on the issue of most concern to his constituency having to do with 
Israel, he was a free agent on almost all other international issues to vote his 
                                                      
9 See Appendix B 
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conscience, and he really had a conscience. … You did not want to get America 
involved in ways that led to the quagmire in Vietnam, but you wanted to do what 
you could to promote democracy and human rights and to fight against 
authoritarianism. So he did have that as a global vision. He had that as a thrust 
from his earliest time in politics.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author, 
February 5, 2010) 
 
Solarz may be an extreme version of a foreign policy entrepreneur, but any member of Congress 
who has both a safe seat and strong moral convictions is likely to become a foreign policy 
entrepreneur if he or she meets the requirements of the model outlined in chapter two. If a 
member learns about human rights abuses in another country and is deeply personally affected 
by it, s/he is likely to use whatever resources are available to end the abuses.   
Second, this study develops the concept of political entrepreneurship by showing the 
conditions under which it is most likely to happen, both in a formal political context, such as the 
U.S. Congress, and in informal political life, in the cases of citizens and congressional staff. 
Political entrepreneurs organize diverse coalitions of supporters to achieve goals that they cannot 
achieve based solely on their own roles. The conditions include: the humanistic values of the 
political entrepreneurs and their supporters; the appropriate historical moment r sequence of 
events that makes entrepreneurship desirable despite risks; and the ability to assemble supporters 
based on both rational and affective political considerations. Humanistic values are essential in 
this study because a political entrepreneur is not just a politician who wants to win an election 
with a bigger margin of victory, or a citizen who wants to help pass legislation. Political 
entrepreneurs have specific targets that include human rights and democratic processes, both in 
the United States and around the world. The appropriate historical moment or sequence of events 
is important because the political entrepreneur responds to events and problems that are 
important right now. As in business entrepreneurship, good timing often means the difference 
between success and failure because good timing helps the political entrepreneur assemble the 
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right coalition of supporters to accomplish desired goals. A political entrepreneur us s both 
rational and affective politics because he or she understands that supporters want to solve 
problems and sustain affective relationships with the entrepreneur. A political entrepr neur uses 
his or her affective relationships as leverage to solve problems.  
The idea of good timing raises an important question: are we likely to find political 
entrepreneurs today and in the future instead of during the specific historical time period from 
the 1970s to the 1980s? To answer this question we need to consider what was important about 
the 1970s and 1980s. We already know that many of the political entrepreneurs in the study used 
their careers in Congress as an extension of their experiences in the social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s. We could logically deduce that, once the people with those experiences left 
Congress, the amount of political entrepreneurs would decrease. We also know that many 
political entrepreneurs responded to human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s. We could 
logically deduce that fewer human rights abuses in the present and future would lead to a 
decrease in political entrepreneurs.  
Writing in 2011, we can attempt to answer these questions: Who are the political 
entrepreneurs today? Are there still human rights abuses around the world? The answer to both 
questions is yes. One political entrepreneur today is Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), who was 
appointed to the Senate in 2008 to replace Sen. Hillary Clinton. Sen. Gillibrand was the 
organizing force behind the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, the law that prohibited gay and 
lesbian soldiers from serving openly in the U.S. armed forces. She saw the law as a viol tion of 
the human rights of gays and lesbians. She had important friendships with gays and lesbis. 
These friendships motivated her to take this issue on as new senator. The issue had been dormant 
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since 1993 when the Clinton administration first adopted it. Sen. Gillibrand became a champion 
of gay rights and convinced the Senate to repeal the law in 2010.  
Another political entrepreneur today is President Barack Obama. During a wave of 
political revolutions in the Middle East and Africa, Pres. Obama used the U.S. military and an 
international coalition to prevent Libyan President Colonel Muammar Qaddafi from killing 
residents in Libya. Pres. Obama has also made public statements supporting dissidents in Egypt, 
Syria, Bahrain, and other countries in the Middle East that are currently experiencing political 
crackdowns.  
Pres. Obama and Sen. Gillibrand demonstrate that political entrepreneurs still exist. 
However, there seems to be a decline in political entrepreneurs since the 1990s for three reasons. 
First, the people who were the most active political entrepreneurs, such as Rep. Solarz, left 
Congress. Solarz was a representative of the humanistic values expressed by his generation of 
politicians. Since the 1990s, many people who had formative experiences in the social 
movements of the 1960s and 70s have left public life. They have been replaced by people who 
have more narrow and rational considerations in public life, including a focus on staying in 
office. Second, the conditions for getting elected and staying in Congress have changed since the 
1990s. Congress has experienced three wave elections since 1990 that produced a change in
control of Congress: 1994, 2006, 2010. In the 1970s and 1980s Congress was controlled by 
Democrats by large numbers. Thus, Congress has become more competitive, and this 
competition has forced more members to focus on fundraising and maintaining their bases of 
political support instead of addressing human rights problems in the United States and around the 
world. Third, the world has liberalized and stabilized politically since the 1990s, with two 
exceptions. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 revealed ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia that 
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produced human rights violations, with Serbs fighting Croats in Bosnia and Kosovo. No 
members of Congress responded to these events, but President Clinton ordered a military 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to stop Serbia’s human rights abuses. In Africa, Rwanda and 
Somalia both experienced genocide and famine in the early 1990s. President George H. W. Bush 
responded to the famine in Somalia with Operation Restore Hope. However, no members of 
Congress responded to these events. Despite these exceptions, human rights abuses seem to have 
decreased since the 1990s, meaning there are fewer events that create political entrepreneurs.  
Third, this study demonstrates that members of Congress respond with their hearts as 
well as their minds to issues involving other countries. As a result, ethnic interest groups do not 
need votes or money. However, presence in a district is essential so that they can go to their 
representatives and tell a powerful story that affects the member of Congress and/or the staff on a 
deeply personal level. In this vein, this study also challenges the rational choice approach to 
political science in general and U.S.-Taiwan relations in particular. Two such st dies of U.S.-
Taiwan relations examine electoral support in a district, financial contributions, and presence of 
U.S.-Taiwan trade in a district (Kastner and Grob 2009, Wu 2009). This study demonstrates that 
the rational choice approach provides at best a partial understanding.  
Fourth, this study reveals what is inside the “black box” of a member of Congress. Most 
political scientists (see Hall 1996) take personal motivation as a given, as a function of ambition 
and district interests, but this study reveals that personal motivation can depend heavily on a 
member’s interaction with ethnic interest groups. This finding requires an inclusive approach for 
scholars of American politics and Congress. In addition to studying only members of Congress 
and their staff, scholars should study how members of Congress interact with different ethnic 
groups in their communities and through their extended families. More immigrant groups are 
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moving into congressional districts, making districts more representative of th  world. More 
people are marrying citizens from other parts of the world, creating global families. A member of 
Congress who interacts with Indian-Americans, Nigerian-Americans, Asian-Americans, 
Brazilian-Americans, etc., in his or her district or extended family will likely be exposed to a 
global list of issues as these people communicate concerns about their home countri s. It is 
important for scholars to understand exactly which interactions become long-term aff ctive 
relationships that motivate members of Congress to take action.  
Fifth, shifting focus from Congress to interest groups, this study reveals that ethnic 
interest groups take advantage of what Smith (1988) called “the power game”. Politicians in 
Washington bring a fight to the public and thus change the nature of the fight, an insight that 
Schattschneider (1961) discovered when studying how crowds respond to street fights. The 
crowd becomes the “semi-sovereign people”, and if a politician can get the crowd on his/her
side, he can win the power game. This study finds that FAPA, like other ethnic lobbies, gets the 
crowd on its side of a political fight and thus changes the nature of the fight. Yet, unlike 
members of Congress, FAPA does not “go public”. Instead, it mobilizes its passionate crowd to 
place pressure on access points in government. To be precise, not only do the grassroots 
Taiwanese-Americans play a decisive role, but their passion over every issue turns everything 
into a fight.  Since they are dispersed geographically, small groups in every member’s district 
can bring the fight to any member of Congress. FAPA is just the organizer of the crowd, sending 
it signals about where to direct its volunteer activity, its money, and its passion.  
Sixth, this study demonstrates the intertwined nature of international, transnational, and 
domestic politics. The cases of the Soviet Union, Uganda and Taiwan demonstrate that countries 
with flagrant and sustained human rights abuses will prompt their citizens to seek refuge in host 
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countries that provide political liberties and economic resources. Diaspora groups will settle in 
host countries for decades, learning the political system and acquiring political power. This 
political education and influence will likely translate into the host country’s foreign policy 
toward the home country. This has already been studied in the case of Ukraine and Canada 
(Schreyer 1994). Similar studies will likely demonstrate how international-transnational-
domestic politics work in other politically open, economically rich countries that attr ct refugees 
and exiles from countries with oppressive regimes. In the case of Taiwan, Taiwanese-American 
activists organized within an open, geographically-dispersed political system and put pressure on 
Congress to tell Taiwan’s government to liberalize while the Reagan administrat on said nothing 
(Cohen 1988, Chi 2002, Fu 1990).  
Seventh, based on this interaction between international, transnational, and domestic 
politics, this study helps international relations theorists to recognize the importance of non-state 
actors in the international system. Moreover, the fact that non-state actors can have such an 
impact casts the autonomy of the system as an independent force in doubt, making it more 
reflective of countries’ foreign policies vis-à-vis their domestic politics han anything inherent in 
the system itself (Cleveland 1979).  
International relations theorists generally rely on three sets of ideas to explain 
international relations and the foreign policies of countries. One intuitive idea is th t 
international relations can be reduced to each country’s foreign policy, which reflects its 
domestic politics as a mirror or “Second Image” (Lowi 1967; Milbrath 1967; Rosenau 1961, 
1963, 1968; Waltz 1959, 1979). A more radical idea is that international relations constitute a 
system that is a causal force, with countries’ foreign policies and domestic poli i s reflecting the 
international system as a “second image reversed” (Gourevitch 1978). A compromise between 
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these two ideas is that foreign policy actors operate on the international and domestic lev l  
simultaneously as a two-level game (Putnam 1988) by linking domestic politics and international 
relations through specific foreign policies (Rosenau 1969, 1973).  These theories are inadequate 
because they focus solely on state actors and international institutions that facilit e interactions 
between state actors. They ignore non-state actors, including Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and transnational actors who campaign for causes that cross national borders. A brief 
examination of how these theories explain U.S.-Taiwan policy, from 1972 to 1979, will 
demonstrate why they are limited if they do not include transnational activists.  
If we view foreign policy as driven by the international system (“second image 
reversed”), international relations scholars have three ways to explain America’s abandonment of 
Taiwan: Realism, which includes Classical Realism, Systemic Realism, and Offensive Realism; 
Liberalism; and Constructivism. Classical Realists explain that we must understand U.S.-Taiwan 
relations as a victim of balance-of-power politics between the United States, he Soviet Union, 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States had withdrawn its military forces 
from Vietnam and feared increased Soviet influence in Asia and Africa. Recognizing the PRC 
was a way to counter this influence by using “the China Card” against the SovietUnion (Sutter 
and Baron 1979), especially as Soviet-American relations soured with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Systemic Realists take a similar approach, explaining that as t e United States 
withdrew from Asia it needed an emerging superpower to manage the region by placing ressure 
on such states as North Korea and Vietnam. Offensive Realists explain that the United States 
wanted to match its declining post-Vietnam military strength with PRC’s emerging military 
strength to force the Soviet Union to worry more about potential conflict with the PRC than 
about potential conflict with the United States in Europe. The PRC’s emerging mil tary and 
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economic power provided a critical distraction for the Soviet Union. Within this dynamic, 
therefore, the United States was forced to sever its ties with Taiwan.  
Liberal scholars shift the focus from the international system to the domestic conditions 
in the United States and Taiwan to explain why American politicians thought a renewed 
relationship with the PRC was beneficial for the United States even if it hurt America’s 
relationship with Taiwan. The United States was facing enormous domestic politi al pressures 
during the 1970s, and so an improved relationship with the PRC gave political capital to 
American leaders in Congress and the executive branch (Kirby, et al. 2005). Congress a d the 
president (from the Nixon administration through the Carter administration) were vying for 
control over American foreign policy as a reaction to the Vietnam War. Taiwan became a 
political weapon for the executive branch against Congress. Congress wanted to be inform d 
about any changes in policy toward Taiwan, but the president refused to satisfactorily inform 
Congress, instead keeping the negotiations completely secret (Sutter 1980).  
Constructivists shift the focus from the international system to what was called “the 
China Lobby” (Chao 1990; Koen 1974) in the United States: a collection of individuals and 
politicians who helped the United States maintain ties with Taiwan. The United States had 
maintained military, economic and cultural ties with the Nationalist governmnt and the people 
of Taiwan for 30 years after the KMT was forced to move from the Mainland to Taiwan. Many 
individuals in “the China Lobby” had helped maintain these connections and worried about the 
United States abandoning a friend and simultaneously sending a message to other cuntri s that 
the United States could no longer be trusted as a loyal ally. They interpreted th  recognition of 
the PRC as another signal after the end of the Vietnam War that American power in Asia was 
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declining. They feared that America’s allies in Europe and the Middle East would no longer 
consider America a reliable partner in maintaining peace and economic prosperity.  
The different variants of Realism offer explanations for why the United States was 
willing to sacrifice Taiwan to recognize the PRC. Liberalism offers an explanation for how the 
recognition process took place, with a surprise announcement from President Cartr without 
bothering to consult with Congress. Constructivism offers an explanation for the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA), which maintained unofficial American military, economic and cultural ties 
with Taiwan after official ties ended. Thus, the period of time from Nixon’s visit to the PRC in 
1972 until the passage of the TRA in April 1979 can be sufficiently explained by International 
Relations theories. However, after April 1979 the theories lose their explanatory power to 
account for changes in American policy toward Taiwan in the 1980s.  
As I argued in the introduction, major international relations theories do not recognize the 
value of non-state actors. Yet, as this study has demonstrated, non-state actors can be very 
valuable in helping to direct the foreign policy of a country, in this case U.S. policy tward 
Taiwan. Realism would ignore the presence of the Taiwan independence movement in the 
United States. Liberalism would acknowledge Taiwanese-Americans as just nother ethnic 
interest group placing pressure on Congress, but it would ignore the transnational nature of that 
pressure. Constructivism would acknowledge the relationship between “the China Lobby” and 
the official representatives of the KMT, but it would ignore the relationships between the 
members of the Gang of Four and the Taiwan independence activists. This study builds on 
Constructivism, but improves it so that we understand why relationships matter.  
Eighth, this study makes a contribution to International Relations theory by improving 
our understanding of Constructivism. Specifically, this study adds bonding social capit l, 
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through affective relationships, to the study of international relations and foreign policy. Scholars 
of international relations understand that international relations have an emotional component 
when it comes to waging war (Femenia 2000). This study has demonstrated that intern ional 
relations have emotional components for everything else when the subject connects in any way 
with human rights. When foreign policy makers learn about human rights abuses, they often use 
their emotional desire to see the abuses stopped to change an aspect of their country’s f reign 
policy. Foreign policy actors keep plugging away until the human rights abuses stop or until the 
actors run out of tools to use. In the cases of members of Congress who changed U.S. foreign 
policy toward Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan and Uganda, the 
only country that did not stop its abuses was the Soviet Union. For those countries that did stop, 
it took many years of activity by the foreign policy maker. Bonding social capital becomes an 
essential concept for explaining why foreign policy makers persist in trying different tools, 
despite evidence that their efforts do not produce immediate results. The relationships that 
foreign policy makers create with each other in Congress, in their offices, and with ethnic 
interest groups, provide them with energy and staying power.  
Ninth, this study gives scholars of U.S. human rights policy a more effective method to 
study foreign policy legislation. Instead of merely studying the laws themselves and the political 
processes that shaped those laws (Forsythe 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991; Forsythe and Welch 
1986), scholars can use the model developed in chapter two to identify the causal chain that 
ultimately produces a specific foreign policy. The first element of the model is international 
provocations: a country must do something that violates the internationally recognized human 
rights of its citizens. Second, a member of Congress must receive information about this 
violation. Third, a member of Congress must be deeply personally affected. Fourth, a member of 
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Congress must be positioned in such a way that the effort of eliminating the violation is easy. 
The second and third elements of this model can point scholars to productive areas of research. 
International human rights violations are easy to find, but NGOs that report on them, and 
refugees who flee from them, present great opportunities for scholarship. Research rs can 
examine the personal lives of members of Congress, including their formative years before 
entering Congress, their relatives, and their interaction with staff. The third element demonstrates 
that a member of Congress is deeply personally affected by a human rights abuse because of his 
or her human relationships. Scholars can learn a great deal about American foreign p licy by 
tracing these human relationships.   
Tenth, this study helps us resolve some debates about the proper roles of the presidency 
and Congress in foreign policy. Frank and Weisband characterized the shift of foreign policy 
control, from the presidency to Congress, as a revolution. The institutional and behavioral 
changes in the House and the Senate made a difference in American domestic and foreig  policy, 
but there is much disagreement among scholars and critics about whether the changes are in the 
best interests of the United States. On the one hand, critics claim that the Congress has become 
too powerful, constraining the executive branch (Crovitz 1990; Jones and Marini 1988). On the 
other, supporters of Congress argue that it is merely the servant of the executiv  branch in 
foreign policy (Koh 1988; Hinckley 1994; Weissman 1995). Yet, in order to truly appreciate the 
shift of influence from the executive branch to Congress, we must understand all the ways 
Congress influences American foreign policy, with legislation constituting just one mechanism. 
Others include simple and concurrent resolutions, informal advice, consultation, direct dealings 
with foreign governments, public appeals through the press, hearings, floor statements, letters, 
and lawsuits against the president (Burgin 1993). “Congress is a player in the foreign policy 
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arena and can influence policy. Sometimes legislation achieves intended results; sometimes 
legislation succeeds in unexpected ways; sometimes the threat of legislation generates desired 
actions; and sometimes nonlegislative mechanisms accomplish members’ goals.” (Burgin 1993, 
350)  
The shift from the executive branch to the legislative branch in foreign policy presented 
mixed results, Franck and Weisband argue, because the executive branch is inherently bett r at 
some activities than Congress, while conversely Congress is inherently better at some activities 
than the executive branch. They note that congressional legislation has virtues that the executive 
branch cannot match: publicity, legitimacy, immutability, comprehensiveness, and universality. 
Unlike the executive branch, congressional activity is publicly debated. When Congress passes 
legislation and the president signs it, the law acquires a legitimacy that is unmatched by a 
bureaucrat or a cabinet secretary. The huge effort to pass legislation renders change very 
difficult, except in extraordinary circumstances, thus giving a measure of order and predictability 
to foreign policy. Given this immutability, legislators try to foresee all possible contingencies 
and account for them in the law, thus making law comprehensive. Finally, the comprehensiv  
reach of the law makes the application of the law universal. The executive branch, in contrast, is 
much more suited to interacting with countries outside of the public eye because of the 
sensitivity of negotiations at high levels. This secrecy gives the executiv  branch flexibility for 
rapid responses, and these responses are necessarily particular to special circumstances.  
Fundamentally, Franck and Weisband argue that congressional legislation is appropri te 
when American foreign policy requires a framework for dealing with all countries, but not when 
a specific country temporarily presents a unique foreign policy challenge to th  United States. “A 
rule of thumb might be that legislation should not be used to prohibit Presidential initiatives in 
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unforeseeable circumstances. … Similarly, the legislative quality of comprehensiveness can be 
useful in advancing a policy where the contingencies are essentially foreseeable: economic 
assistance, nuclear exports, trade.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 161) The rise of Congress in 
controlling American foreign policy was, the authors say, a necessary corrective to the de facto 
bifurcation of the Constitution, in which there was “one set of principles governing the 
distribution of power over domestic affairs, another for foreign relations” (Franck d Weisband 
1979, 156). Yet, Congress should still recognize the limitations of legislative power in the 
foreign policy arena. The Washington Post criticized the activities of “435 Secretaries of State” 
in the House, and Harvard Professor Stanley Hoffmann wrote in the New York Times that 
individual members of Congress insisted on having their own policy on every foreign issue 
(Franck and Weisband 1979, 211).  
This study has presented six cases of congressional activity in foreign policy targeted at 
specific countries: Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and Ug a, 
starting in the late 1970s and continuing to the present day. These cases help us evaluate the 
concerns about Congress that Franck and Weisband express. They present a persuasive a g ment 
that congressional legislation has the virtues of publicity, legitimacy, immutability, 
comprehensiveness, and universality. They recommended that congressional legislation is 
appropriate when American foreign policy requires a framework for dealing with all countries, 
but not when a specific country temporarily presents a unique foreign policy challenge to the 
United States. Yet, in the cases presented in this study, each case presented a unique foreign 
policy challenge to the United States that was successfully addressed by congressional 
legislation.  
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For Cambodia, Rep. Solarz (D-NY) worked with Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) to change 
the refugee laws so that 15,000 Cambodians could enter the United States immediately as  
group. Next, Solarz worked with Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA) to pass legislation authorizing $5 
million in economic aid and lethal aid to the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR) in Cambodia. 
Solarz created the UN Interim Trusteeship Perm Five Plan that, with the Senate’s endorsement, 
helped the UN administer democratic elections in Cambodia. Finally, the Senate provided covert 
lethal to the NCR and overt economic aid to the children of Cambodia.   
For El Salvador, Congress provided Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Salvadorans in 
the Immigration Act of 1990. Congress has extended TPS for El Salvador and used TPS for other 
countries experiencing civil unrest. Congress also passed legislation in November 1990 that used 
military assistance to El Salvador to pressure the government to investigate humn rights abuses 
and reach a peace agreement with the FMLN. Rep. Moakley (D-MA) sponsored legislation to 
shut down the School of the Americas (SOA) that had trained the military police who killed 
Jesuit priests in El Salvador. This legislation failed to become law, but it started a dialogue with 
the Pentagon that ultimately changed the leadership and culture at the SOA.  
For South Africa, Congress passed Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) over 
President Reagan’s veto. The CAAA became the catalyst for President F. W. De Klerk to release 
Nelson Mandela from prison and end Apartheid. By 1991 President George H. W. Bush lifted 
sanctions. South Africa ended its state of emergency and allowed opposition political parties. 
For the Soviet Union, Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) and Sen. Clifford Case (R-NJ) helped 
create the U.S. Helsinki Commission to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Accords, which was an international alliance th t 
monitored human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. Representative Thomas Vanik (D-OH) and 
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Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) helped pass the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 
Trade Act, which made American-Soviet trade policy contingent on Jewish citizens being 
allowed to leave the Soviet Union. The Helsinki Accords helped changed global norms on 
human rights, thus speeding up the demise of Communism (Thomas 1997).  
For Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which recognized the 
importance of human rights and democracy in Taiwan. In 1982, in response to the killing of Prof. 
Wen-Cheng Chen, Congress passed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act which denied 
arms to any country engaged in a “consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment 
directed against individuals in the United States.” In 1983 Congress passed a resolution ca ling 
for Taiwan’s future to “be settled peacefully, free of coercion and in a manner cc ptable to the 
people on Taiwan.” In 1985, in response to the assassination of Henry Liu, Congress passd a 
resolution calling for an extradition agreement and cooperation between American and Taiwan 
authorities to solve the murder. Congress passed an amendment to the Foreign Relatio s 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986, calling for democracy on Taiwan. Also in 1986 Congress 
passed a resolution calling on the Taiwan authorities to allow the formation of genuine 
opposition parties, end censorship and guarantee freedom of speech, expression and assembly,
and move towards full representative government. In 1987 Congress passed an amendment to the 
State Department Authorization Bill calling for sustained progress “towards a fully democratic 
system of government on Taiwan.” Taiwan ended martial law in July 1987. In 1992 Congress 
passed a resolution stating the need to end the blacklist so that Taiwan-born residents of the 
United States could return to their homeland. The KMT phased out the blacklist system that year.  
 For Uganda, Congress passed a resolution condemning Uganda after the murder of an 
archbishop. Congress successfully placed pressure on the State Department to stop issuing visas 
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to Uganda citizens who worked for President Idi Amin. Congress also successfully placed 
pressure on the FAA to deny certification to Amin’s pilots after they trained n Texas. Congress 
passed a resolution urging the president to support and implement measures to discourage United 
States support of Uganda. In response to this resolution, the coffee industry started a boycott to 
deprive Idi Amin of coffee revenues, which provided a majority of Uganda’s export income. 
This resolution also sent a signal to Tanzania to send a military force after Amin, which caused 
him to flee Uganda. 
 These six cases demonstrate that congressional legislation and resolutions that are
specifically targeted to a country can have a big, and sometimes immediate, impact on the target 
country’s domestic politics and international relations. In the case of binding legislation this is to 
be expected. In the case of non-binding congressional resolutions, this is both puzzling and 
surprising. Since non-binding congressional resolutions lack the force of law, we should expect 
them to have less impact than binding legislation signed into law by the president. Yet, in the 
cases of Taiwan and Uganda, non-binding resolutions that advocated specific processes r re ults 
in the target country had just as much, if not greater impact, than binding legislation. One 
explanation is that a non-binding resolution communicates congressional intent more clearly than 
binding legislation because a resolution has broader scope while binding legislation has a 
narrow, technical focus. Another explanation is that binding legislation is necessarily rare 
because it is difficult both to pass and to get signed into law. In contrast, a non-binding 
resolution is easy to pass and does not require a presidential signature, meaning that Congress 
can pass many resolutions about a variety of topics regarding a target country. If many members 
of Congress submit resolutions over a period of months or years, this sends the target country 
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messages that accumulate and place pressure on the government. Countries that depend heavily 
on the United States for trade and military assistance will likely respond to this constant pressure.  
 One final point closes this study. From an analytical perspective, it is important to 
understand the role of political entrepreneurs in the United States, both in public life, such as the 
U.S. Congress, and in private life as citizens. From a normative perspective, the influence of 
citizens and congressional staff has increased since the 1970s. Scholars assume that members of 
Congress lead their staff, but, as Smith (1988) notes, the staff often have much more power than 
members of Congress. This can be both good and bad for members of Congress. It is good when 
members of Congress have expert staff who can write great legislation. Members of Congress 
can take the credit when the political process works, and blame their staff when the poli ical 
process fails. Staffs become the scapegoats when they do things that show members of Congress 
in a bad light. Yet, it is worth thinking about whether staff should have this much power and 
influence. The only way to reduce the power of congressional staffs is to increase the number of 
members of Congress. The Senate is fixed constitutionally at two senators per state. That leaves 
the House as a potential growth area. The size of the House has remained fixed at 435 since 1910 
for no legal or constitutional reason, even though the population of the United States tripled. 
Scholars should explore the impact of increasing the size of the House so that it is more
















The United States served as the focal point of the transnational activity of TIM in this 
dissertation. Even though TIM established a presence in several countries where its members had 
immigrated and organized, including Japan, the Philippines, Canada, Sweden, and other 
European countries, the largest concentration of Taiwanese is in the United States.  
 
Data collection 
Interviews were done with key FAPA employees. Interviews with key congressional 
figures, included former Rep. Solarz, former Rep. Leach. Interviews with congressional staff 
included Nancy Soderberg, former aide to Sen. Kennedy, and Edward Friedman, former aide to 
Rep. Solarz. Public interviews included Fulton Armstrong, former aide to Rep. Leach, and 
Thomas Hughes, former aide to Sen. Pell. Interviews were also done with scholar of U.S.-
Taiwan-China relations, including Robert Ross, Robert Sutter, and Pei-Te Lien. 
 
Every interviewee answered the following questions. 
 
I am doing this research because I want to explain why American interest groups, especially 
those with limited resources and members who frequently travel across national borders, 
manage to have much greater influence than would otherwise be expected. The Taiwan 
Democracy Movement and its grassroots lobby, FAPA, are perfect examples of this becau e the 
key activists traveled between Taiwan, Japan, Europe and the U.S. to promote democracy in 
Taiwan, specifically an end to martial law. I want to know how FAPA went from nothing to the 




1. What information, if any, did you provide TIM activists about the best way to develop the 
organization and resources of FAPA? 
 
2. What explains congressional support for the legislative agenda of FAPA? 
 
3. How did the Taiwan Democracy Movement make Congress aware of its existence? 
 
4. How did the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) make Congress aware of its 
existence? 
  
5. In your opinion, who were the most effective activists in the Taiwan Democracy Movement or 
in FAPA? 
 
6. In your opinion, do you believe the Taiwanese Democracy Activists learned anything from 
other ethnic interest groups, including but not limited to the Cuban-American Lobby and the 
Israeli-American Lobby?  
 










Appendix B: Safe seats 
 
Member of Congress Election Year Vote totals percentage Margin 
Rep. Don Bonker 1974 93980 0.609192 22 
  58774 0.380981  
  1516   
 Total 154270   
     
 1976 145198 0.708034 42 
  57517 0.280472  
  2357   
 Total 205072   
 1978 82616 0.586403 17 
  58270 0.413597  
 Total 140886   
     
 1980 155906 0.626687 25 
  92872 0.373313  
 Total 248778   
     
 1982 97323 0.600544 24 
  59686 0.3683  
  5049   
 Total 162058   
     
 1984 150432 0.710755 43 
  61219 0.289245  
 Total 211651   
     
 1986 114775 0.735501 47 
  41275 0.264499  
 Total 156050   
     
Rep. Sherrod Brown 1992 134486 0.533129 18 
  88889 0.352373  
  20320   
  4719   
  3844   
 Total 252258   
     
 1994 93147 0.490826 4 
  86422 0.45539  
  7777   
  2430   
 Total 189776   
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Rep. Sherrod Brown 1996 148690 0.608127 25 
  87108 0.356263  
  8707   
 Total 244505   
     
 1998 116309 0.615473 23 
  72666 0.384527  
 Total 188975   
     
     
 2000 170058 0.645877 32 
  84295 0.320151  
  5837   
  3108   
 Total 263298   
     
 2002 123025 0.689672 37 
  55357 0.310328  
 Total 178382   
     
 2004 201004 0.674297 35 
  97090 0.325703  
 Total 298094   
     
     
Sen. Sherrod Brown 2006 2257369 0.561641 13 
  1761037 0.438152  
  830   
 Total 4019236   
     
Sen. Frank Church 1956 149096 0.562007 18 
  102781 0.387426  
  13415   
 Total 265292   
     
 1962 141657 0.547391 9 
  117129 0.452609  
 Total 258786   
     
     
 1968 173482 0.602628 21 
  114394 0.397372  
 Total 287876   
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Sen. Frank Church 1974 145140 0.560717 14 
  109072 0.421376  
  4635   
 Total 258847   
     
 1980 214439 0.487753 -1 
  218701 0.497447  
  6507   
 Total 439647   
     
Rep. Charles Diggs 1954 64,716 0.658205 32 
  33,127 0.336924  
  359   
  120   
 Total 98,322   
     
 1956 87,353 0.697635 39 
  37,860 0.302365  
 Total 125,213   
     
 1958 57,354 0.727178 46 
  21,280 0.269804  
  238   
 Total 78,872   
     
 1960 76,812 0.71374 43 
  30,369 0.28219  
  124   
  74   
  144   
  96   
 Total 107,619   
     
 1962 59,688 0.71208 43 
  24,134 0.28792  
 Total 83,822   
     
 1964 102,413 0.85814 72 
  16,585 0.138969  
  345   
 Total 119,343   
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Rep. Charles Diggs 1966 60,660 0.830322 67 
  12,393 0.169637  
  3   
 Total 73,056   
     
 1968 81,951 0.864243 73 
  12,873 0.135757  
 Total 94,824   
     
 1970 56,872 0.861488 73 
  9,141 0.138466  
  3   
 Total 66,016   
     
 1972 97,562 0.856348 72 
  15,180 0.133242  
  501   
  685   
 Total 113,928   
     
 1974 63,246 0.873527 76 
  8,036 0.11099  
  832   
  289   
 Total 72,403   
     
 1976 83,387 0.890059 80 
  9,002 0.096086  
  449   
  366   
  285   
  198   
 Total 93,687   
     
 1978 44,771 0.791804 59 
  11,749 0.207789  
  23   
 Total 56,543   
Rep. Millicent Fenwick 1974 81,498 0.533511 10 
  66,380 0.434544  
  3,102   
  1,778   
 Total 152,758   
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Rep. Millicent Fenwick 1976 137,803 0.668603 35 
  64,598 0.313421  
  499   
  1,723   
  1,483   
 Total 206,106   
     
 1978 100,739 0.72554 45 
  38,108 0.27446  
 Total 138,847   
     
 1980 156,016 0.775046 57 
  41,269 0.205013  
  2,465   
  1,549   
 Total 201,299   
     
Rep. Donald Fraser 1962 87002 0.51651 3 
  80865 0.480076  
  575   
 Total 168442   
     
 1964 127963 0.618986 23 
  78767 0.381014  
 Total 206730   
     
     
 1966 86953 0.596512 19 
  58816 0.403488  
 Total 145769   
     
     
 1968 108588 0.575435 16 
  78819 0.417681  
  747   
  552   
 Total 188706   
     
 1970 83207 0.571194 15 
  61682 0.423431  
  783   
 Total 145672   
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Rep. Donald Fraser 1972 135108 0.658421 41 
  50014 0.243733  
  15845   
  4233   
 Total 205200   
     
 1974 90012 0.737531 49 
  30146 0.247007  
  1887   
 Total 122045   
     
 1976 138213 0.706625 45 
  50764 0.259535  
  1824   
  1070   
  536   
  3189   
 Total 195596   
     
Sen. J. William Fulbright 1944 182,499 0.851045 71 
  31,942 0.148955  
 Total 214,441   
 1950 Unopposed  100 
     
 1956 331,689 0.829835 65 
  68,016 0.170165  
 Total 399,705   
     
 1962 214,867 0.686739 37 
  98,013 0.313261  
 Total 312,880   
     
 1968 349,965 0.591461 19 
  241,731 0.408539  
 Total 591,696   
     
Rep. William Gray III 1978 132,594 0.819701 66 
  25,785 0.159404  
  2,321   
  1,059   
 Total 161,759   
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Rep. William Gray III 1980 127,106 0.964181 95 
  2,396 0.018175  
  2,326   
 Total 131,828   
     
 1982 120,744 0.760952 54 
  35,205 0.221869  
  2,726   
 Total 158,675   
     
 1984 200,484 0.910071 83 
  18,224 0.082725  
  1,587   
 Total 220,295   
     
 1986 128,399 0.983938 97 
  2,096 0.016062  
 Total 130,495   
     
 1988 184,322 0.937134 87 
  12,365 0.062866  
 Total 196,687   
     
 1990 94,584 0.920956 85 
  8,118 0.079044  
 Total 102,702   
     
Rep. Michael Harrington 1970 114276 0.616938 23 
  70955 0.383062  
 Total 185231   
     
 1972 139697 0.640583 29 
  78381 0.359417  
 Total 218078   
     
 1974 199278 100 100 
     
 Total    
 1976 121562 0.548056 13 
  91655 0.413221  
  8589   
 Total 221806   
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Sen. Mark Hatfield 1966 354,391 0.517537 3 
  330374 0.482463  
 Total 684,765   
     
 1972 494671 0.537857 7 
  425036 0.462143  
 Total 919707   
     
     
 1978 550165 0.616928 23 
  341616 0.383072  
 Total 891781   
     
     
 1984 808152 0.665543 33 
  406122 0.334457  
 Total 1214274   
     
 1990 590095 0.537506 7 
  507743 0.462494  
 Total 1097838   
     
Sen. Henry "Scoop" 
Jackson 
1952 595,288 0.562263 13 
  460,884 0.435316  
  1,912   
  651   
 Total 1,058,735   
     
 1958 597,040 0.673235 36 
  278,271 0.313785  
  7,592   
  2,257   
  1,662   
 Total 886,822   
     
 1964 875,950 0.722083 45 
  337,138 0.277917  
 Total 1,213,088   
 1970 879,385 0.824315 66 
  170,790 0.160095  
  9,255   
  7,377   
 Total 1,066,807   
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Sen. Henry "Scoop" 
Jackson 
1976 1,071,219 0.718403 47 
  361,546 0.242468  
  3,389   
  19,373   
  28,182   
  7,402   
 Total 1,491,111   
     
 1982 943,665 0.689569 44 
  332,273 0.242803  
  72,297   
  20,251   
 Total 1,368,486   
     
Sen. Edward Kennedy 1962 1,162,611 0.554394 14 
  877,669 0.418519  
  50,013   
  5,330   
  1,439   
  23   
 Total 2,097,085   
     
 1964 1,716,907 0.742598 49 
  587,663 0.254176  
  4,745   
  2,700   
  13   
 Total 2,312,028   
     
 1970 1,202,856 0.621436 26 
  715,978 0.369898  
  10,378   
  5,944   
  451   
 Total 1,935,607   
     
 1976 1,726,657 0.693087 40 
  722,641 0.290071  
  26,283   
  15,517   
  157   
 Total 2,491,255   
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Sen. Edward Kennedy 1982 1,247,084 0.608106 22 
  784,602 0.382589  
  18,878   
  205   
 Total 2,050,769   
     
 1988 1,693,344 0.649731 31 
  884,267 0.33929  
  15,208   
  13,199   
  207   
 Total 2,606,225   
     
 1994 1,265,997 0.580747 17 
  894,000 0.410102  
  14,484   
  4,776   
  688   
 Total 2,179,945   
     
 2000 1,889,494 0.726891 60 
  334,341 0.128621  
  308,860   
  42,113   
  13,687   
  8,452   
  2,473   
 Total 2,599,420   
     
 2006 1,500,738 0.693025 39 
  661,532 0.305488  
  3,220   
 Total 2,165,490   
     
Rep. James Leach 1976 109,694 0.519375 4 
  101,024 0.478324  
  486   
 Total 211,204   
     
 1978 79,940 0.634671 28 
  45,037 0.357564  
  978   
 Total 125,955   
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Rep. James Leach 1980 133,349 0.640759 30 
  72,602 0.348862  
  1,374   
  786   
 Total 208,111   
 1982 89,595 0.592004 19 
  61,734 0.407911  
  13   
 Total 151,342   
 1984 131,182 0.667678 33 
  65,293 0.332322  
 Total 196,475   
 1986 86,834 0.663742 33 
  43,985 0.336212  
  6   
 Total 130,825   
     
 1988 112,746 0.607088 22 
  71,280 0.383812  
  1,670   
  20   
 Total 185,716   
     
 1990 90,042 0.998326 100 
  151   
 Total 90,193   
     
 1992 178,042 0.681347 37 
  81,600 0.312274  
  1,667   
 Total 261,309   
     
 1994 110,448 0.602024 23 
  69,461 0.378615  
  1,213   
  2,264   
  75   
 Total 183,461   
 1996 129,242 0.52839 7 
  111,595 0.456242  
  1,394   
  2,277   
  88   
 Total 244,596   
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Rep. James Leach 1998 106,419 0.565433 14 
  79,529 0.422559  
  932   
  1,252   
  76   
 Total 188,208   
 2000 164,972 0.617896 25 
  96,283 0.360624  
  5,564   
  171   
 Total 266,990   
     
 2002 108,130 0.521936 7 
  94,767 0.457434  
  4,178   
  96   
 Total 207,171   
     
 2004 176,684 0.58918 19 
  117,405 0.391505  
  5,586   
  206   
 Total 299,881   
     
 2006 101,707 0.48573 -3 
  107,683 0.51427  
 Total 209,390   
     
Rep. John Joseph Moakley 1972 70,571 0.432187 2 
  67,143 0.411194  
  23,177   
  2,397   
 Total 163,288   
 1974 94,804 0.893046 79 
  11,344 0.10686  
  10   
 Total 106,158   
 1976 103,901 0.69559 46 
  34,547 0.231283  
  7,862   
  3,058   
  3   
 Total 149,371   
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Rep. John Joseph Moakley 1978 106,805 0.918058 86 
  6,794 0.058399  
  2,709   
  30   
 Total 116,338   
 1980 104,010 0.999654 100 
  36   
 Total 104,046   
     
 1982 102,665 0.640755 30 
  55,030 0.343455  
  2,527   
  3   
 Total 160,225   
     
 1984 153,132 Unopposed 100 
  120   
 Total 153,252   
     
 1986 110,026 0.737089 59 
  21,292 0.14264  
  17,953   
 Total 149,271   
     
 1988 160,799 Unopposed 100 
  243   
 Total 161,042   
     
 1990 124,534 0.619581 35 
  52,660 0.261994  
  23,803   
 Total 200,997   
     
 1992 175,550 0.692139 58 
  54,291 0.214053  
  15,637   
  8,084   
  72   
 Total 253,634   
     
 1994 146,287 0.697608 39 
  63,369 0.302192  
  42   
 Total 209,698   
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Rep. John Joseph Moakley 1996 172,009 0.722266 45 
  66,079 0.277466  
  64   
 Total 238,152   
     
 1998 150,667 Unopposed 100 
  888   
 Total 151,555   
     
 2000 193,020 0.775941 58 
  48,672 0.195662  
  6,998   
  66   
 Total 248,756   
     
Rep. Donald Pease 1976 108061 0.660185 36 
  49828 0.304418  
  5794   
 Total 163683   
     
 1978 80875 0.651461 31 
  43269 0.348539  
 Total 124144   
     
     
 1980 113439 0.638248 27 
  64296 0.361752  
 Total 177735   
     
     
 1982 92296 0.612347 26 
  53376 0.354128  
  5053   
 Total 150725   
     
 1984 131923 0.663743 37 
  59610 0.299915  
  7223   
 Total 198756   
     
 1986 88612 0.628169 25 
  52452 0.371831  
 Total 141064   
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Rep. Donald Pease 1988 137074 0.698071 39 
  59287 0.301929  
 Total 196361   
     
 1990 93431 0.566722 20 
  60925 0.369552  
  10506   
 Total 164862   
     
     
Sen. Claiborne Pell 1960 275,575 0.688967 37 
  124,408 0.311033  
 Total 399,983   
     
 1966 219,331 0.676595 35 
  104,838 0.323405  
 Total 324,169   
     
 1972 221,942 0.53683 8 
  188,990 0.457126  
  2,041   
  458   
 Total 413,431   
     
 1978 229,557 0.751124 51 
  76,061 0.248876  
 Total 305,618   
     
 1984 285,811 0.726596 45 
  107,545 0.273404  
 Total 393,356   
     
 1990 225,105 0.618315 23 
  138,947 0.381658  
  10   
 Total 364,062   
     
     
Rep. Stephen Solarz 1974 80,828 0.726629 59 
  14,838 0.133391  
  10,180   
  5,391   
 Total 111,237   
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Rep. Stephen Solarz 1976 110,624 0.836641 67 
  21,600 0.163359  
 Total 132,224   
 1978 64,514 0.760429 62 
  12,524 0.147621  
  4,323   
  3,478   
 Total 84,839   
     
 1980 77,704 0.753267 59 
  16,813 0.162986  
  4,250   
  2,723   
  1,666   
 Total 103,156   
     
 1982 65,390 0.768119 61 
  13,392 0.157312  
  2,324   
  865   
  3,159   
 Total 85,130   
     
 1984 78,455 0.625902 33 
  37,408 0.298436  
  3,939   
  4,155   
  1,390   
 Total 125,347   
 1986 57,704 0.778353 63 
  10,941 0.14758  
  2,106   
  3,385   
 Total 74,136   
 1988 77,988 0.716531 50 
  23,926 0.219825  
  3,610   
  3,317   
 Total 108,841   
 1990 45,412 0.769656 63 
  7,954 0.134807  
  2,034   
  3,603   
 Total 59,003   
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Rep. Charles Vanik 1954 76,201 0.759905 51 
  24,076 0.240095  
 Total 100,277   
 1956 96,106 0.716322 43 
  38,060 0.283678  
 Total 134,166   
     
 1958 93,987 0.803699 21 
  22,956 0.196301  
 Total 116,943   
     
 1960 103,460 0.729691 45 
  38,326 0.270309  
 Total 141,786   
     
 1962 79,514 0.798807 59 
  20,027 0.201193  
 Total 99,541   
     
 1964 113,157 0.901125 81 
  12,416 0.098875  
 Total 125,573   
     
 1966 81,210 0.816879 63 
  18,205 0.183121  
 Total 99,415   
     
 1968 102,656 0.547116 9 
  84,975 0.452884  
 Total 187,631   
     
 1970 114,790 0.715439 43 
  45,657 0.284561  
 Total 160,447   
     
 1972 126,462 0.639201 31 
  64,577 0.326404  
  3,463   
  3,342   
 Total 197,844   
     
 1974 112,671 0.786501 57 
  30,585 0.213499  
 Total 143,256   
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Rep. Charles Vanik 1976 128,535 0.727325 48 
  42,727 0.241774  
  5,461   
 Total 176,723   
 1978 87,551 0.660403 43 
  30,930 0.233307  
  6,966   
  7,125   
 Total 132,572   
Sen. Lowell Weicker 1970 454721 0.417432 8 
  368111 0.337925  
  266497   
 Total 1089329   
     
 1976 785683 0.577238 16 
  561018 0.412177  
  14407   
 Total 1361108   
     
 1982 545987 0.503907 4 
  499146 0.460676  
  30212   
  8163   
 Total 1083508   
     
 1988 678454 0.490384 -0.7 
  688499 0.497644  
  12409   
  4154   
 Total 1383516   
     
Rep. Lester Wolff 1964 96,503 0.506881 1 
  93,883 0.493119  
 Total 190,386   
     
 1966 81,959 0.502566 1 
  81,122 0.497434  
  163,081   
 Total    
 1968 98,226 0.520563 12 
  75,910 0.402296  
  14,556   
 Total 188,692   
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Rep. Lester Wolff 1970 94,414 0.544063 16 
  66,196 0.381456  
  12,925   
 Total 173,535   
     
 1972 109,620 0.515476 3 
  103,038 0.484524  
 Total 212,658   
     
 1974 101,247 0.66713 33 
  50,528 0.332936  
 Total 151,765   
     
 1976 112,422 0.617883 28 
  60,567 0.332883  
  8,958   
 Total 181,947   
     
 1978 80799 0.600263 28 
  44304 0.329138  
  9,503   
 Total 134606   
     
 1980 80209 0.471898 -5 
  89762 0.528102  
 Total 169971   
Rep. Howard Wolpe 1978 83,932 0.513314 3 
  79,572 0.486649  
  6   
 Total 163,510   
     
 1980 113,080 0.520114 5 
  102,591 0.471869  
  891   
  843   
  9   
 Total 217,414   
     
 1982 96,842 0.563163 14 
  73,315 0.426347  
  1,111   
  693   
 Total 171,961   
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Rep. Howard Wolpe 1984 106,505 0.529286 5 
  94,714 0.470689  
  5   
 Total 201,224   
     
 1986 78,720 0.603681 21 
  51,678 0.396304  
  2   
 Total 130,400   
     
 1988 112,605 0.573418 15 
  83,769 0.426577  
  1   
 Total 196,375   
     
 1990 82,376 0.578524 15 
  60,007 0.421427  
  7   





























“1979-Tragedy in Indochina: War, Refugees, and Famine”, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 28, 
Sept. 18, October 10, 17, December 18, 19, 1979 
A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, Edited by 
Thomas E. Mann. Brookings Institution Press. 1990 
Activists Beyond Borders, Keck, Margaret E., and Sikkink, Kathryn, eds. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998 
Adamson, Fiona Buchan, “Mobilizing at the Margins of the System: The Dynamics nd 
Security Impacts of Transnational Mobilization by Non-State Actors”, Dissertation, Columbia 
University, 2002 
 Ainsworth, Scott and Sened, Itai, “The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with T o 
Audiences”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1993)  
Al Qahtani, Saleh A., “The Impact of Lobbying on the United States Foreign Policy: 
Saudi Arabia Lobbying for the Acquisition of the Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS)”, Dissertation, Howard University, 2001 
Albright, Madeleine K., and Friendly, Alfred, Jr., “Helsinki and Human Rights”, in The 
President, the Congress, and foreign policy, edited by Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush; 
Kenneth W. Thompson. Lanham: University Press of America, 1986. p. 285-310 
Aldrich, John H., Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in 
America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1995 
Allen, Victoria Heavey, “Walking the Line: Social Movement Interest Groups and the 
Delicate Balance Between Social Movements and Political Parties”,  Di sertation, City 
University of New York, 2007 
Almond, Gabriel, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Harcourt. 1950 
 America in the Seventies: Problems, Policies, and Politics, edited by Allan P. Sindler. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1977 
Anderson,Thomas. Matanza. University of Nebraska Press, 1971. 
Armstrong, Fulton, presentation on “Taiwan’s Transition to Democracy: The History” at 
“Beyond Formosa Betrayed: Towards Truth and Reconciliation in Taiwan”, September 25, 2009 
http://www.fapa.org/Events/beyond-formosa-betrayed-seminar/fulton_armstrong.wma 
Arnson, C.J., and  P. Brenner, "The Limits of Lobbying: Interest Groups, Congress, and 
Aid to the Contras." In Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by R. Sobel, pp. 191-220. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 1993 
Auerbach, Jon, “Scattered, a Community Bonds: A Vibrant Culture Melds a Tragic Past 
with a Bright Future.” Boston Globe (April 23, 1995): 1 
Aziabu, Yao E. “Black Activism and American Foreign Policy: From South Africa to 
Haiti”, Dissertation, Duke University, 1992 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D., Agendas and Instibility in American 
Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1993 
Bennet, Douglas J. Jr., “Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall, 1978), pp. 40-50 
Bernstein, Anya Elisabeth, “The Moderation Dilemma: Legislative Coaliti ns and the 
Politics of Family and Medical Leave”, Dissertation, Harvard University, 1997 
Birkland, Thomas A., After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing 
Events. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 1997 
 223
Bobrow, Davis B. and Chan, Steve, “Assets, Liabilities, and Strategic Conduct: Status
Management by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea”, P cific Focus, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1986), 
pp. 23-55 
Bourdieu, P. “The forms of capital.” In J. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education. Westport CT: Greenwood  Press. 1986 
Brenner, Philip; Haney, Patrick J., and Vanderbush, Walter, “The Confluence of 
Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998-2001”, International 
Studies Perspectives 3 (2), 192-208. (2002)  
Brett, Edward T., “The Attempts of Grassroots Religious Groups to Change U.S. Policy 
Towards Central America: Their Methods, Successes, and Failures”, Journal of Church & State, 
Autumn94, Vol. 36, Issue 4 
  Briggs, Philip J., “Congress and the Cold War: U. S.-China Policy, 1955”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 85. (Mar., 1981), pp. 80-95.  
Bright, Christopher, “Neither Dictatorships nor Double Standards: The Reagan 
Administration's Approach to Human Rights”, World Affairs, Vol. 153, No. 2, The 
Neoconservatives and the Reagan Administration (FALL 1990), pp. 51-80 
Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic structures and 
international institutions, Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed. Cambridge University Press, 1999 
Burgin, Eileen, “Representatives’ Decisions on Participation in Foreign Policy Issues”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (November 1991), p. 521-546 
Burgin, Eileen, “The Influence of Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on 
Issues of Foreign and Defense Policy”, in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defese Policy on 
Capitol Hill, edited by Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 1993 
Burgin, Eileen, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Misperceptions”, in Congress 
Reconsidered, Fifth Edition, edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 1993 
Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942, Taiwan in the 
Modern World Series. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 2004 
Bush, Richard C., Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2005 
“Cambodia: Where Do We Go From Here?”, Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, September 28 1998 
“Cambodia After 5 Years of Vietnamese Occupation”, Hearing Before The 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, September 
15, October 6, 18, 1983 
Cannon, Brendon J., “Politicizing History and Legislating Reality: History, Memory and 
Identity as Explanations for Armenian Claims of Genocide”, Dissertation, University of Utah, 
2009 
Carleton, David and Stohl, Michael, “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and 
Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 
1985), pp. 205-229 
Carleton, David and Stohl, Michael, “The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, 
No. 4 (Nov., 1987), pp. 1002-1018 
 224
 Carter, Ralph G.; Scott, James M.; Rowling, Charles M.; “Setting a Course: 
Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs In Post-World War II U.S. Foreign Policy”, 
International Studies Perspectives, 2004) 5, 278-299 
Carter, Ralph G., and Scott, James M., “Understanding congressional foreign policy 
innovators: Mapping entrepreneurs and their strategies”, The Social Science Journal 47 (2010) 
418-438 
Champoux, Mark and Sullivan, Dan, “Authorizations and Appropriations: A Distinction 
Without Difference?”, Harvard Law School, Federal Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 
15, May 10, 2006 
Chafe, William H., Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save 
American Liberalism. New York: BasicBooks. 1993 
Chao, Ena, “The China bloc: Congress and the making of foreign policy, 1947-1952”, 
Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1990 
Chen, Yu-Wen, “Taiwanese American Grassroots Lobbies on the Hill: A Case Study of 
the Formosan Association for Public Affairs”, Issues & Studies© 43, no. 1 (March 2007): 41-77 
Chi, Tsung, “From the China Lobby to the Taiwan Lobby: Movers and Shakers of the 
U.S.-china-Taiwan Triangular Relationship”, in The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in 
U.S.-China Relations: Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, Peter H. Koehn 
and Xiao-huang Yin, editors. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2002 
Clemens, Elisabeth S., The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of 
Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925, University of Chicago Press, 1997 
Cleveland, Harlan, “The Internationalization of Domestic Affairs”, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 442, The Human Dimension of F reign 
Policy: An American Perspective (Mar., 1979), pp. 125-137 
Clymer, Adam. Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography. New York: William Morrow and 
Company. 1999 
Cmiel, Kenneth, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States”, The 
Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 3, The Nation and Beyond: Transnational 
Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (Dec., 1999), pp. 1231-1250 
Cobb, Roger W., and Elder, Charles D., Participation in American Politics: The 
Dynamics of Agenda-Building. The Johns Hopkins University Press; 2nd edition. 1983 
Cohen, Marc Jacob, “Food for Development: The Carter Administration and United 
States Food Aid to Southeast Asia”, Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983 
Cohen, Marc J. Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and 
Social Change on the Beautiful Island. Washington, D.C.: Asia Resource Center. 1988 
Cohen, Roberta, “Human Rights Diplomacy: The Carter Administration and the Southern 
Cone”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 212-242 
Cohen, Stephen B., “Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices”, 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Apr., 1982), pp. 246-279 
Collier, David and Mahon, James E. Jr., “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting 
Categories in Comparative Analysis”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 
(Dec., 1993), 844-855 
Corbin, Tanya Buhler, “Policy entrepreneurs and focusing events: Congressional age da 
setting after Hurricane Katrina”, Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University, 2010 
Cosgrove, Kenneth Mark, “The tangled web: Ethnic groups, interest group theory, and 
Congressional foreign policymaking”, Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1993 
 225
Crovitz, L. Gordon, “Micromanaging Foreign Policy”, The Public Interest, Summer 1990 
Davis, David R. and  Moore, Will H., “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances 
and Foreign Policy Behavior”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Mar., 1997), pp. 
171-184.  
Day, Horace Talmage, Jr., “A study of political opportunity structure: Political 
opportunity in Hawaii, 1926-1966”, Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1974 
DeGregorio, Christine A., Networks of Champions: Leadership, Access, and Advocacy 
in the U.S. House of Representatives. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 
1997 
Dent, D. W., "Interest Groups." In U.S.-Latin American Policymaking; A Reference 
Handbook, edited by D. W. Dent, pp. 129-162. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1995 
DeRoche, Andrew J., Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador. Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources Inc. 2003 
Dietrich, John W., “Interest Groups and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-
Cold War Era”, Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1997 
Epstein, David and O’Halloran, Sharyn, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 1999 
Ericson, Brenda A., “The Making of an Ally: Chiang Kai-Shek and American Foreign 
Policy, 1936-1941”, Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2004 
 Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by Thomas Ambrosio, Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2002 
Fan, Yun, “Activists in a Changing Political Environment: A Microfoundaitonal Study of 
Social Movements in Taiwan’s Democratic Transition, 1980s-1990s”, Dissertation, Yale 
University, 2000 
Fernandez, D., "From Little Havana to Washington, DC: Cuban-Americans and U.S. 
Foreign Policy." In Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by M. E. Ahrari, pp. 115-134. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1987 
Fischer, Lara Ann, “NGOs Advocating for the South in the U.S. Congress: Changing the 
Rules of the Global Game?”, Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Ch mpaign, 2004 
Fisher, Louis, “The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and 
Informal Practices”,  Catholic University Law Review Vol 29: 51. 1979-1980 
Fisher, Stewart W. , “Human Rights in El Salvador and U. S. Foreign Policy”, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), pp. 1-38 
Fitch, John Samuel, “Human Rights and the U. S. Military Training Program: 
Alternatives for Latin America”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 65-80 
Forsythe, David P., “Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect”, 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 435-454 
Forsythe, David P., “Congress and Human Rights in U. S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of 
General Legislation”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 382-404 
Forsythe, David P., “Human Rights, the United States and the Organization of American 
States”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 66-98  
Forsythe, David P., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered. 
Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. 1988 
 Forsythe, David P., Human Rights and World Politics, Second Edition, Revised. Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 1989 
 226
Forsythe, David P., and Welch, Susan, “Human Rights Voting in Congress”, Policy 
Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, September, 1986 
Fox, Harrison W. Jr., and Hammond, Susan Webb, Congressional Staffs: The Invisible 
Force in American Lawmaking. New York: The Free Press. 1977 
Franck, Thomas M., and Weisband, Edward, Foreign Policy By Congress, N w York: 
Oxford University Press. 1979 
Fraser, Donald M., “Freedom and Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Spring, 
1977), pp. 140-156 
Fraser, Donald M., “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Basic Questions 
Regarding Principles and Practice”, International Studies Quarterly, Vo . 23, No. 2, Special Issue 
on Human Rights: International Perspectives (Jun., 1979), pp. 174-185 
Fraser, Donald M. and Salzberg, John P. “Foreign Policy and Effective Strategies for 
Human Rights”, Universal Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1979), pp. 11-18 
Fraser, Donald M. and Salzberg, John P. “International Political Parties as a Vehicle for 
Human Rights”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 442, The 
Human Dimension of Foreign Policy: An American Perspective (Mar., 1979), pp. 63-68 
Frey, Marc E., “Challenging The World Conscience: The Soviet Jewry Movement, 
American Political Culture and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1952-1967”, Dissertation, Temple 
University, 2002 
Fu, Jen-Kun, “Taiwan and the geopolitics of Sino-American relations, 1972-1988”, 
Disertation, Syracuse University, 1990 
Galey, Margaret E., “Congress, Foreign Policy and Human Rights Ten Years after 
Helsinki”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Aug., 1985), pp. 334-372 
Galey, Margaret E., “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Role of 
Congress”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 524-529 
Ghassemi, Ali, “U.S.-Iranian Relationships, 1953-1978: A case study of patron-client 
state relationships”, Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1988  
Ginieczki, M. Boyce, “Are Appropriators Actually Authorizers in Sheep’s Clothing? A 
Case Study of the Policymaking Role of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies”, Dissertation, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2010 
Gist, John R., “The Impact of Annual Authorizations on Military Appropriations in the 
U.S. Congress”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Aug., 1981), pp. 439-454 
Gittel, R. & Vidal, A. Community Organising: Building Social Capital as a Development 
Strategy. London , Sage. 1998 
Goldberg, D.H., Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian jews 
Lobby for Israel. New York: Greenwood Press. (1990) 
Gomis, Henriette, “The Impact of the Congressional Black Caucus on U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Haiti and the Haitian Refugees, 1991-1994”, Dissertation, University of Miami, 2000 
Gourevitch, Peter, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources f Domestic 
Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-912. 
Gregor, A. James, and Chang, Maria Hsia, The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A 
Study in Human Rights, Washington, D.C., Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983 
Greve, Frank, “Ethnic Lobby Powers Up.” The Armenian Reporter 28 (50) (September 
30, 1995): 16 
 227
 Gwertzman, Bernard, “2 Liberal Senators moving to protect security of Taiwan. Kennedy 
and Cranston, Backers of Relations with China, Aim for a Resolution in Congress”, The New 
York Times, January 22, 1979. Page A1  
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Javits Presses for Guarantees on Taiwan’s Security”, The New 
York Times, February 7, 1979 
Hall, Richard, Participation in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 1996 
Haney, Patrick J.  & Vanderbush, Walt, “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. 
Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation”, International Studies 
Quarterly, Volume 43 Issue 2, Pages 341 – 361. June 1999 
Hannum, Hurst, “International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 82-138 
Harraghy, Karen. Interviewed by Wayne Feugill. John Joseph Moakley Oral History 
Project OH-009. 12 May 2003. Transcript and audio available. John Joseph Moakley Archive 
and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
Hartman, Gary Alan, “The Immigrant as Diplomat: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the 
Shaping of Foreign Policy in the Lithuanian-American Community, 1870-1922”, Dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin, 1996 
Haskins, James, Andrew Young: Man With a Mission. New York: Lothop, Lee & 
Shepard Company. 1979 
Heclo, Hugh, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1977 
Heclo, Hugh, "Issue networks and the Executive Establishment," in: The new American 
political system, American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., 1978 
Heindl, Brett Sheridan, “From Miami with Love: Transnational Political Activism in the 
Cuban Exile Community”, CAMPBELL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSTITUTE, Sawyer Law and 
Politics Program, November 19, 2004 
Heindl, Brett Sheridan, “Transnational Political Activism in American Cuban, Jewish, 
and Irish Communities”, Dissertation, Syracuse University, 2007 
Helman, Joseph Jay, “The Politics of Patron-Client State Relationships: The United 
States and Israel, 1948-1992”, Dissertation, George Washington University, 2002 
Henschen, Beth M. and Sidlow, Edward I., “The Recruitment and Career Patterns of 
Congressional Committee Staffs: An Exploration”, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 
4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 701-708 
Herrnson, Paul S., “Congress's Other Farm Team: Congressional Staff”, Polity, V l. 27, 
No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 137-156 
Hinckley, Barbara, Less Than Meets The Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of 
the Assertive Congress. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1994 
 Holdaway, Jennifer, “From the Open Door to the WTO: Constructing the National 
Interest Toward China, 1898-2000”, Dissertation, City University of New York, 2002 
 Hughes, Thomas, presentation on “Taiwan’s Transition to Democracy: The History” at 
“Beyond Formosa Betrayed: Towards Truth and Reconciliation in Taiwan”, September 25, 2009 
http://www.fapa.org/Events/beyond-formosa-betrayed-seminar/thomas_hughes.mp3 
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean. 
Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company. 1979 
“Human Rights in Cambodia”, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, May 8, July 26, 1977 
 228
“Human Rights in the World Community: A Call For U.S. Leadership”, Report of the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreig 
Affairs, March 27, 1974, Chaired by Donald M. Fraser 
Huntington, Samuel P. “Transnational Organizations in World Politics”, World Politics, 
Vol. 25, No. 3. (Apr., 1973), pp. 333-368. 
Huseynov, Tabib, “Influencing American Foreign Policy: A Case on Ethnic Versus 
National Interests”, Stradigma.com, June, 2003 
http://www.stradigma.com/english/june2003/articles_04.html 
“International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations and 
the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy”, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, August 1, Sept. 13, 19, 20, 
27, Oct. 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 24, 25, November 1, Dec. 7, 1973. Chair: Donald M. Fraser 
Javits, Jacob K. "The Congressional Presence in Foreign Relations," F reign Affairs 48 
(1970): 21-34 
Jenkins, J. Craig and Perrow, Charles, “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker 
Movements (1946-1972)”, 1977, American Sociological Review 42: 249-268 
Jenkins, J. Craig, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements”, 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553 
Jentleson, Bruce, “American Diplomacy: Around the World and Along Pennsylvania 
Avenue.” A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, Edited by 
Thomas E. Mann. Brookings Institution Press. 1990 
 Johnson, Victor Charles, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The House Foreign Affairsand 
Senate Foreign Relations Committees”, Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
1975 
Jones, Rochelle and Woll, Peter, The Private World of Congress. The Free Press. 1979 
 Kedrowski, Karen Marie, “Media entrepreneurs and the media enterprise in the United 
States Congress: Influencing policy in the Washington community”, Dissertation, The University 
of Oklahoma, 1992 
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. (1972), “Transnational Relations and World Politics: 
An Introduction”, International Organization, 25 (3) 3 (summer), pp. 329-249 
Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 1965 
Kerr, George H. Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-
1945. Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii, 1974.  
King, Charles and Melvin, Neil J., “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, 
and Security in Eurasia”,  International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 108-
138.  
King, David C. Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1997 
King, David and Pomper, Miles, “The U.S. Congress and the Contingent Influence of 
Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from U.S. Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan”, JOURNAL OF 
ARMENIAN STUDIES (VIII, 1), SUMMER 2004 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~dking/Section907v2.pdf 
Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd Edition), Longman 
Higher Education. 1984 
Koen, Ross Y. , The China Lobby in American Politics, Octagon Books, 1974 
 229
Koh, Harold Honju, “Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair,” Yale Law Journal 97 (June 1988) 
Kollman, Ken, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998 
 Korey, William, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and 
American Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s Press/Institute of EastWest Studies, 1993 
LaRose, Stephen M. Interviewed by Beth Anne Bower and Zenelky Ortiz. John Joseph 
Moakley Oral History Project OH-002. 7 April 2003. Transcript and audio available. John 
Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
Lai Tse-Han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou. A Tragic Beginning: the Taiwan Uprising 
of February 28, 1947,  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1991 
Lee, David Tawei, “Congress versus president on foreign policy: A case study of Taiwan 
Relations Act”, Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1987 
LeoGrande, William M. and Robbins, Carla Anne, “Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in 
El Salvador”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 5 (Summer, 1980), pp. 1084-1103 
Lien, Pei-Te, “Transnational Homeland Concerns and Participation in US Politics: A 
Comparison among Immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong”, Journal of Chinese 
Overseas 2,1 (May 2006): 56-78 
Lin, Catherine Kai-ping, “Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroot  
Diplomacy in the United States: the case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs”,  
Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 15, Number 46, Number 46/February 2006 , pp. 133-
159(27) 
Lindsay. James M., “Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s 
Foreign Policy Style”, The Brookings Review, Winter 2002, Vol. 20, No 1, pp. 37-40 
Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, 
Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969 
 Livingstone, Neil, “Death Squads”, World Affairs, Vol. 146, No. 3, SUBNATIONAL 
CONFLICT (Winter 1983-84), pp. 239-248 
Loescher, G. D., “Carter's Human Rights Policy and the 95th Congress”, The World 
Today, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Apr., 1979), pp. 149-159 
Loflin, Katherine Torres, “Bonding and Bridging Social Capital and their Rlationship to 
Community and Political Civic Engagement”, Dissertation, University of North Carolin  Chapel 
Hill, 2003  
Loomis, Burdett, “The Congressional Office as a Small (?) Business: New Members Set 
up Shop”, Publius, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer, 1979), pp. 35-55 
Loomis, Burdett, The New American Politician: Ambition, Entrepreneurship, and the 
Changing Face of Political Life, New York: Basic Books. 1988.  
Lowery, David and Brasher, Holly, Organized Interests and American Government. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2004 
Lowi, Theodore, “Making democracy safe for the world: National politics and foreign 
policy”, in Domestic sources of foreign policy, edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: Free 
Press. 1967 
Ma, Laurence J. C.  and Cartier, Carolyn L., The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, 
Mobility, and Identity, Rowman & Littlefield 2003 
Malbin, Michael J., “Our Unelected Representatives: Congressional Committee Staffs: 
who’s in charge here?”, The Public Interest, 47 (Spring 1977): 16-40. 
 230
Malbin, Michael J., Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Futur  of 
Representative Government. New York: Basic Books. 1980 
Maltzman, Forrest, Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of 
Congress. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 1997 
Manning, Bayless, “The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Th ee 
Proposals”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Jan., 1977), pp. 306-324 
Mayhew, David, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1974 
McC. Mathias, Charles Jr., “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 59,  
Summer 1981, Number 5 
McCarthy, John D., and Zald, Mayer N., The Trend of Social Movements in America: 
Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. General Learning Corporation. 1973 
McCarthy, John D., and Zald, Mayer N., “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: 
A Partial Theory”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6 (May, 1977), pp. 1212-
1241 
McCormick, James M. “The Changing Role of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 
the 1970s and 1980s”, Congress & the Presidency, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 1-20. 1985,  
McCormick, James M., “Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations 
Committees”, in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, edited by 
Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993 
Mearsheimer, John J., and Walt, Stephen M. (2006) “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy Middle East Policy”, Middle East Policy Volume 13 Issue 3 Page 29-87, September 2006  
Mendel, Douglas. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1970. 
Milbrath, Lester W., “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy”, in Domestic Sources of 
Foreign Policy, Rosenau, James, ed. New York: The Free Press. 1967 
 Mims, Nancye J., “Granting Safe Haven to El Salvadoran Refugees: Moakley-DeConcini 
Bill Offers Humanitarian Approach to Difficult Problems in the United States nd Central 
America”, Suffolk Transnational Law Journal, Vol. 12: 603. 1989 
Mintrom, Michael and Vergari, Sandra, “Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and 
Policy Change”, Policy Studies Journal vol 24 pages 420-34 Autumn 1996 
Mintrom, Michael, “Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation”, American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 738-770 
 Mintrom, Michael and Norman, Philippa, “Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change”, 
The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2009 
Moakley, John Joseph. Interviewed by Robert Allison. John Joseph Moakley Oral 
History Project OH-001. 2 April 2001. Transcript and video available. John Joseph Moakley 
Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
Moore, Will H., “ Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review vol. XXII no. 2 
(Summer-Fall 2002) 
Moukarim, Joumana, “Policy entrepreneurship in the U.S. Senate: Evidence from 
morning hour speeches”, Dissertation, The American University, 2008  
Muravchik, Joshua, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human 
Rights Policy. Lanham: Hamilton, 1986 
Noble, Claire E., “Competing for Influence: The Foreign Policy Committees and Arms 
Sales”, Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993 
 231
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Keohane, Robert O. “Transnational Relations and World Politics: 
An Introduction”,  International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, Transnational Relations and 
World Politics. (Summer, 1971), pp. 329-349. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Keohane, Robert O. “Transnational Relations and World Politics: 
A Conclusion”, International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, Transnational Relations and World 
Politics. (Summer, 1971), pp. 721-748. 
O’Gara, Matthew, “Ethnic Mobilization and U.S. National Interest: Cuban, Irish, and 
Jewish Lobbies and American Foreign Policy”, Dissertation, University of Southern California, 
2000 
O’Grady, J., “An Irish Policy Born in the USA. Foreign Affairs”, 75(3):2-7. 1996 
Olson, Mancur Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965) 
Ornstein, Norman J., “The Democrats Reform Power in the House of Representatives, 
1969-1975”, in America in the Seventies: Problems, Policies, and Politics. Edited by Allan P. 
Sindler. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1977 
Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva, “The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices”, 
International Migration Review”, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 760-786. 2003 
Pachter, Elise Forbes, “Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983: 
patron-client relations in the international sphere”, Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 
1987 
Paul, David M. and Paul, Rachel Anderson, Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2009 
Peng, Meng-min A Taste of Freedom, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1972 
Peterson, Bill, “After Police Interrogation, a Death; Death of U.S. Profess r in Taiwan 
Stirs Fears, Probe; Plunge of U.S. Professor Visiting Home in Taiwan Prompts Hill Probe.” The 
Washington Post. July 28, 1981 
Peterson, Christian Philip,  “Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The United States, 
Soviet Union, and Private Citizens, 1975-1989”, Dissertation, Ohio University, 2009 
Pinkus, Benjamin, Jews of the Soviet Union: A History of a National Minority. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 
Pinkus, Benjamin and Frankel, Jonathan, The Soviet Government and the Jews: A 
Documented Study, 1948-1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984 
Platt, Matthew B and Valeria Sinclair-Chapman.  2008.  "Legislative Problem-Solving: 
Exploring Bill Sponsorship in Post-War America."  Paper presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting 
of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
Podbielski, Monica E., “Charles Rozmarek, the Polish-American Congress and Their 
Influence on United States Foreign Policy Toward Poland, 1944-1952”, Dissertation, The 
Catholic University of America, 1997 
Polsby, Nelson W.; Gallaher, Miriam; Rundquist, Barry Spencer, “The Growth of the 
Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives”, The American Political Sc ence 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 787-807 
Polsby, Nelson W., Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1984 
Polsky, Andrew, “When Business Speaks: Political Entrepreneurship, Discourse and 
Mobilization in American Partisan Regimes”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2000 12: 455 
 232
Power, Samantha, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. Basic 
Books. 2002 
Price, David E., “Professionals and ‘Entrepreneurs’: Staff Orientations and Policy 
Making on Three Senate Committees”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 
316-336 
Putnam, Robert D., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games", International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, (Summer, 1988), p. 427-460 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Rampersad, Indira, “Down With The Embargo: Social Movements, Contentious Politics 
and U.S. Cuba Policy (1960-2006)”, Dissertation, University of Florida, 2007 
Rich, Andrew, “Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertis ”, Dissertation, 
Yale University, 1999 
Riker, William H., “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study 
of Institutions”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 432-
446 
Ro’I, Yaacov, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1991 
Robson, John Sinclair Petifer, “Henry Jackson, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and 
détente: Ideology, Ideas, and United States Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era”, Dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin, 1989 
Rohde, David W., “Partisanship and Congressional Assertiveness in Foreign and Defense 
Policy”, in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, edited by David A. Deese. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press. 1994 
Romzek, Barbara S. and Utter, Jennifer A., “Career Dynamics of Congressional 
Legislative Staff: Preliminary Profile and Research Questions”, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul.,1996), pp. 415-442 
Romzek, Barbara S. and Utter, Jennifer A., “Congressional Legislative Staff: Political 
Professionals or Clerks?”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), pp. 
1251-1279 
Romzek, Barbara S., “Accountability of Congressional Staff”, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 10.2 (April 2000): p413 
Rosenau, James N., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. New York: Random House. 1961 
Rosenau, James N., National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the 
Mobilization of Public Support. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1963 
Rosenau, James N., The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and 
Some New Evidence. Princeton: Center of International Studies. 1968.  
Rosenau, James N., "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited," in Conflict 
Behavior and Linkage Politics, edited by Jonathan Wilkenfeld. New York: David McKay. 1973 
Rosenau, James N. The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the 
Transnationalisation of World Affairs, New York: Nichols Publishing Company. 1980 
Ryan, Sean T. Interviewed by Paul Caruso. John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project 
OH-004. 18 April 2003. Transcript and audio available. John Joseph Moakley Archive and 
Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
Said, A. A. Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger. 1981 
 233
Saideman, Stephen M. “ The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on 
Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review vol. XXII no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002) 
Sabatier, Paul A., “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of 
Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, Policy Change d 
Policy-Oriented Learning: Exploring an Advocacy Coalition Framework (1988), pp. 129-168 
Saikaly, Ramona, “Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy: Applying Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams Model to the 2003 Iraq Crisis”, Dissertation, Kent State University, 2009 
Salisbury, Robert H. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. “U. S. Congressman as Enterprise”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 559-576 
Salisbury, Robert H. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. “Congressional Staff Turnover and the 
Ties-That-Bind”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Jun., 1981), pp. 381-
396 
Salzberg, John P., “A View from the Hill: U.S. Legislation and Human Rights”, in The 
Diplomacy of Human Rights, edited by David D. Newsom. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. 
University Press of America. 1986. p. 13-20 
Sartori, Giovanni, “Conceptual Misinformation in Comparative Politics”, American 
Political Science Review 64: 1033-1053. 1970.  
Sartori, Giovanni, “Guildelines for Comcept Analysis”, in Social Science Concepts: A 
Systemic Analysis, edited by Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1984 
Schlesinger, Joseph, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 1966 
 Schneider, Mark L., “A New Administration’s New Policy: The Rise to Power of Human 
Rights”, in Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by Peter G. Brown and Douglas 
MacLean. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company. Lexington Books. 1979 
 Schneider, Mark and Teske, Paul, “Toward A Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: 
Evidence from Local Government”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, 
(September 1992), p. 737-747 
Schneider, William, “JFK's children: the class of '74”, The Atlantic Monthly. March 
1989: p35. 
 Schreyer, Karmel, “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ukrainian 
Canadian Community and Canada’s Foreign Policy Toward Ukraine, 1985-1992”, Master’s 
Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1994 
Shain, Yossi, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”,  Foreign Policy, No. 100, 25th Anniversary 
Issue. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 69-87.  
Shain, Yossi, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy”,  Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 109, No. 5. (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 811-841.  
Shain, Yossi & Tamara Cofman Wittes. “Peace as a Three-Level Game: The Role of 
Diasporas in Conflict Resolution” in Ambrosio, Thomas. Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign 
policy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 2002 
Shain, Yossi, and Barth, Aharon, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory", 
International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Summer, 2003), p. 449-479 
 Sheingate, Adam D., “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American 
Political Development”, Studies in American Political Development, 17 (Fall 2003) 185-203 
 Sheingate, Adam D., “Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue 
Attention in Congress”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October 2006), p. 
844-859 
 234
 Shu, Wei-Der, “Transforming National Identity in the Diaspora: An Identity Formation 
Aproach to Biographies of Activists Affiliated with the Taiwan Independence Movement in the 
United States”, Dissertation, Syracuse University, 2005 
Silverman, Carol Jean. “Image Versus Reality: Ethnic Interest Groups in the Foreign 
Policy Process, AIPAC, A Case Study.” Dissertation, University of Virginia. 1996. 
Skidmore, D. "The Politics of National Security Policy: Interest Groups, Coalitions, and 
the SALT II Debate." In The Limits of State Autonomy, edited by D. Skidmore and V. M. 
Hudson, pp. 205-233. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1993 
Smith, Hendrick, The Power Game: How Washington Works. New York: Random 
House. 1988 
Smith, Robert M., “U.S. Admits Foe of Chiang Regime: Professor who Fled Taiwan will 
Teach at Micigan”, The New York Times, October 1, 1970 
Smith, Steven S., “Revolution in the House: Why Don’t We Do It on the Floor?”, in New 
Perspectives on the House of Representatives, Fourth Edition. Edited by Robert L. Peabody and 
Nelson W. Polsby. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992 
Smith, Tony, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of 
American Foreign Policy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 7, 1944. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1945. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1944election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 5, 1946. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1947. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1946election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 2, 1948. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1949. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1948election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 7, 1950. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1951 On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1950election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 4, 1952. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1953. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1952election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 2, 1954. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1955. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1954election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 6, 1956. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1957. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1956election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 4, 1958. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1959. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1958election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 8, 1960. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1961. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1960election.pdf 
 235
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 6, 1962. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1963. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1962election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 3, 1964. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1965. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1964election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 8, 1966. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1967. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1966election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 5, 1968. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1969. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1968election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1970. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1971. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1970election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 7, 1972. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1973. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1972election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 5, 1974. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1975. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1974election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 2, 1976. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1977. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1976election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 7, 1978. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1979. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1978election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 4, 1980. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1981. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1980election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 2, 1982. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1983. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1982election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 6, 1984. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1985. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1984election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 4, 1986. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1987. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1986election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 8, 1988. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1989. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1988election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 6, 1990. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1991. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1990election.pdf 
 236
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 3, 1992. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1993. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1992election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 8, 1994. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1995. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1994election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 5, 1996. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1997. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1996election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1998. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 1999. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1998ection.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 7, 2000. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2001. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2000election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 5, 2002. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 2003. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2002election.pdf 
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 2, 2004. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2005. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2004election.pdf 
Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 7, 2006. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office. 2007. On the Internet at 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2006election.pdf 
 Sutter, Robert G., “Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy, 1978-79”. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1980 
Sutter,Robert G., and Baron, Michael, “Playing the China Card: Implications for United 
States-Soviet-Chinese Relations”, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives by the Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
1979 
Taiwan Communiqué, International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan. Seattle, 
WA: December 1980, January 1981, March 1981, July 1981, December 1981, March 1982, 
August 1982, October 1982, January 1983, April 1983, June 1983, August 1983, January 1984, 
April 1984, August 1984, November 1984, February 1985, April 1985, June 1985, August 1985, 
October 1985, January 1986, March 1986, May 1986, August 1986, October 1986, January 1987, 
March 1987, May 1987, September 1987, December 1987, February 1988, May 1988, August 
1988, September 1988, December 1988, February 1989, April 1989, June 1989, September 1989, 
November 1989, January 1990, April 1990, August 1990, October 1990, December 1990, 
January 1991, April 1991, June 1991, October 1991, December 1991, January 1992, April 1992, 
June 1992, October 1992, December 1992. On the Internet at http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/ 
 Tang, Kuo-Yang, “The formation and decline of the Taiwan independence organization 
in the United States of America 1950's--1990's: A case study of social organization”, Master’s 
Thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005 
The Diplomacy of Human Rights, edited by David D. Newsom. Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy. University Press of America. 1986 
 237
The Fettered Presidency,  edited by L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin. 
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 1989 
The Imperial Congress, edited by Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini. New York: 
Heritage Foundation. 1988 
The President, the Congress, and foreign policy, edited by Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth 
Rush; Kenneth W. Thompson. Lanham: University Press of America, 1986. 
Thomas, Daniel Charles, “Norms and Change in World Politics: The Helsinki Accords, 
Human Rights and the Demise of Communism, 1975-1990”, Dissertation, Cornell University, 
1997 
Tierney, John T., “Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense 
Policy”, in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, edited by Randall 
B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993 
Tierney, John T., “Congressional Activism in Foreign Policy: Its Varied Forms and 
Stimuli”, in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, edited by David A. Deese. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 1994 
Tillery, Alvin B. Jr., “Foreign Policy Activism and Power in the House of 
Representatives: Black Members of Congress and South Africa, 1968-1986”, Studies in 
American Political Development, 20 (Spring 2006), 88-103. 
Tower, John G. "Congress versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of 
American Foreign Policy," 60 (1981/1982): 229-46. 
Transnational Relations and World Politics, Edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1972 
Trice, R. H., Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middl  
East. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1976 
Vogelgesang, Sandy, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1980 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War. New york: Columbia University Press. 1959 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. 1979 
Wang, Kenjohn, Memoirs of Kenjohn Wang: The Struggling History of 
Immigration of a Taiwanese American, Upiand, Calif.: Taiwan Publishing Co. 1999 
Wang, Mei-Ling T., The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign 
and U.S.-China Relations, Rowman & Littlefield, 1999 
Watanabe, Paul Y. Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics 
of the Turkish Arms Embargo, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984 
 Weissert, Carol S., “Policy Entrepreneurs, Policy Opportunists, and Legislative 
Effectiveness”, American Politics Research, 1991; 19; 262 
Weissman, Stephen R., A Culture of Deference: Congress’s Failure of Leadership in 
Foreign Policy. New York: BasicBooks. 1995 
Whalen, Charles W., Jr., The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional 
Reform. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. 1982 
Whitfield, Teresa. Paying the Price: Ignacio Ellacurcia and the Murdered Jsuits of El 
Salvador. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994 
 Winik, Jay B., “U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia in the 101st Congress: A Case Study of 
Congressional Initiation and Influence in Foreign Policy”, Dissertation, Yale University, 1993 
Woodruff, Paul, “Ethnic Interest Group Influence on US Foreign Policy Toward Cuba”, 
Winter 2005, http://faculty.mckendree.edu/scholars/winter2005/woodruff.htm 
 238
Wu, Joshua Su-Ya, “Ecoomics, Lobbying, and U.S. Congressional Support For Taiwan: 
Buying American Support 2002-2006”, ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 49, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 
2009 
Wu, Rwei-Ren, “ The Formosan ideology: Oriental colonialism and the rise of Taiwanese 
nationalism, 1895--1945”, Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 2003 
Zanger, Virginia Vogel. Interviewed by Laura Fountaine. John Joseph Moakley Oral 
History Project OH-005. 19 April 2003. Transcript and audio available. John Joseph Moakley 
Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
Zook, Nathan, “Human Right Groups as Political Actors in the Shaping of U.S. Foreign 
Policy: The Case of the Cuban Embargo”, Dissertation, Indiana University, 2004 
 
